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ABSTRACT 
 
Augustine Birrell was a man who held dear the classical liberal principles of 
representative democracy, political freedom and civil liberties. During his time as Irish 
Chief Secretary from 1907-1916, he fostered a friendly working relationship with the 
leaders of the Irish Party, whom he believed would be the men to lead the country once 
it was conferred with the responsibility of self-government. 
 Hundreds of years of religious and political strife between Ireland’s Nationalist 
and Unionist communities meant that Birrell, like his predecessors, took administrative 
charge of a deeply polarized country. His friendship with Irish Party leader John 
Redmond quickly alienated him from the Irish Unionist community, which was 
adamantly opposed to a Dublin parliament under Nationalist control. 
 Augustine Birrell’s legacy has been both tarnished and neglected because of the 
watershed Easter Rising of 1916, which shifted the focus of the historiography of the 
period towards militant nationalism at the expense of constitutional politics. Although 
Birrell’s flaws as Irish Chief Secretary have been well-documented, this paper helps to 
rehabilitate his image by underscoring the importance of his economic, social and 
political reforms for a country he grew to love. 
 This study reviews Birrell’s legislative achievements, setbacks and inaction 
while Irish Chief Secretary to determine how much his actions were influenced by his 
preconceived political views of the country, and by his friendship with the Irish Party. 
The agency of British and Irish Unionist leaders, paramilitary organizations and the 
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Great War are also considered to better understand his decision-making during this 
tumultuous time in Irish history.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION: THE IRISH CHIEF SECRETARY 
 
This dissertation seeks to enhance our understanding of Irish Chief Secretary 
Augustine Birrell’s relationship with the Irish Parliamentary Party1 before, during and 
after the political drama of the Third Home Rule Bill of 1912. As head of the Irish 
administration based in Dublin Castle from 1907-16 he passed an average of five pieces 
of legislation annually, making him the most productive Chief Secretary since the 
passage of the Act of Union in 1800. Birrell firmly believed in Ireland’s right to self-
governance, and, while Chief Secretary, fostered amicable relations with the leadership 
of the Irish Party, who he believed would be the men to lead a future Irish parliament in 
Dublin. 
 The “Irish Question,” the label attached to the seemingly unsolvable British 
attempts to reconcile the demands of Irish Nationalists and Unionists within the 
framework of a United Kingdom, dominated parliamentary proceedings in Britain in the 
late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century. Augustine Birrell took charge of Ireland’s political 
administration in a period of deep agricultural unrest in the country, and at a time when 
the leaders of Irish Nationalism became increasingly vociferous in their demand that a 
third Home Rule Bill be carried through parliament. The idea of self-government for 
Ireland was a polarizing issue between the Protestant majority population in the 
                                                 
 
1
 The Irish Parliamentary Party was commonly called the Irish Party. I will use the shortened version 
throughout this paper. 
  
2 
 
Northeast of the country which wanted a guarantee of its position within the United 
Kingdom, and the majority Roman Catholic population throughout the rest of the island 
that wished for its own parliament in Dublin. 
 Historical analysis of the “Irish Question” frequently adopts a conventional 
approach whereby the overarching weight of the research focuses on the interaction 
between major British and Irish political figures. For the reader of post-1800 Irish 
history a typical library bookshelf has plenty of dust jackets that bear the names of great 
political figures such as Daniel O’Connell and Sir Robert Peel, Charles Stewart Parnell 
and William Gladstone, and John Redmond and Herbert Henry Asquith. We can learn 
much on the complexity of Irish politics through an assessment of these great men, but 
we can learn more by delving deeper into the machinations of Dublin Castle, and of the 
roles of successive Irish Chief Secretaries, who, in effect, acted as the chief executive of 
Ireland as well as a British minister of the crown. Augustine Birrell was one of the most 
consequential Chief Secretaries between the Act of Union and the formation of the Irish 
Free State in 1922. 
 An examination of Augustine Birrell’s earliest viewpoint of Irish politics can 
provide us with a better understanding of his actions as Irish Chief Secretary. In 1889, 
during an election campaign stop in Aberdour, Scotland, Birrell first publicly expressed 
his views about the “Irish Question.” He claimed seven hundred years of English control 
had yet to make the country a contented and happy part of the United Kingdom. The 
liberties of the Irish people, he explained to the crowd, particularly in Southern Ireland, 
were entirely decided upon by judges chosen by a non-Irish executive. England had, 
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after all these years, still been unable to govern the Irish through constitutional means or 
in accordance with the ordinary law. The time had come, he insisted, for Ireland to be 
given the dignity of self-government.
2
 
 The “Grand Old Man,” William Gladstone had committed his Liberal Party to 
Irish self-government in the early 1880s. Although his first legislative attempt to secure 
Home Rule failed in 1886, creating an irreparable ideological split in his party, he and 
the majority of his colleagues remained committed to bestowing self-government upon 
the Irish people. In 1892, Augustine Birrell, during an electoral campaign stop in West 
Fife, continued to champion Ireland’s cause. He stressed to his supporters that it was 
more hazardous to attempt to suppress the Irish people than to entrust them with the 
ability to govern themselves. Regarding the objections of the Protestants of Ulster he 
was certain a lot of the arguments put forth by them were simply bluster, and when the 
Unionists of Belfast discovered they had not been “sold into slavery” in a Dublin 
parliament they would soon enjoy the patriotic endeavor of self-government. He also 
countered the “vain delusion” that Arthur Balfour, during his time as a Conservative-
Unionist Chief Secretary, had somehow managed to suppress the Irish nation and forever 
extinguish its desire for Home Rule. Even if Balfour was able to convert lawless paupers 
into law-abiding proprietors the Irish demand for self-government, he insisted, would not 
simply vanish.
3
 The Conservative-Unionist Party, Birrell was convinced, had not 
                                                 
 
2
 Glasgow Herald, July 4, 1889, 8.  
 
3
 Birrell election address to the voters of West Fife, June 23, 1892, MS. 10. 1., Liverpool University 
Archives.  
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satisfied the Irish people through conciliatory economic and social measures because the 
demand of a people to govern itself could never be quashed. 
  Although the Liberal Party lost much of its enthusiasm for Irish Home Rule in 
the wake of several crushing electoral defeats in 1895 and in 1900 Birrell occasionally 
wrote on the issue. In an article published in the North American Review in 1901 he 
claimed that the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists exhibited neither courage nor 
understanding in their administrative handling of Ireland since 1886. In 1903 he edited 
the Liberal pamphlet Eight Years of Tory Government, in which he attacked the 
Opposition government’s political, economic and social policies. On the issue of Ireland, 
Birrell lambasted the Irish Local Government Act of 1898. He wrote, “No one pretends 
that the Local Government Act of 1898 is a full measure of Home Rule, but in itself it 
gives the ‘coup de grace’ to many of the arguments used to confound Home Rule.”4 He 
was certain that Unionist attempts to mollify the Irish demand for self-government 
through such a conciliatory measure would never be enough. After a brief stint as the 
Liberal Party’s President of the Board of Education in 1906 Birrell took up the Chief 
Secretaryship of Ireland in January 1907. 
 Chapter II examines Birrell’s formative interaction with Irish Party leader John 
Redmond and his deputy John Dillon. Birrell established a cordial relationship with both 
men during the drafting of his Education Bill in 1906. The bond between these men 
                                                 
 
4
 Augustine Birrell, Eight Years of Tory Government 1895-1903 (London: Liberal Publication Department, 
1903), 194. The Local Government Act of 1898 established democratically elected county and urban 
councils throughout Ireland, giving them fiscal and administrative functions. 
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grew upon Birrell’s appointment as Irish Chief Secretary in January 1907. The Irish 
Council Bill of 1907 became the first major attempt by Birrell to provide the leaders of 
Irish Nationalism with more control over the administration of Ireland. This chapter 
uncovers how and why the Bill failed to satisfy the Irish Party despite Birrell’s best 
efforts. 
 Chapter III focuses on Birrell’s agricultural and educational reforms. Through 
close cooperation with the Irish Party he familiarized himself with the plight of those 
poor Irish tenants who had not benefited from previous land legislation. His seminal 
Irish University Act of 1908 endeared him to Nationalist Ireland because it enabled 
Ireland’s Catholics to pursue a college degree without any religious restrictions.5 This 
Act, however, shone a light on Ireland’s stark regional religious differences and Birrell 
would soon realize the importance of this during negotiations over the Irish Home Rule 
Bill in 1912. 
 Chapter IV underscores the struggles faced by the Chief Secretary during the 
formulation of the Irish Home Rule Bill. The two General Elections of 1910 created a 
situation in which the Irish Party held the balance of power in the British House of 
Commons. The Liberal Party reengaged itself with the fractious issue of Irish self-
government, and Augustine Birrell soon found himself acutely aware of the sectarian 
                                                 
5
 Born in 1850 in the village of Wavertree, a suburb of the port city Liverpool, Birrell, whose father was a 
Baptist minister, grew up in the tradition of liberal non-conformity. When ten years old he and his family 
moved into Liverpool Separated by 117 nautical miles, Dublin and Liverpool had strong trade 
connections, and a large Irish immigrant community made up of emigrants and seasonal workers resided 
in the latter. In his autobiography Things Past Redress (London: Faber & Faber, 1937) Birrell said he 
always had a soft spot in his heart for religious minorities including Catholics and Jews. The stories of 
those emigrants who fled Ireland to Liverpool during the Great Famine of 1845-51likely influenced his 
perceptions of the Irish people and of their politics. 
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divide within Ireland as Irish Unionists and Nationalists squabbled over the terms of the 
Bill. Birrell was a committed Home Ruler and continued to act as Redmond’s 
mouthpiece during Cabinet discussions on the issue, but he quickly became acquainted 
with the militant voices of Ulster Unionism under the fiery leadership of Sir Edward 
Carson. 
 Chapter V follows Birrell’s poor administrative handling of the deteriorating 
political conditions within Ireland from early 1914 to mid-1915. The creation of separate 
opposing paramilitary forces in Ulster and in the rest of Ireland left the country on the 
brink of civil war, which was only prevented by the distraction of war in Europe. A 
small but determined group of anti-British Irish Nationalists proved to be a challenge for 
the Chief Secretary’s administration of Ireland. His trusted Irish Party friends Redmond 
and Dillon assured him this small group of separatists was unimportant and irrelevant. 
As a result, a seditious propaganda campaign was allowed to flourish in an already 
delicate political environment. 
Chapter VI discusses the impact the wartime national coalition had upon Birrell 
and his Irish duties, and concludes with his resignation after the Easter Rising of 1916. 
During his final twelve months in office Birrell came under heavy criticism from the 
Opposition for not adequately enforcing law and order in Ireland. Much to the surprise 
of the Chief Secretary and Redmond, on Easter Monday over one thousand men staged 
an insurrection in Dublin city and declared an Irish republic. The rebellion and its 
aftermath dismayed Birrell and he decided to retire from politics for good two years 
later.  
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Historiography 
  In the late 19
th
 century Irish historians were easily defined as either Nationalist or 
Unionist in outlook due to their blatant denominational and political positions. Scholars 
such as James Anthony Froude and William Edward Lecky wrote an unabashed 
Unionist-centric history of Ireland. In his The English in Ireland in the Eighteenth 
Century (1872) Froude stressed the ascendancy of Protestantism over Roman 
Catholicism, insisted the Irish were incapable of self-government, espoused the 
superiority of the English race, and believed a revolutionary sentiment existed in the 
country only because the English were not authoritative enough. In 1892, Lecky 
published his History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century as a five volume work. He 
wished to correct some untruths he found in Froude’s work, but agreed with him that the 
Irish were incapable of administering their own affairs. 
Those who championed a Nationalist telling of Irish history included John 
George MacCarthy and William O’Connor. In 1871 MacCarthy wrote A Plea for the 
Home Government of Ireland in which he called for his fellow Irishmen to unite and 
demand Home Rule. Prophetically, he wrote that if Ireland was persistently rebuffed in 
its demand for self-government then a considerable portion of the population would seek 
complete separation. Published in 1881, William Anderson O’Connor’s History of the 
Irish People sought to remove the stain of racial inferiority from political discourse. He 
argued that the Home Rule debate was not a battle of the races but a struggle between 
the right of self-government and the wrong of conquest. 
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Those contemporaries who wrote of the history of Ireland in the years following 
Birrell’s resignation in 1916 were by and large politicians and journalists. Historical 
enquiry during the interwar era was mostly Nationalist or Liberal in outlook. Nationalist 
historians focused mainly on the Easter Rising as a watershed moment in Irish history. 
They studied the evolution of revolutionary and romantic Nationalist ideals operating 
inside a moderate political environment. Studies on the “Gaelic Revival” and on the 
emergence of those radical figures responsible for rebellion in 1916 dominated 
discussions at the expense of the Home Rule Crisis. The Easter Rising, these writers 
proudly announced, acted as the catalyst for creation of an Irish Free State with its own 
Dublin parliament [minus six counties in Ulster] in 1922. Those who did not ascribe to 
the traditional romantic Nationalist approach of their contemporaries kept their focus on 
the Liberal Party’s lost opportunities for a successful resolution of the Home Rule 
debate. George Dangerfield’s book The Strange Death of Liberal England (New York: 
Capricorn Books, 1935) wrote of the successful Conservative assault upon the Liberal 
Party’s very existence by those angry with the its passage of the Parliament Act in 1911 
and those ideologically opposed to the Third Home Rule Bill. Other non-Nationalist 
scholars like J.L. Hammond, Gladstone and the Irish Nation (London: Longmans Green, 
1938), focused on the difficulties faced by Liberal Party Prime Minister William 
Gladstone in the late 19
th
 century as he attempted to legislate for Irish self-government in 
the face of obdurate Irish and British Unionist resistance.  
  The historiography of Ireland during Birrell’s term as Chief Secretary has 
undergone extensive revisionism within the past forty years. One of the earliest 
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revisionists was Roy Foster, whose book Modern Ireland 1600-1972 (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1989) was an attempt to move beyond scholarship wedded to political 
predilections. Foster praised this new wave of academic scholarship among his 
contemporaries, and commended their “ability to appreciate half-tones, to be skeptical 
about imputing praise or blame, to separate temporary intentions from historical 
effects.”6 The Protestants and Catholics, and Unionists and Nationalists of Ireland have a 
strong sense of attachment to their history. In the religiously controlled schools of 
modern day Ireland the history textbooks tend to paint a glamorized picture of the past 
for their audiences; so, with alternative interpretations came hostility from those 
unwilling to accept this new, and much less self-serving, wave of scholarship. 
 The first and only major manuscript on Birrell’s Irish career was Leon O’Broin’s 
The Chief Secretary: Augustine Birrell in Ireland (London, Chatto & Windus, 1969). 
Born in 1902, O’Broin was swept up by the separatist Sinn Fein organization and joined 
it while still in school. Thoroughly researched, his book explains the challenges and 
achievements of a man who genuinely sought to improve the lives of the Irish people. 
Patricia Jalland has provided the best scholarly work on the Liberal Party’s 
administration of Ireland during Birrell’s time in Dublin Castle. Her doctoral thesis 
assessed the Liberal government’s response to the growing Ulster Crisis from 1911-
                                                 
6
 M.A.G. O’Tuathaigh, “Irish Historical ‘Revisionism’: State of the Art or Ideological Project?,” in 
Interpreting Irish History: The Debate on Historical Revisionism,” ed. Ciaran Brady (Dublin: Irish 
Academic Press, 1994), 311.  
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1914
7
, and, in a natural progression, her first major publication was aptly titled The 
Liberals and Ireland: The Ulster Question in British Politics to 1914 (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1980). She is sharply critical of the Liberal Government for its clumsy 
handling of Unionist opposition to the Home Rule Bill. She also admonishes Prime 
Minister Asquith for his perceived half-heartedness and weakness on the issue. Jalland 
has also published a journal article on Augustine Birrell, in which she rightly claims the 
Chief Secretary had a just and independent outlook towards Ireland, and that over time 
he developed a shrewd and sympathetic working relationship with the leaders of Irish 
Nationalism.
8
 
 Lawrence McBride’s The Greening of Dublin Castle: The Transformation of 
Bureaucratic and Judicial Personnel in Ireland, 1892-1922 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1991) describes Augustine Birrell as the man most 
responsible for creating a bureaucracy in Ireland filled predominantly with Catholic men 
affiliated with the Irish Party. During his Chief Secretaryship Birrell hired twice as many 
Catholic Justices of the Peace than Protestant because he knew these were the men who 
would be best representative of their constituencies once Ireland was granted self-
government. Paul Bew’s Ideology and the Irish Question: Ulster Unionism and Irish 
Nationalism, 1912-1916 (New York: Clarendon Press, 1994) claims that Irish Party 
leader John Redmond missed a great opportunity in early 1914 to accept the exclusion of 
                                                 
 
7
 Patricia Jalland. “The Irish Question in Liberal Politics 1911-1914” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 
1976).  
 
8
 Patricia Jalland, “A Liberal Chief Secretary and the Irish Question: Augustine Birrell, 1907-1914,” The 
Historical Journal 19, no. 2 (1976): 428. 
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Ulster’s four Protestant-majority counties without a six-year time limit, thus allowing for 
the creation of a Home Rule government in Dublin before the outbreak of war on the 
continent. This would have allowed for Birrell to leave his no longer required post of 
Chief Secretary with his reputation intact. 
 In this new era of academic scholarship some historians have shifted their focus 
to localized issues to help explain the progression of high politics during Birrell’s time in 
office. In Land and Revolution: Nationalist Politics in the West of Ireland, 1891-1921 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) Fergus Campbell argues that agrarian protests 
in the “bogs of Connaught” influenced Irish Party leader Redmond and his colleagues to 
pursue more radical policies than they would otherwise have done. Redmond threw his 
support behind the Ranch War 1906-09, and this ultimately forced Birrell to respond 
with a Land Act in 1909 to address the grievances of the peasantry in the West. Michael 
Wheatley studied five counties in central Ireland in the period 1910-1916 in his analysis 
of Redmond’s support base during this tumultuous time. In his book Nationalism and the 
Irish Party: Provincial Ireland 1910-1916 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) he 
found that on the eve of the Great War the Irish Volunteer Force had become a more 
popular organization than Redmond’s party, and the Irish Party leader’s pledge to utilize 
the Irish Volunteers lost him the support of many people not interested in aiding Britain 
during the Great War.  
 The bulk of the recent scholarship on early 20
th
 century Irish history offers a 
critical reinterpretation of the major Irish and British political leaders, and a fresh look at 
the major political crises. My paper provides a fresh analysis of Chief Secretary 
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Augustine Birrell, and of his centrality to the narrative of events. The literature on Birrell 
has been limited to several articles and book chapters since O’Broin’s monograph of 
1969. Through a synthesis of the existing secondary source material on Birrell and a 
close inspection of his personal papers it is my hope to add constructively to the 
historiography by shedding new light on his achievements and failures, and on his 
interaction with the Irish Party during this fascinating time in Irish history. 
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CHAPTER II 
ENGLISH EDUCATION AND AN IRISH COUNCIL BILL 
 
Following the Conservative Party split in 1903 over the contentious issue of 
Tariff Reform, Prime Minister Arthur Balfour found himself in an increasingly 
precarious position due to the constant defections of anti-tariff “Free Food” Tories from 
his party.
1
  Exasperated, he resigned in December 1905, and Liberal Party leader Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman was immediately charged by King Edward VII to form a 
government. The General Election of the following month resulted in the largest 
electoral victory in history for the Liberal Party. It won 397 seats in the House of 
Commons, while the opposition Conservative and Liberal Unionist parties mustered only 
156. The Irish Party gained six more seats than in the 1900 election, bringing its total to 
eighty-two seats. With a massive majority in the House of Commons, even without its 
traditional Irish allies, the Liberal Party was well-placed to embark on a whole host of 
reforms. The Free Trade platform had been the Liberal Party’s centerpiece of the 1906 
election; however, the Irish Party believed the government’s focus should be a Home 
Rule bill for Ireland, which would grant the Irish a self-governing parliament in Dublin. 
                                                 
1
 Those in favor of Tariff Reform agreed with Liberal Unionist Joseph Chamberlain’s plan for a system of 
preferential tariff agreements with British colonies in response to tariffs on British goods from her rivals 
Germany and the USA. Since the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, Britain had been a free-trading nation, 
and a majority of the population supported free trade as a healthy and competitive way to ensure cheap and 
plentiful food. For an extended discussion on the issue see E.H.H. Green’s article “Radical Conservatism: 
The Electoral Genesis of Tariff Reform” in The Historical Journal 28, no.3 (Sept, 1985): 667-692. Also 
see Travis Crosby’s Joseph Chamberlain: A Most Radical Imperialist (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011) for 
an excellent analysis on how Chamberlain’s protectionist crusade divided the Conservative Party in the 
Edwardian era. 
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Augustine Birrell, although a committed Liberal, like many in his party was a 
realist when it came to the issue of Irish self-government.
2
 The Liberal Party, having 
been out of office for a decade, was not prepared to jeopardize its plan for economic and 
social reforms in Britain by pursuing a fractious policy of Home Rule for Ireland. Birrell 
spent most of 1904 working within the Liberal Publication Department pumping out 
pamphlets and posters extolling the virtues of free trade, whilst Ireland rarely got 
mentioned. In June, during a speech in Oxford, he said that it was utterly out of the 
question for his party, once it returned to power, to introduce a Home Rule measure 
because no such legislation could possibly pass through the Conservative-dominated 
House of Lords. Therefore, he believed, to hold this “bogey issue” up as the focus of the 
Liberal campaign was a ridiculous idea.
3
 Consequently, during the election campaign, 
the Liberals shoved Home Rule to the back of the political agenda, leaving the 
Conservative-Unionist coalition divided over Tariff Reform and unable to effectively 
use “The Union in Danger” as a natural rallying cry.4 
                                                 
2
 The Liberal Party’s core beliefs in the late 19th century included its advocacy of civil liberties, the pursuit 
of peace, responsible government expenditure and political freedom. Prior to 1885, its leader William 
Gladstone sought to mollify the Irish demand for self-government through economic, social and religious 
reforms. The 1885 General Election gave the Irish Party the balance of power in the House of Commons, 
and the results convinced Gladstone the time was right to give the Irish their own parliament. His Home 
Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893 both failed, and caused an irrevocable schism in his party. Ian Cawood’s The 
Liberal Unionist Party: A History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012) provides a comprehensive study of the 
Liberal Unionist Party, from its inception in 1886 with Lord Hartington as leader, to its alliance with the 
Conservative Party by the turn of the century. Roy Jenkins lengthy biography of Gladstone details the 
evolution of his beliefs on Irish politics and his eventual zeal for Irish Home Rule. 
 
3
 Mr. Tuff, “Home Rule HC Deb 12 April 1905 vol. 144 cc1484-517,” Hansard. 
 
4
 John Kendle, Walter Long, Ireland and the Union 1905-1920 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University 
Press, 1992), 36. 
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 Augustine Birrell was given the position of President of the Board of Education 
in Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s new Liberal government, and, in typical Liberal 
fashion, immediately set out to remedy Nonconformist grievances surrounding Balfour’s 
Education Act of 1902.
5
 Traditional Liberal philosophy insisted that the tight bond 
between the Church of England and national institutions was counter to a free society. 
With a return of almost two hundred Nonconformist M.P.s in the Liberal landslide of 
1906 Campbell-Bannerman felt compelled to remedy the outrage they felt over the 1902 
Act. Balfour’s Act provided tax monies for denominational instruction in voluntary 
[religious-based] elementary schools, owned primarily by Anglicans and Roman 
Catholics. Also, it firmly entrenched in many rural areas the Anglican Church as the sole 
provider of elementary education, and this Nonconformists found intolerable.
6 
The 
Welsh Liberal M.P. David Lloyd George summed up the attitude of the Nonconformists 
in his party saying they wanted to “get rid of the priest, with his black scepter to ensnare 
and enslave the souls of children.”7 
On April 9, 1906, Birrell put his own bill before parliament. It proposed that all 
schools supported by government taxes should be managed by local councils and 
                                                 
 
5
 Led by Lord Cranborne, the “Church Party”, a faction loyal to the Church of England, had influenced 
Balfour’s education policy to temper the growth of secularism in British schools. In many constituencies 
there was evidence Balfour’s Education Act had alienated Nonconformists within the Conservative Party, 
thus exacerbating its electoral woes in 1906. See R.J.Q. Adams’ Balfour: The Last Grandee (London: 
John Murray, 2008) & D.R. Pugh’s "The 1902 Education Act: The Search for a Compromise," British 
Journal of Educational Studies  16, no.2 (1968): 164–178 for more on Balfour and the Education Act. 
 
6
 R. Pattison, “The Birrell Education Bill of 1906,” Journal of Educational Administration and History 5, 
no. 1 (1973): 34. 
 
7
 Colin Cross, The Liberals in Power 1905-1914 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), 39. 
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teachers, and they would not be compelled to give religious instruction. The Cowper-
Temple clause in the 1870 Education Act, which allowed parents to withdraw their 
children from religious education, would now become universal through Birrell’s 
legislation. This clause forbade board schools from teaching any religious catechism or 
religious formulary which was distinctive of any particular denomination. The Bill 
reached the committee stage early in June and was reported to the House with 
amendments on July 27.  
The construction of the Bill gave Birrell his first prolonged interaction with Irish 
Nationalist leader John Redmond and Irish Party second in command, John Dillon, who 
were concerned with the fortunes of Roman Catholic schools in England. The first 
clause of the Education Bill proposed that a school would not be recognized as a state-
maintained elementary school unless it was a school provided by a local education 
authority. Birrell spoke of the problems in the past between conflicting ownership of 
schools among private [religious] owners and local authorities, and pointed to Ireland as 
a case in point:  
 
“Dual control has had a gloomy history in this country and in Ireland. We know 
what comes out of it. I believe that the abolition of it in this case will save an 
enormous amount of time, temper and ratepayers’ money.”8  
 
                                                 
8
 Anna Tolman Smith, The Education Bill of 1906 for England and Wales as it past the House of 
Commons (Washington: G.P.O., 1906), 15. 
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Birrell’s suggestion was that denominational instruction should no longer be financed 
from local property rates.
9
 But, as a concession, denominational instruction could be 
provided by private means and outside school hours on two mornings a week in any 
school, ex-voluntary [religious] or ex-school board, for those children whose parents 
wished them to attend. He believed Anglicans would mostly use this option but was of 
the view Catholics needed their schools to have a much more specifically Catholic 
regime. So, to mollify Roman Catholic unease that the denominational character of their 
schools would be eradicated, Birrell took up his Cabinet colleague Haldane’s suggestion 
that in any school where 80% of the parents requested the measure, there could be 
denominational instruction on every day of the week and no non-denominational Bible 
instruction at all.
10
 Known as Clause IV, this provision allowed local educational 
authorities in urban areas [with a population over five thousand] to arrange that a school 
should continue denominational teaching as before, but under two conditions:  four fifths 
of parents had to approve, and there had to be a state school option for those who did 
not.  
Irish Party leader John Redmond expressed his concerns about the shortcomings 
of Clause IV.  He wanted religious safeguards for parents who sent their children to 
these types of schools because it could be used, he feared, as an instrument of injustice 
and religious tyranny in the hands of a dominant [i.e. Protestant] majority. He demanded 
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that the voices of parents should be heard when it came to selecting school teachers 
suitable for the faith of their children. Although the bulk of Roman Catholic schools 
would benefit from Clause IV, there were a further five hundred that would not qualify 
because of the double operation of five thousand [population] and four-fifths [parental 
approval] rules.
11
 Redmond insisted on qualifying the proposal to ensure these schools 
would be included. During his negotiations with the Irish Party, Birrell struck up a 
friendly relationship with John Dillon, whose brother Henry was a Franciscan priest held 
in high esteem in Rome. Dillon spoke up for the Catholic case during the second reading 
of the Bill, and declared that if faced with a choice between a completely secular system 
and a purely Bible-reading system [Protestant] of education, then, without a doubt, he 
would accept a purely secular one.
12
  
Redmond and Dillon wanted a provision which would safeguard Catholic 
religious teaching in British schools, much like the protections afforded to Protestant 
religious teaching. It would be unfair, they argued, for Catholic schools to pay for their 
own maintenance, pay for their own Catholic teaching, and, in addition, have Catholic 
families pay taxes for the teaching of what to him was simply Protestantism in Protestant 
schools. Disagreements with Clause IV led Redmond and the Irish Party to vote against 
it. Also opposing the Bill was the fiery Liberal Unionist leader Joseph Chamberlain, 
himself a Unitarian, who, in May, during a debate on amendments to the bill, 
condemned Birrell for ingeniously and unjustly introducing the four-fifths clause to 
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pander to his Irish Nationalist friends, whilst Anglican schools, he believed, were to 
suffer disproportionately.  
To quell the fears of some within his own party, Birrell accepted Cabinet 
modifications to the bill to satisfy those Nonconformists who opposed Clause IV. 
Summing up the position of Nonconformists, Lloyd George, the President of the Board 
of Trade, wrote that many of his constituents said “clause [four] was the worst 
endowment of sectarianism in the schools of this land that has ever been perpetrated by 
any government.”13 Cabinet revisions to the clause meant denominational instruction 
would now be confined to ex-voluntary [non state-funded] schools, and religious 
teaching would be excluded from ex-board schools. This further aggrieved the Irish 
Party, who remained unhappy with the lack of protection for Catholic schools; 
nevertheless, even without Redmond’s support, the Bill passed the House of Commons 
with a majority of 192 votes.  However, it could not overcome the biggest hurdle of all, 
the overwhelmingly Conservative House of Lords. 
After the Bill received its second reading in the Lords, those opposed to it 
amended it to such an extent to protect denominational schools that it came back to the 
Commons barely recognizable. Birrell bemoaned that the Bill was returned to him a 
“miserable, mangled, tortured, twisted tertium quid.” The massacre of his Bill in the 
upper chamber left him fuming and helpless to proceed with its passage. Consequently, 
his position as President of the Board of Education became untenable. In November, 
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1906, in a speech to the Anchor Society in his constituency of Bristol, he stated that the 
House of Lords’ proposals simply bolstered denominationalism. Their amendments 
perpetuated it, protected it, defended it and endowed it afresh with a large sum of public 
money to be taken every year from the pockets of the taxpayers. He compared the Lords 
interference to a Redistribution Bill that inserted a clause to take away M.P.s from 
Manchester and Birmingham and restore them to the infamous rotten boroughs of Old 
Sarum and Grampound.
14
 It was not wise, he argued, for people to assume that the 
country could be divided by those who went to church and those who went to chapel, for 
some went to neither.
15
 Protecting the vested interests of Anglicans, Catholics and other 
denominations in public schools was unfair in an increasingly secular society. 
Born in Ulster, James Bryce, a legal scholar, historian and Liberal M.P. for South 
Aberdeen, was appointed Irish Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in 
November 1905. Though a firm believer in granting Ireland self-government his hands 
were very much tied when he assumed office, because the Liberals did not want to risk 
their plans for social reform in Britain by toying with the controversial idea of another 
Irish Home Rule Bill. Therefore, he saw himself condemned to a policy of palliatives 
and second bests from which some objects of value might be derived but certain to fail 
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in securing a settlement of the Irish question.
16  
The Irish Party was mistrustful of the 
partnership of Bryce and his Under-Secretary Sir Antony MacDonnell, because they did 
not actively attempt to foster a working relationship with Redmond and Dillon. In fact, 
Dillon, although he thought kindly of Bryce personally, thought little of him as an 
administrator and was happy to see him go at the end of 1906. 
In 1905, Bryce, and his Under-Secretary MacDonnell, began a modest scheme of 
administrative devolution for Ireland. MacDonnell took up his Dublin Castle position in 
1902 at the behest of George Wyndham [the then Conservative-Unionist Chief 
Secretary], and quickly came to believe, drawing on his experience in the Indian Civil 
Service, the Unionist policy of modest conciliatory reforms was the best way to address 
Irish Nationalist political, economic and social grievances.
17
 It was understood that, due 
to his successful administrative record in India, MacDonnell would have the freedom to 
draft legislation for Bryce once he became Chief Secretary. His main aims were the 
maintenance of order, a solution to the troublesome land question on the basis of 
voluntary sale and, perhaps most importantly, the co-ordination of government 
departments to reconcile Irish Nationalist opinion and improve government efficiency.
18
 
An Irish Council Bill, he believed, would resolve this problem. 
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 Under great secrecy, something which alarmed Redmond and Dillon, in February 
1906, MacDonnell submitted a proposal for a scheme of what came to be called 
devolution. He recommended the establishment of an executive council of thirty, 
partially elected, members who would be responsible for advising government policy.
19
 
Redmond was greatly wary of MacDonnell’s plans, and suggested that within his 
scheme there lay ulterior motives to weaken politically the support base of the 
Nationalist party. At a speech in Coalisland on October 14, 1906, Redmond informed his 
audience that the Council Bill in its initial form was a weak attempt of administrative 
Home Rule, perhaps designed by its architects to weaken the voice of the Irish Party.
20 
 
Bryce, too, had his concerns with the composition of the Bill. He wrote to MacDonnell 
in August, 1906: 
 
“The exclusion of any legislative function may prove to be a grave 
disappointment to all sections of nationalism….What one fears is that the ultra 
party, the fenian dregs, the Sinn Fein men, etc. etc., will, when our little chicken 
is hatched, cry out……J.E.R [Redmond], who already thinks himself in a tight 
place, will be in a tighter one.”21 
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In December 1906, Chief Secretary Bryce jumped at the opportunity to take up the then 
vacant ambassadorial appointment in Washington. He was in despair over the 
controversy of the Council scheme, and this was a great way for him to escape his Irish 
woes.  
After the scuttling of the Education Bill in the House of Lords, Prime Minister 
Henry Campbell-Bannerman decided it was time for a Cabinet reshuffle. Birrell realized 
that he was more likely than anyone else to be appointed to the now vacated position of 
Irish Chief Secretary.
22
 Campbell-Bannerman agreed, but Birrell told the Prime Minister 
he was not eager for the position and joked that he hoped he was not selected because his 
leader viewed him as an enemy.
23 
In a letter to the premier on December 27 Birrell 
reluctantly agreed to go ahead and accept the position. He said he was reassured by 
Bryce that he could manage the job, and although he feared a political impasse on the 
other side of the Irish Sea, he said he was ready for it.
24
 Romantically, in the back of his 
mind, he hoped to be the Chief Secretary who resolved the vexatious problem of higher 
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education in Ireland and establish a teaching university to which the Catholics of the 
country could flock with pride and confidence.
25 
  
In Dublin, on January 26, 1907, at a household dinner at the Vice Regal Lodge 
with Lord Aberdeen, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Augustine Birrell, a man well-
known for his wit and charm, was officially installed as Irish Chief Secretary, Irish Privy 
Councillor, and Chancellor of the Most Noble Order of the Knights of St. Patrick; a 
position he would hold for over nine years. Some years later he quipped that he quickly 
learned three things about the country: nothing in Ireland was explicable, everything of 
unimportance was known and that it was such a small place.
26
 Birrell was eager to get to 
working again with the Irish Party and duly sent a letter from Dublin Castle to Redmond 
on January 29 stating that he was excited to meet him at a Congested Districts Board 
meeting the following day.
27
  
As Chief Secretary, Birrell, in theory assumed a political position that was ill-
defined. Only answerable to the Lord Lieutenant, he was in effect governor of Ireland, 
with direct control over ten of the approximately forty-five [even this number was 
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unclear] administrative departments responsible for the governance of Ireland.
28
 He 
found that some officials within Dublin Castle were answerable to him, while others 
worked totally independent of his control, and while some departments were voted in 
others enjoyed a long tradition of political patronage in the country. A few months into 
his position as Chief Secretary he made it known the system needed revision. He said to 
the House:  
 
“If anybody believes that the present system of administration of Irish affairs is 
sound and sensible, or that it is a system likely to train the Irish people in the 
habits of self-respect and economy I must wait and see how that individual 
makes out his case.”29 
 
In a veiled slight at the history of British governance in Ireland, and what can be clearly 
interpreted as his firm belief in the potential of Irish self-government, he claimed that the 
Irish people would never prosper under the current system: 
 
“It is not that Dublin Castle is a sink or seat of jobbery and corruption. It may 
have been so once. It certainly is so no longer. But it is, to use a familiar 
expression, "switched off" from the current of national life and feeling; and one 
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cannot feel—I do not believe anybody within the walls of Dublin Castle can 
feel—that that is the way to secure the regeneration of Ireland.30 
 
His sympathy for Irish Nationalism was evident right from the start of his tenure 
in Ireland. As a Liberal Chief Secretary he sought to “govern Ireland according to Irish 
ideas.” He wished to strike up a cordial working relationship with the leaders of Irish 
Nationalism because he firmly believed these men would be in the near future the 
leaders of a self-governing Ireland. In the meantime, he would serve Irish interests as 
best he could at Dublin Castle and in the House of Commons. Although the Liberal 
government was backed by an overwhelming majority in the House of Commons, 
enough to push through much of their reform program there, Birrell and his colleagues 
were well-aware that a measure of Home Rule was virtually impossible given the 
composition of the House of Lords. The Conservatives in the upper chamber had made 
so many amendments to Birrell’s Education Bill the previous year that it was barely 
recognizable and had to be scrapped. Any attempt at a Home Rule Bill without some 
prior reform of the House of Lords was, therefore, out of the question. It would be a 
waste of time and effort to spend so much time drafting a bill for it to be either voted 
down or amended to the point of being unrecognizable. Therefore, Birrell knew and 
accepted that he would have to try to appease the leaders of the Irish Party through more 
moderate reforms. 
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  Liberal Cabinet members were aware of the task in hand for Birrell. Lord 
Morley, himself a former Liberal Irish Chief Secretary, told the Prime Minister that the 
“situation for Birrell will be mighty difficult, for he will have to bear all the odium of Sir 
A.M. [Antony MacDonnell] on his back, and that’s a heavy load.”31 Campbell-
Bannerman, on the other hand, felt his new appointment was up to the task of keeping 
MacDonnell in order as he went about his business. An editorial in the popular British 
newspaper The Saturday Review perhaps best summed up Birrell’s position within the 
context of MacDonnell’s council scheme: 
 
“Mr. Birrell’s House of Commons reputation stands high, and his good temper 
and apparent simplicity will help him to parry criticism even more trying than 
that he had to meet in the education debates. At the same time to satisfy the Irish 
members that he is giving them Home Rule, and the English members that he is 
not, will be no easy business.”32 
 
Birrell admitted he knew little of Ireland from personal experience. He had read 
Irish novels and some historical texts, but his knowledge of the current political 
complexities of this little island was limited. Sticking to his long-held Liberal principles, 
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he sought to gain favor with the Irish Party, which he believed would have conferred 
upon it the responsibility of governing the country in the not too distant future. 
 At Birrell’s behest, a government committee was set up to take another look at 
MacDonnell’s administrative proposals in order to make the plan acceptable to Redmond 
and Dillon, and to ensure it still was moderate enough to survive the House of Lords 
unscathed. On March 6, in a memo to the Cabinet, Birrell explained that any 
administrative council, in order to effectively operate the many government departments, 
would need to have anywhere from eighty-eight to one hundred council members. Not 
only would it make it more efficient but it would, he believed, provide the Nationalists 
with a good working majority “as they must have in any system” put forward by the 
government.
33 
 In response to Irish Unionist objections to administrative changes, Birrell 
expressed his belief that it was impossible for any Chief Secretary to do even one tenth 
of what the Irish people had a right to expect.  He wished the Unionists would “cease 
mumbling the dry bones of belated bigotry,” and focus on meaningful political 
reforms.
34
 
In late 1905, Redmond had expressed his opinion that a form of devolution as a 
first step toward Home Rule would be acceptable, but the proposed structure of the 
Council Bill was such that it became increasingly difficult for him to support. He was 
aggrieved at attempts to reconfigure parliamentary constituencies to provide the 
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Unionists of Ulster with more Council positions than their population merited.
35
 For 
example, under the proposed scheme, Cork City, with a population of 76,122, would 
have the same representation as Londonderry with 39,151. Also, Cork would lose 
representation with its allocation of a solitary seat on the Council while Belfast was to be 
granted five. In a memorandum to the British Cabinet on April 29, Redmond warned:  
 
“In some of the constituencies, this appeal against disfranchisement would have 
added force and violence from historic traditions very familiar and very dear to 
Irish minds…..We are ready to conciliate Unionist opposition in Ireland and to 
meet fair demands from Ulster for greater representation through the nominated 
element, but we protest against both methods, redistribution and nomination, 
being used for this purpose”36  
 
Redmond was also upset Birrell would not yield to his party’s demand that the entire 
Irish political representation in parliament be ex-officio members of the proposed 107-
member Council. Birrell, of course, knew this demand would be savaged by the 
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Unionist-dominated House of Lords. Nevertheless, he did accept Redmond’s call for a 
fairer allocation of elected seats based on representation. 
Further Irish objections included the veto powers granted to the Lord Lieutenant 
for Ireland.
37
 Not only could he throw out Council proposals, he could institute his own 
policies at his own initiative. Intolerably for Redmond and Dillon, the Council was to 
exercise its control through committees which were to be placed under the direction of a 
paid chairman appointed by the Crown. 
 
Dillon, in a letter to Lord Morley, ridiculed the 
measure as nothing more than an attempt by MacDonnell and his colleagues to break up 
the Irish Party machine and its dominance of Irish politics. Dillon saw it as an 
underhanded approach to administer Ireland through non-political businessmen, and so 
“turn Ireland into a loyal and peaceful country, very subservient and manageable, purged 
of politics and devoted to the breeding of pigs and the making of butter.”38 
Birrell recognized early on that the Council Bill had put him in a tricky situation. 
He knew the plan gave his Irish Nationalist friends no legislative ability, but it was next 
to impossible to yield such a concession, because anything that resembled Home Rule 
would precipitate another fierce, prolonged and injurious clash at Westminster.
39
 On the 
other hand, he feared that abandoning the measure outright would embolden Irish 
radicals such as the separatist Sinn Fein organization at the expense of the more 
moderate Irish Party. He made his thoughts known to Campbell-Bannerman:  
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“If we were to drop the Bill there will be a tremendous row in Ireland & my 
position will become almost untenable and the whole situation (without any 
Crimes Act) very alarming.”40 
 
No matter how Birrell tried to present the Council Bill, when introduced to Parliament 
on May 7, he feared it was destined to fail miserably once the Irish Nationalist 
Convention met a few weeks later at the Mansion House in Dublin to discuss the 
measure. 
Presenting his administrative scheme in the House of Commons, Birrell 
immediately set out to try to allay Unionist criticisms by informing them that the Bill did 
not contain any suggestion whatsoever of any new legislative power or authority. To 
justify his proposal, he spoke of the current administrative inadequacies in Ireland, and 
stressed that reforms were needed to make Dublin Castle work better and more 
efficiently for its people. To try to win the support of Redmond, Dillon and the Irish 
Party, he said he would endeavour to frame the new administrative system to:  
 
“make them capable of relaxation, perhaps ultimately of relinquishment, in 
response, to any proof we may receive from the Irish people of their fitness for 
self-government, their fitness for the assumption of those responsibilities.”41 
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In this clever and carefully worded sentence he let it be known to the Irish Party that if it 
accepted this proposal it could be a useful stepping stone toward eventual Home Rule.  
The Bill, in its final form, called for an administrative council of eighty-two 
elected members with a further twenty-four to be nominated by the Crown for the first 
term. The council was to have control over eight [the most important ones] of the forty-
five Irish departments, and receive funds to administer them. These were the Local 
Government Board, the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction, the 
Congested Districts Board, the Commissioners of Public Works, the Commissioners of 
National Education, the Intermediate Education Board, the Inspection of Reformatory 
and Industrial Schools, and the Registrar-General. 
In his speech to the House, Birrell spoke of the necessity of a representative 
assembly for Ireland in a democratic age. It was not befitting of the British Government, 
he contended, to send someone to Ireland to control it with an iron fist. As a 
counterweight to this, he appealed to the concerns of the Ulster Unionist community, 
informing them that the Council included nominated members [sympathetic to the 
Unionist cause] who would safeguard their interests. As a further protection he 
highlighted the position of the Lord Lieutenant, who was granted the power of the veto, 
to exercise when he saw fit. The Chief Secretary knew he could satisfy neither side 
completely. Summing up his proposals he said:  
 
“If the new Council after some years is a success, why, then, I dare say it may 
pave the way to Home Rule. If, on the other hand, it is a failure, it appears to me 
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that it would present a very considerable obstacle to persuading the electors in 
this country, who have been called the predominant partners, to accept Home 
Rule.
42
  
 
Navigating the middle ground showed weakness in the eyes of Unionists and 
Nationalists alike, so the Bill came under vicious attack. 
Arthur Balfour, leader of the Opposition and a former Irish Chief Secretary 
himself, condemned Birrell’s measure as muddled and unworkable. On top of its many 
inadequacies, it gave, he believed, a platform for Irish Nationalists to thrust themselves 
into important political decisions: 
 
“As certainly as the sun rises in the east and sets in the west, so certainly if you 
bring into being this semi-elected body, nominally for the purpose of controlling 
and administering these eight departments, it will be used by those who have the 
majority in it for political and Nationalist purposes.”43 
 
Balfour was sure the scheme would please nobody. Not only would it hurt British 
interests in Ireland, it would impose undue grievances upon the British people. Citing his 
own political experience in Ireland, Balfour claimed the Bill would be violently opposed 
by all those who claimed to represent the Protestants of Ulster, and expressed his 
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certainty that the Irish Party would reject it because of its failure to conform to their 
aspirations.
 
Redmond told the Commons he would not pass final judgment on the Council 
Bill until after the Irish Convention had an opportunity to look at and study it. He used 
the platform for the introduction of the Bill to espouse his party’s desire for eventual 
Home Rule, just like that which had been conferred upon self-governing and prosperous 
dominions such as Canada and Australia. He condemned the Bill for not giving 
legislative power to the Council, saying he was not in favor of getting “maimed and 
dwarfed legislative powers.” The nominated element was, Redmond believed, 
shamefully undemocratic because the Crown would fill the nominated positions with 
Ulster Unionists. He warned the House that even if the Bill was to be passed the 
following day, the Irish Party’s demand for a resolution to the larger question of Home 
Rule would vigorously continue. If the scheme could be utilized with moderate success 
and aided the Irish demand for Home Rule then he would surely support it; nevertheless, 
the decision, he reminded them, would rest with the Convention in a few short weeks.
44
 
On May 20, the day before the Irish Party Convention, at a caucus meeting 
organized by the “Molly Maguires” (the nickname of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, 
an Irish-Catholic fraternal organization which had a large following among the Catholic 
laboring classes in Ulster) word spread among the crowd that the Bill was to be thrown 
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out by the Irish Party, so their representatives actively lobbied against it.
45 
Adding to the 
pressure on Redmond to kill Birrell’s Bill were widespread Nationalist newspaper 
attacks on the measure. The Derry People & Donegal News ridiculed it for its complete 
lack of legislative power, meaning it could not even be regarded as a stepping stone 
towards Home Rule.
46
 The Kilkenny People was even more scathing in its commentary: 
 
“Some say half a loaf of bread is better than no bread so we should accept 
whatever the British government throws at us. Redmond a few weeks ago quoted 
the words of an American speaker – ‘Half a loaf is better than no bread, but half 
a chronometer is not better than no watch.’ The Irish Council Bill is worse than a 
half a chronometer and more like a grandfather clock that the Lord Lieutenant 
can tinker with as he pleases.”47  
 
The Longford Leader joined in and blasted the Liberal Party, stating it was better to 
reject the measure and risk the chance of the Tories regaining power because “for our 
part we’d rather a thousand times be ruled by open enemies than by false friends.”48 
Nationalists throughout Ireland believed the great Liberal landslide in the 1906 election 
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would bring with it the deliverance of autonomy for the country, and so this less than 
modest Bill was derided for falling so far below their expectations. 
Redmond now feared a party split if he did not renounce the Irish Council Bill in 
its entirety. The mass of the Irish Party had been kept largely in the dark during its 
formulation, and once they saw what was offered they hammered it for its shortcomings. 
At the Convention, the party leader, followed by speaker after speaker, condemned the 
Bill as no palliative substitute for their goal of Home Rule. The Echo newspaper 
perfectly summed up the feelings of Irish Nationalists, stating that the greatest Liberal 
Party majority of modern times had the opportunity to offer so much more. Only 
offering the Irish partial control of eight departments of the Irish administration 
demonstrated the utter confusion of the government when it came to ruling over Ireland. 
The impression among many Nationalists was that the Chief Secretary was not 
enthusiastic about the Bill, and was even rather ashamed of it because of its 
shortcomings. Even Arthur Balfour was astonished by its timidity and undemocratic 
character and argued that it would satisfy no one.
49
 The hostile reception from the Irish 
Convention meant Campbell-Bannerman, despite the Liberals having gained the Bill’s 
acceptance in the House, had to shelve it because it was worthless without the active 
support of the Irish Party. 
In this tumultuous first year on the job, Birrell quickly came to recognize the 
difficulty of his position as a Liberal Chief Secretary. He had the misfortune of 
inheriting from his predecessor Bryce a flawed and unacceptable scheme for 
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administrative reform.  Birrell had come to Ireland convinced his job was to pave the 
way for Irish Home Rule, but the secrecy of Bryce and MacDonnell in formulating the 
Council Bill, and Redmond and Dillon’s non-committal approach to it, fostered much 
suspicion among both Nationalists and Unionists. Although the Irish Convention 
condemned the measure, Birrell felt the reasons for its rejection were never clearly 
revealed. He surmised that the Catholic clergy negatively influenced public opinion 
because, as part of the Bill, a new Education Department was to be created. The leaders 
of the Roman Catholic Church believed this was somehow an attempt to lessen their grip 
on the religious education of children.  
Birrell thought Redmond and Dillon had been less than forthcoming over the past 
year regarding whether they would thrust their support behind it, and this left the Chief 
Secretary in a difficult situation. Six months before the Bill was even introduced 
Redmond had said:  
 
“When the hour of that Convention comes, any influence which I possess with 
my fellow countrymen will be used to induce them to reject any proposal, no 
matter how plausible, which in my judgement may be calculated to injure the 
prestige of the Irish party, and disrupt the national movement.”50 
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Redmond certainly did Birrell no favors by discrediting the Bill in its infancy during his 
speeches to his party’s constituents, while at the same time promising the Chief 
Secretary, during their official and personal correspondence, he would give the measure 
an honest appraisal before passing judgement on it. 
Birrell was also disgruntled with Under-Secretary MacDonnell for his secretive 
drafting of the Council Bill while serving under Bryce. MacDonnell, upset that his work 
was destined to fail, criticized Birrell’s attempts to pander to Redmond’s overtures by 
reworking his original scheme. He threatened to resign if Birrell and his committee 
attempted to send a Bill through to the House of Lords that would, in his opinion, surely 
be rejected. Following Redmond’s rejection of the finalized scheme, Birrell felt certain 
any future administrative legislation would have to go much further, with some sort of 
Home Rule mechanisms built into it. MacDonnell, on the other hand, believed a plan for 
administrative and financial devolution was the best [and only] approach because, in his 
mind, England was not ready to grant Ireland Home Rule for the foreseeable future. He 
claimed the Irish Question would become less significant as the years went by, due to 
the country’s high level of Catholic/Nationalist emigration.  Devolution, the Under-
Secretary was certain, offered the best chance to rid Ireland of its bigotry, and remake it 
into a tolerant and buoyant country.
51
 Reflecting on MacDonnell’s stubbornness, Birrell 
informed the Prime Minister:  
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“Our poor dear Sir Antony still thinks that if the Bill had been ‘much less’ it 
would have gone through!! Our mistake has been to have touched ‘Devolution’ 
at all. ‘Home Rule’ we could not give….. we should have taken altogether our 
own line and left Sir Antony in the lurch.”52 
 
Irritated by the obstinacy of his Under-Secretary, Birrell told Redmond at this time that 
he had had “more than enough of MacDonnellism and would not swallow any more.”53 
An Under-Secretary’s function, he insisted, was to not hinder but support the Chief 
Secretary with his duties. 
 The failure of the Bill, as Birrell predicted, did cause much disquiet throughout 
Ireland. Redmond was certain the mere existence of the Bill had damaged his reputation 
among his voters, and therefore pushed the Chief Secretary for generous land and 
educational reforms to show his electorate an Irish Party-Liberal Party alliance was still 
best for Irish interests. Several months later, in a speech in Dublin, Redmond reflected 
that the demise of the Bill was probably a blessing in disguise. He was sure its failure 
served notice to the British government that it was impossible for Westminster to offer 
the Irish people anything short of full Home Rule, and this would be made clear during 
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the next General Election.
54
 William O’Brien, that great champion of the Irish peasant, 
viewed the failure of the Council Bill differently. He stressed the psychological impact it 
had on the lives of ordinary people, whom, he argued, had been let down yet again by 
Redmond and his broken promises.
55
 The Gaelic League [a prominent Irish social and 
cultural organization] and the newly formed radical Sinn Fein organization tied the 
suffering of the Irish people to continued British rule and the ineptitude of Redmond and 
his party. Former Chief Secretary Bryce went so far as to say that the radical “Sinn 
Feiners” had played a key role in fomenting enough discontent to ensure the Bill’s 
failure.
56
  
 Whatever misgivings Augustine Birrell had about the proposed Irish Council and 
its chances for success he was certain he had to wed himself to Redmond and Dillon so 
he could tap into the pulse of general feeling among the Irish people. Home Rule, he was 
sure, would have to wait until something was done regarding the power of the 
intransigent House of Lords. For the time being, he would seek to continue to foster the 
good will of Irish Nationalists through substantive reforms. He felt it was impossible for 
the Irish fully to administer their own needs if they continued to have an English or 
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Scotsman come over to govern the country from Dublin Castle.
57
 He had failed with an 
education measure in England, and he knew there was an Irish university question yet to 
be resolved, and, of course, a remedy was needed for the shortcomings of the Wyndham 
Land Act of 1903. Birrell’s strategy of appeasement and reform solely directed towards 
the Irish Party was not the correct approach because he alienated himself from the voices 
of Irish Unionism, and over time this made his administration of Ireland that much more 
difficult. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROBLEMS WITH IRISH LAND AND HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
The Great Famine 1845-49 in Ireland, led to the deaths of one million people and 
the emigration of a million more. The large number of evictions of Irish peasants during 
the famine, and to a lesser extent in the following thirty years, along with continued 
emigration, caused a profound change in the average farm size, and altered the size 
distribution of holdings so by 1876 approximately eight hundred families owned fifty 
percent of the total land.
1
 Peasant resistance to British landlordism in Ireland lay behind 
the establishment of the Irish Land League, which boasted over 200,000 members at its 
height in the early 1880s. Through a combination of intimidation and boycotting during 
the” Land War” of 1879-82, the League forced the British government to pay closer 
attention to the plight of the Irish peasant. A series of Land Acts were passed during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, but, they did not improve the lives of the poorest in 
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Irish society; therefore, successive Irish Chief Secretaries had to deal with periodic rural 
disorder from an organized peasantry.
2
 
 Before 1903, only eighteen percent of tenanted land had been purchased under 
previous Land Acts, and so, George Wyndham [Conservative Irish Chief Secretary 
1900-1905], facing intense pressure from both the radical United Irish League and the 
Irish Party, threw his support behind the Irish Land [Dunraven] Conference of December 
1902, which was a meeting of landlord and tenant representatives who wished to arrange 
a final solution to the land question. Representing the Irish landlords was Lord Dunraven 
who was also a Conservative member of the House of Lords and a moderate when it 
came to Irish economic and political reforms, Dermot Bourke who was the 7
th
 Earl of 
Mayo and a fellow member of the House of Lords, Colonel William Hutcheson-Poe 
who, as High Sheriff of County Tyrone, represented Ulster’s interests, and Colonel 
Nugent Everard who was the High Sheriff of County Meath. Representing the tenantry 
were William O’Brien, John Redmond, Thomas Wallace Russell [a former Irish Liberal 
Unionist and head of the Farmers and Labourers Union, which was a tenant-farmer 
protest movement in Ulster], and the Lord Mayor of Dublin Timothy Charles 
Harrington.  Both sides agreed that while landlords should not be forced by the 
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government to sell their land, the Chief Secretary should propose legislation that would 
provide them  a  generous financial incentive to pay the difference between the price 
offered by the tenants and that demanded by the landlords.
3 
Wyndham, with cross-party support, proceeded with this final scheme of non-
compulsory land purchase and proudly introduced a Land Act to the House of Commons 
on March 25, 1903. Despite British Treasury reservations surrounding its financial 
provisions, the Bill swiftly passed, and it signaled the beginning of the end for 
landlordism in Ireland. Wyndham’s Act was for the most part a success. It resulted in 
approximately 300,000 sales, with 30% of tenanted land purchased from landlords by 
1908. The Act chiefly benefited those farmers who were already on a stable economic 
footing and who were willing and able to proceed with land purchase. Unfortunately, it 
failed to solve the problems of indigent smallholders, evicted tenants, poor laborers and 
the landless in the countryside.
4
 The following year, Irish peer Lord Muskerry, in a 
House of Lords discussion of the Act, reflected on its inadequacies: 
 
“The failure of the Land Act of 1903 to settle the land question, to promote 
goodwill between landlord and tenant, or even to check emigration, is due to the 
facts that the only classes it proposes to benefit are the substantial farmers 
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already amply benefited by previous legislation, and that practically nothing has 
been done for the small tenants and cottiers, while at the same time the 
employment of labour has been, and will be still more, seriously affected by the 
displacement and exile of a residential proprietary and of the employing classes 
dependent on them;”5 
 
Increasingly, those tenants who failed to benefit from Wyndham’s Land Act turned their 
eyes towards the large untenanted grazing ranches as a source of land acquisition, thus 
culminating in the so-called “Ranch War” of 1906-1909.  
At Halifax, three months after he was sworn in as Chief Secretary, Augustine 
Birrell incorrectly asserted that Ireland was “in a more peaceful condition than she had 
been for the last six hundred years.”6 Soon after, he was duly apprised of increased 
criminal activity in the countryside, which was being spearheaded by Laurence Ginnell, 
a junior Irish Party M.P. for Westmeath North. A lawyer, staunch Nationalist and keen 
Gaelic revivalist, Ginnell was seen by the United Irish League as the pioneer of the anti-
ranch/grazier movement. Prosperous graziers, who remained largely unaffected by 
Wyndham’s Act, emerged out of an increasingly popular practice employed by landlords 
in the latter half of the 19
th
 century. Landlords would lease large tracts of land, usually 
over 200 acres, to graziers on an eleven-month lease, who could then, based on market 
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conditions, fatten their cattle for sale in the British market. Landlords would typically 
auction their untenanted land each year to the highest bidder through local newspapers. 
Both sides benefitted because the eleven-month lease meant the graziers had no legal 
recourse if the landlord wanted them off the land, while the graziers benefited because 
they only needed to rent the land when market conditions were right.  Furthermore, 
many landlords preferred this use of their land because, as a further bonus, landlords 
were more likely to obtain rent payment from eleven-month graziers than from ordinary 
tenants.
7 
From the 1890s onwards the rights of graziers came under increasing scrutiny 
in the grazing counties of the West, from hungry and landless peasants who found the 
system unjust. 
 Birrell, therefore, had the dual problem of dealing with increasing criminal unrest 
from disaffected peasants, while at the same time finding a solution to the shortcomings 
of the 1903 Land Act. His Irish Nationalist allies, Redmond and Dillon, who had drawn 
much of their political strength from agrarian unrest over the past thirty years, were also 
thrust into the difficult position of demonstrating their loyalty toward the Liberal 
government, while, at the same time, championing the grievances among their support 
base.  Birrell realized the task at hand and made his thoughts known in a speech at the 
Bradford Liberal Association in April 1907. Land legislation in Ireland, he insisted, had 
been held back too long because of red tape. Landlords who were willing to sell land to 
tenants experienced difficulties because: 
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“a great cloud of lawyers come down and settle like a brood of crows, to blacken 
the whole field and delay the matter. It is the fault of an absurd system.”8 
 
He postulated that there was not a single conversant man in Ireland who would not admit 
that the 1903 Act needed amending, and hoped he could alleviate the suffering of the 
poorest in rural Ireland by passing legislation that made the transfer of land from 
landlord to tenant attractive, seamless and affordable.
9
 
The first signs of rural unrest toward graziers occurred in July 1906 at Grange, 
Co. Limerick. Incidents of cattle driving occurred in Galway and Meath the following 
year, and, by 1908, criminal attacks on the property of graziers had spread to 
Westmeath, Sligo, Roscommon, Tipperary, Longford and Clare. These “cattle drives” 
involved releasing a grazier’s animals from the fields and chasing them away from their 
owners’ properties. Sometimes the livestock would be physically maimed and blinded as 
part of the drive. Letters of intimidation were also a popular method of applying pressure 
on a landlord to stop the practice of grazing. These eight counties, having the highest 
incidence of trouble, were proclaimed to be in a state of disturbance, and Birrell had to 
send extra Royal Irish Constabulary [R.I.C.] officers to help quell the disorder.
10
 In a 
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House of Lords speech in 1908, the Marquess of Londonderry provided damning figures 
on the condition of Ireland. He said:  
 
“In November, 1905, when the late Government went out of office, there were 
162 cases of boycotting; on November 30, 1908, there were 840. In January, 
1906, there were 208 persons under police protection; on November 19, 1908, 
there were 351. In 1905 there were no cattle-drives at all; there were 635 in 
eleven months of 1908. In 1905 there were 270 cases of agrarian outrage; in 
eleven months of 1908 there were 537. In 1905 there were eleven persons fired 
at; in eleven months of 1908 there were forty. In 1905 there were eighteen cases 
of firing into dwellings; in eleven months of 1908 there were eighty-one.”11  
 
Many prominent Unionists including John Lonsdale, Walter Long, J.H. Campbell and 
James Craig lashed out at Birrell for being much too weak on agrarian outrages, and 
demanded a harsh response in the interest of law and order.
 
The Chief Secretary had to walk a fine line between not upsetting Irish 
Nationalist opinion and quelling the disturbances in the countryside. If he used the R.I.C. 
to crack down hard on the economically impoverished who did not benefit from 
Wyndham’s Land Act this would surely play into the hands of the more radical elements 
in Irish society, and weaken the support base of his Nationalist allies. On the other hand, 
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if he did not uphold law and order, a central tenet of Conservative policy in Ireland, then 
he would continue to be ridiculed in the House of Commons for being weak on crime.  
Making matters worse for Birrell was the non-renewal in December 1906 of the 
Irish Peace Preservation Act of 1881, which gave the government complete control over 
the sale, importation and carrying of arms.
12
 This Act also gave the Lord Lieutenant the 
right to declare a district as being in a state of conflict and to appoint a force of special 
constables, under the command of a paid magistrate, to assist in policing the proclaimed 
area.
13
  Birrell viewed coercive measures as contrary to his Liberal principles. Ireland, he 
believed, should be treated like any other part of the United Kingdom, and criminals 
should be dealt with under the ordinary law. He compared British coercive legislation in 
Ireland to that of the autocracy of Russia. In that country citizens were faced with the 
duality of a trial by jury and the power of an executive to deprive them of their rights 
whenever he saw fit. Birrell said he deplored cattle raiding, a symptom, he was sure, of 
land purchase problems, but the Irish had a right to be treated under the ordinary law.
14
  
Coercive Acts were, he maintained, a code of tyrannical laws, and not a cure for 
boycotting.
15
 John Dillon had instructed Birrell’s predecessor, Bryce, that while Home 
Rule legislation was pending he ought to govern the country in accordance with Irish 
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ideas.
16
 For him, this meant economic and social legislation, as well as the repeal of 
coercive measures. Redmond described the Peace Preservation Act as not just an irritant 
and unfair but as “an open declaration of war upon every man in Ireland.”17 Its end was 
necessary for the Irish people to trust in British administration while Home Rule 
remained on the backburner.  
In 1905, at a speech in Swinford, Co. Mayo, John Dillon voiced his opinion that 
the Wyndham Land Act was a “dismal failure” because the issue of the renting of 
untenanted grazing land had not been considered. Landlords successfully exploited this 
loophole at the expense of the landless. In a speech two days later in Tuam in Co. 
Galway, he called for the introduction of compulsory purchase of land in the West to 
remedy land grievances.
18 
Similarly, in a speech in Roscommon, Redmond expressed his 
desire to break up the large tracts of land used for grazing in the West as the only 
solution to the plight of the people there.
19 
For radical Irish Nationalist M.P.s Laurence 
Ginnell and David Sheehy, it was unjust for the landless poor in the West to have to 
choose between the indifference of landlords when it came to the possible sale of their 
lands and the possibility of jumping aboard an emigrant ship to escape extreme 
poverty.
20
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Once the Ranch War erupted in the autumn of 1906, Redmond was largely silent 
on the issue because he wanted to avoid a division within his party between those who 
supported agrarian agitation and those who wished to distance themselves from such 
illegal activities. Disorder in the West reached its zenith in the autumn of 1907, owing in 
no small part to the Nationalist reaction toward the embarrassing failure of the Irish 
Council Bill. The universal condemnation of the Council Bill at the Convention in May 
had worried Redmond, who feared his inability to achieve more political autonomy for 
Ireland could result in his replacement as party leader. Soon after the Council Bill 
failure, he sent a letter to Birrell asking him to make his intentions known in regard to 
future economic and social reforms, which would, he hoped, help secure his position.
21 
In July, Redmond, to bolster his political support, thrust his support behind Ginnell and 
Sheehy’s coordination of cattle driving, and hoped this would force Birrell to pass land 
legislation on more favorable terms. At a speech in Battersea, Redmond called for 
“widespread and vigorous agitation in Ireland [and] especially a movement which will 
force the compulsory purchase of the grazing tracts in the West of Ireland.”22  
In June, West Belfast Nationalist M.P. Joe Devlin, in a letter to Dillon, had 
outlined the reasons for the change in party policy towards the land issue. After several 
conferences with Redmond it was agreed that: 
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“Prompt steps should be taken to give the country a lead and to deal with the 
situation that has arisen in consequence of the rejection of Birrell’s [Irish 
Council] Bill.”23  
 
The Chief Secretary was aware that the failure of the Council Bill could have the twin 
effect of damaging the Irish Party’s relationship with its constituents, and his 
relationship with Redmond and Dillon, if he did not respond with some sort of 
conciliatory measure on outstanding land grievances. He believed it a matter of honor 
for the government to resolve the issue by restoring evicted tenants or by finding them a 
new home.
24
  
On June 27, 1907, Birrell introduced the Evicted Tenants Bill to the House of 
Commons. Before discussing its particulars, the Chief Secretary painted a gloomy 
picture of the West of Ireland, with its melancholy atmosphere, dilapidated hovels, and 
the rotting and saturated turf in the fields. He hoped what he now proposed would be 
taken by the population as a measure of good faith and good feeling.
25
 The Bill was to 
provide for the compulsory [if need be] sale of land for the resettlement of thousands of 
evicted tenants. The second clause of the 1903 Land Act enabled evicted tenants to 
become purchasers of their former holdings. Thus far, Birrell informed Parliament, 
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under Wyndham’s measure, only 1033 of 8041 applications for restoration to former 
holdings had been successful. To speed things up compulsion had to be part of this piece 
of legislation. After providing a detailed synopsis of his Bill, the Chief Secretary spoke 
of its necessity:  
 
“A measure of this sort, I honestly believe, will help to bind up many a well-nigh 
broken heart, and in some measure to staunch the bleeding wound. At all events, 
those of us who feel able to support this measure through its passage may feel 
certain that their own winter firesides will be all the brighter by their efforts, and 
that the roof-trees of their own homes, which probably are not half as dear to 
them as the cabin of the Irish peasant is to him, will stand all the faster.”26 
 
The Bill in its final form was given the Royal Assent on August 28.  It resulted in the 
purchase of 26,000 acres and the resettlement of 3500 tenants either to their former 
property or to new holdings. Although Birrell had addressed a particular grievance, he 
had failed to satisfy the majority of people in the West who felt aggrieved at the vast 
tracts of untenanted ranch land still unavailable to them. Cattle driving, boycotting and 
intimidation continued, and was a source of constant frustration for his Irish 
administration. 
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Birrell referred to Ginnell as a “pestilent ass” because his inflammatory speeches 
throughout the latter half of 1907 allegedly caused much criminal unrest.
27 
At the end of
August the Under Secretary Anthony MacDonnell drew up a report on the activities of 
Ginnell and Sheehy for Birrell’s perusal. He suggested that if their actions remained 
unchecked then the government would have no choice but to freshly employ the Crimes 
Act, which would in turn be a confession that the Liberal Government was unable to 
govern Ireland by ordinary law. He advocated for criminal proceedings against Sheehy 
and Ginnell based on the provocative nature of their speeches, labelling them “disruptive 
of public respect for law and order.” He felt it was demoralizing for policemen to be 
chasing after cattle let loose by the agitators, and it was particularly upsetting for the 
rank and file police officer that so few convictions were made.
28
In a speech on August 25, Sheehy had told his supporters that his doctrine was to 
turn cattle out on the road and let the police go after them. He also called for collective 
action against landlords who voted against the Evicted Tenants Bill in the House of 
Lords. He warned: 
“if wherever I find the people agreeing to sell to any individual of that House of 
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the sale until the grabber is out, and the evicted tenant is in.”29
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55 
In September, at Dunboyne, Co. Meath, he threatened potential graziers that if they took 
up the eleven month lease system any more they would have to face the consequences 
from the local population.
30 
Likewise, Ginnell, in a July speech at Elphin, Co.
Roscommon, called for agitation up and down the country toward the grazing system, 
through boycotts and cattle driving, until it was broken up.
31 
In September, at a meeting
in Meath, he said graziers should not be given another twenty-four hour’s peace or grace 
until the lease system was destroyed.
32
In a letter to his Under Secretary a day after the passage of the Evicted Tenants 
Act, Birrell took a swipe at the House of Lords, which had used its powers, he believed, 
simply to foment trouble. Frustrated with their amendments to his Bill he complained 
they haggled over the price of land as a mischievous way to protect the planter class. He 
was sure, if he and MacDonnell were given a free hand they could fix all Irish land 
problems within six months, but these “carrion crows” in the Lords made it next to 
impossible.
33 
Redmond felt sorry for Birrell, and felt the landed class in the upper
chamber, and their Conservative friends in the Commons, wished to hamper the Chief 
30
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Secretary’s efforts so that he would become embroiled in the inevitable rural unrest in 
Ireland during the winter months, thus undermining his position.
34 
 In Birrell’s reply to MacDonnell’s report, which called for criminal proceedings 
to be lodged against Sheehy and Ginnell, he recommended caution because he was 
certain it would do more harm than good. Furthermore, he believed it would be a direct 
Liberal challenge to the Irish Party if it was to sanction the arrest of any of its members. 
The Chief Secretary recognized their speeches were mischievous but reflected that they 
had a certain degree of truth to them. Furthermore, he tried to downplay Redmond’s 
increasingly sympathetic views towards the agitators, informing MacDonnell that the 
Irish Party leader’s speeches were feeble and verbose, and did not include a call to 
violence.
35
 In a letter to the Irish Attorney General Richard Robert Cherry, Birrell 
claimed Ginnell’s policy of clearing ranches of cattle and intimidation was probably a 
good strategy leading into the winter months because the onus would be on the 
government to implement reforms to deal with the crisis in the West. Like MacDonnell, 
he told Cherry he would not get involved in a policy of coercion because that was a Tory 
game not befitting a Liberal government.
36
 It was easy for the Tories to have a dual 
policy of coercion and conciliation because that party had the House of Lords on its side. 
                                                 
 
34
 Patrick John Cosgrove, “The Wyndham Land Act, 1903: The Final Solution to the Irish Land 
Question?” (PhD thesis, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2008), 326. 
 
35
 Birrell to MacDonnell, September 2, 1907, MS Eng. hist. c 350, Bodleian Library. 
 
36
 The word Tory is synonymous with the British Conservative Party. Prior to 1832 those political 
supporters of traditional political and social institutions against the forces of reform were known as Tories. 
  
57 
 
For the Liberals, the House of Lords made it difficult to mollify the Irish through 
reforms, and so he had to deal with shouts of “firm government” from the Opposition.37 
 As the Ranch War intensified throughout the cold months in the West, Birrell 
grew weary of criticisms directed his way due to the lack of progress towards land 
reform. In a letter to Dillon on December 2, he said he wished Ginnell would cease 
denigrating him in the press.
38 
He was most likely alluding to the speech Ginnell gave in 
Meath a day prior in which he advocated cattle scattering in Johnstown and 
Garmoylstown if land was to be let for grazing in the New Year. According to the police 
note taker the radical Irish M.P. said: 
 
“If Mr. Birrell were honest and thought badly of cattle scattering he would apply 
at once the only remedy now possible – to break up the ranches at once, instead 
of waiting to be forced to do it; and even the landlords and future historians 
might salute Augustine Birrell as a man.”39  
 
An arrest warrant was issued in Dublin by High Court judge Mr. John Ross for Ginnell 
to be sentenced for a period of six months. Birrell hoped this would both quell the 
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dissension among Unionists in the Commons, and lessen disturbances in the Irish 
countryside. 
 Hampering Birrell’s ability to propose substantive land reform was the length of 
time it took the Dudley Commission to report its findings. When the Liberal 
Government came to power at the end of 1905, the new Chief Secretary Bryce had 
sought solutions to the continued agrarian problems facing Ireland. Without a good 
understanding of the problems facing Irish peasants, he was unwilling to legislate until 
the matter was thoroughly researched. Appointed in July 1906, the Dudley Commission 
held, over the course of two years, 116 meetings across Ireland and interviewed 559 
witnesses to try to understand the problems in the West so they could be remedied.  
 The Irish Party leaders had differing views on the value of further land reforms. 
For Redmond, while he sympathized with the plight of the people in the poverty-stricken 
West of Ireland, rural lawlessness and cruelty to animals undermined the positive image 
of a respectable nationalism he was trying to generate.
40
 He hoped for a meaningful 
measure from the Chief Secretary to address the shortcomings of the Wyndham Act, 
because continued unrest only hampered his argument that the Irish were a civilized 
people, ready for self-government. Dillon, the champion of the bloc of Irish Party M.P.s 
who supported agrarian agitation, wished for another land act, but believed a successful 
legislative remedy was potentially threatening to the Nationalist cause, insofar as it 
undermined the use of agrarian agitation as a weapon to be wielded in pursuit of Home 
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Rule.
41 
Nevertheless, Dillon viewed the landed aristocracy as a chief evil for Ireland, and 
understood cattle grazing to be an explosion of popular feeling against landlordism, 
which had desolated the country. He was outraged that there existed in western counties, 
such as Roscommon and Mayo, rich, grassy lands, inhabited by cattle, while humans 
were cast to the roadside in a state of beggary.
42
 
 The final report of “Dudley’s Commission on Congestion in Ireland” was 
submitted to Birrell in May 1908. The area assessed encompassed 3.6 million acres [one 
sixth of total acreage of the country] with a population of 506,000 people. The term 
congestion was a misnomer because it was used to refer to people who were considered 
exceptionally poor, and not overcrowding. The Commission found that the average value 
of agricultural holdings was 3s 6d per acre compared to 12s 1d for rest of Ireland. The 
trouble, it concluded, was not the scarcity of land, but the scarcity of any but the poorest 
land. Nine-tenths of the population in the congested districts was dependent on the land 
for a living, but over three-quarters were living on holdings too small to support them in 
a reasonable standard of living. Thus, many peasants engaged in seasonal migration to 
make ends meet.
43 
On June 2, the Chief Secretary submitted the results of the Dudley Commission 
to the Cabinet along with its recommended actions for resolving the land crisis in the 
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West. Any future land act, it found, should ensure the enlargement of small holdings to 
an economic standard to aid in the continued relief of congestion. It also advocated 
compulsory powers be granted to the Congested Districts Board and Estates 
Commissioners for purchase not only of tenanted but untenanted land whenever 
necessary to relieve congestion. Any land acquired in this way would not be negotiated 
like the 1903 Act; instead, it should be given a value set by the Commissioners. A large 
increase in Treasury grants would be needed to help relief efforts.
44
 Within his Cabinet 
memorandum Birrell claimed cattle-driving was the sole political movement in the West, 
with no talk of devolution or Home Rule. He warned the government:
 
 
“the present situation in Ireland is capable of very dangerous development, and 
that past experience teaches us that we do not in the long run secure economy by 
simply refusing to listen to Irish demands.”45 
 
For Birrell, the resolution of land grievances was a top priority to ensure a 
peaceful and stable Irish society, and he set to work on drafting legislation to remedy the 
situation. The sorry condition of the people in the West of Ireland caused him great 
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anxiety, and was adamant that, as long as he continued as Chief Secretary, he would not 
work in the interests of landlords, nor any other section of society, but for the interests of 
the Irish as a whole.
46
 He knew an adequate money supply was crucial to the success of 
any further Land Act. Earlier in the year, in a Commons speech on government finances, 
Birrell pleaded for extra funds from a “reluctant and rebellious” Treasury to aid land 
purchases stemming from the 1903 Act.
47 
Unfortunately,  the British Treasury was 
burdened with the crippling costs associated with the Boer War, the arms race with 
Germany, and the finances associated with its social and economic programs.
48
 Birrell 
hoped with an increased money supply the land issue could be successfully put to rest 
within the next ten to fifteen years.
49 
Introducing his Land Bill to the House of Commons on November 23, Birrell 
warned his colleagues that the entire peace and prosperity of Ireland were bound up in its 
soil. The Dudley Commission raised some alarming numbers on the plight of people in 
congested districts. Nine-tenths of the population lived on land worth on average £6 
compared to a general average valuation of £22. The structure of many estates was found 
to be based on an old communal or tribal system of land holding, whilst the land itself 
was of poor quality. In fact, most of the holdings consisted mainly of rough grazing land, 
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and potatoes and oats were the only crops usually grown. The methods of cultivation 
were primitive, with little rotation of crops, insufficient drainage, and inadequate 
manuring. To address these problems the Chief Secretary argued access to new lands 
needed to be made available with adequate instruction on modern farming techniques; 
otherwise the people must either starve or emigrate. To achieve this, the great grazing 
lands of the West needed to be broken up.
50
 
 Birrell proposed to reconstruct the Congested Districts Board, greatly enlarge its 
area of operation and its funds, and grant it the contentious power of compulsory 
purchase. The Chief Secretary defended compulsion, saying that it was not such a 
terrible thing, because landlords would receive lucrative bargains under such 
circumstances. He was convinced the no one in Ireland was afraid of this “bugbear of 
compulsion,” and there should be no delay in legislating this measure. The condition of 
Ireland would have been better, he was sure, had it been enforced much sooner.
51
  John 
Redmond congratulated him on his “bold and far-reaching” measure of reform, even if it 
contained several defects. He lauded him for granting the Estates Commissioners the 
power of compulsion both inside and beyond the congested districts and was certain it 
would receive widespread satisfaction in Ireland. Redmond pointed to the evil done by 
British governments in the past who forced peasants off their fertile lands. The Irish 
Party leader lamented how much time and effort the Commons had to devote to Ireland’s 
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economic difficulties in the past fifty years, and expressed hope that Birrell’s proposals 
afforded the first real prospect of the final settlement of the land question.
52 
Dillon 
appreciated Birrell’s frankness on the terrible conditions of peasants in the West. 
Whereas the Chief Secretary had said the government must choose either rescuing these 
people from despair or protecting the cattle trade, Dillon countered that the cattle 
industry would actually benefit from the breaking up of grazing lands. Addressing the 
shortfalls of the 1903 Act, Dillon said the best way to judge the effectiveness of land 
reform was by the level of peace and contentment it brought to the country. Clearly, 
Wyndham’s Act was a great achievement but it chiefly benefited more comfortable 
tenants, thus the agrarian unrest of the past few years was a testament to this shortfall.
53
 
 
Unfortunately for Birrell he was unable to get the Second Reading of the Bill into 
the Commons before the Christmas break of 1908. A Second Reading would have 
allowed him the opportunity to divulge the intricacies of the Bill. This would have given 
his Irish friends in Parliament an opportunity to go to the countryside to explain the 
measure to the Irish people, and quell the tempers of the cattle-drivers. The ever-popular 
land agitator William O’Brien attacked the Bill for not going far enough to alleviate the 
suffering of the people. His condemnation made Redmond wary about an upsurge in 
criminal activities during the winter months.
54 
Boycotting, cattle-driving and other forms 
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of intimidation soared as did Unionist attacks on Birrell for not granting more powers to 
the police to crack down on the criminals. 
 The Second Reading of the Land Bill was eventually introduced on March 30, 
1909. Birrell proudly announced that Ireland was in the midst of a “gigantic agrarian 
revolution” whereby landlordism was on its way out. Seven million acres of land had 
changed hands and a further nine million acres would soon be sold. In response to 
Unionist criticisms of the Bill as nothing more than pandering to the Irish Party, 
Redmond reminded them that there was not one Unionist who was returned for an 
agricultural constituency who did not express himself in favor of compulsory purchase 
in Ireland. John Dillon commended the Bill for being the first one presented by a British 
government to apply a fix to the problem of congestion; the root, he was sure, of all land 
disorder in Ireland. He warned that if the Bill was thrown out or badly mutilated in the 
House of Lords, then land purchase would cease in Ireland because within the past year 
inadequate Treasury support had shifted the onus of land purchase costs onto Irish 
property taxes and, added that, the current system of land purchase was simply 
unsustainable.
55 
During the Third Reading of the Bill in September, Birrell came under increased 
scrutiny from Irish Unionists over the government’s power of compulsion. Sir Edward 
Carson assailed him for practically avoiding debate on the compulsion clauses during the 
previous discussion of the Bill and expressed deep reservations about the power of the 
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Congested Districts Board. The Chief Secretary countered that parliamentary discussion 
surrounding the contentious People’s Budget of 1909 left much less time to be devoted 
to the Land Bill. Birrell added that the 1903 Act had been irretrievably smashed beyond 
repair, and that his study of the various Land Acts passed in Ireland over the past fifty 
years had proven the Nationalist Party represented people who had sincere grievances 
about the shortcomings of these acts.
56
 Carson criticized the Liberal government for 
pandering to lawlessness in Ireland and demanded the Bill be delayed by six months so 
the Opposition could fully examine its contents and ramifications. Redmond defended 
the Chief Secretary for his tenacity in resolving the land question, and expressed his 
hope that the House of Lords would not destroy the Bill, because if it were rejected there 
would be “widespread disappointment and irritation and resentment in Ireland.” Dillon 
attacked the Unionists for their prejudicial and fear-mongering statements, and criticized 
them for not offering any practical alternatives. For him, the Wyndham Land Act had 
failed in its financial arrangements and it was unfair for Irish taxpayers to be forced to 
make up the shortfall. Like Redmond and Birrell, he hoped the Lords would not be so 
foolish as to destroy the Bill.
57 
 The slow pace at which the House of Lords dealt with the Land Bill deeply 
frustrated Redmond, who warned Birrell that the people of Ireland were beginning to 
think the promises made by the government were all humbug.
58 
In early November, the 
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Chief Secretary put forth the Lords’ amendments to the Land Bill for discussion in the 
Commons. He told his colleagues he could not fathom the scrapping of the Bill at this 
juncture. Of the thirty-seven most significant clauses of the Bill, the Lords struck out 
twenty-four of them. Nine of the thirteen remaining clauses were radically altered, and 
sixteen new clauses were added to the Bill. In his typically witty fashion, Birrell rhymed 
off the clauses A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P and Q “not to show that I 
know the alphabet, but because those things are there.” In a frustrated swipe at the upper 
house, he argued that the democratically-elected Commons was responsible for the 
government of the country, and if the Lords ruthlessly disregarded the need for 
legislation to preserve peace and prosperity in Ireland, then they would have truly 
declared war on the principles of representative government. If a settlement could not be 
reached then the Lords would have to shoulder the blame.
59
 
Birrell did not want the hard work of the Dudley Commission and his 
formulation of a Land Bill that he firmly believed would be of great benefit to Ireland to 
go to waste. On November 10 he met with some of the more obstinate Tories including 
Lansdowne, Aikinson and Long, and brought with him Lord Cherry and British Attorney 
General Sir William Robson, in the hope of achieving a compromise acceptable to both 
parties. Those opposed to the Land Bill in its proposed form wanted landlords and 
tenants to have the right to come together under the provision of the Wyndham Act for 
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the purposes of sale and purchase. They were opposed to government interference on 
tenanted land if it was economically sound, while on the issue of compulsion they 
expressed deep misgivings but were prepared to recognize the principle within congested 
areas. Outside these districts they sought a tribunal to make rulings on individual cases 
rather than through compulsion. Afterwards, in a letter to Redmond, Birrell expressed 
his worry and anger that the obstinate state of mind in the House of Lords could ruin the 
bill because they had the propensity towards stupidity and nagging over the most trivial 
of things. Nevertheless, he was glad of their reluctant acceptance of compulsion, even if 
they had placed costly restrictions upon it.
60
 
 
In its final form, the Land Act of 1909 represented a triumph for Birrell and the 
Irish Party. The Treasury provided more money for tenants wishing to purchase land, 
whilst both the Congested Districts Board and the Estates Commissioners were granted 
limited compulsory powers to deal with untenanted land in congested areas. This 
effectively resolved all but the most radical demands of the anti-grazier movement in the 
West. A judicial commissioner was tasked with deciding the price for land acquired this 
way, and it was purchased in cash. The Act was less favorable towards landlords 
because, unlike the generous provisions of the Wyndham Act, they were to be paid in 
stock for voluntary sales rather than with cash. By 1920, the various Tory Land Acts, 
and with the additional financing and compulsory sale powers within Birrell’s Act, over 
£157,000,000 had been loaned to finance peasant purchase of over nine million acres of 
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Irish land, enabling over 200,189 tenants to buy their holdings. In 1870 only 3% of 
tenants owned the land on which they toiled, but by 1916 this had increased to 63.9%.
61
 
Birrell’s Land Act of 1909 gave the Irish Party a solid mandate on which to continue to 
work in alliance with the Liberal Party for the betterment of the Irish people. Thankfully 
for both, agrarian unrest plummeted after the Bill received the Royal Assent on 
December 3, 1909. 
Another reason for the flourishing relationship between the Irish Chief Secretary 
and the leaders of the Irish Party was the former’s work towards resolving Catholic 
grievances in higher education. The Catholic hierarchy in Ireland had long pushed for 
the establishment of a Catholic College within the University of Dublin in which the 
Protestant Trinity College was the sole institution. In 1793, two hundred years after its 
establishment in Dublin, Catholics were finally admitted to pursue degrees at Trinity; 
however, the Catholic bishops had condemned Trinity as dangerous to the faith and 
morals of Catholics, and in 1906 reiterated their opposition to any form of “mixed 
education.”62 A principle tenet of Liberalism was non-denominational education, 
something Birrell had attempted with his Education Bill of 1906. The opportunity to 
address the problems in higher education in Ireland was, as Birrell phrased it, the reason 
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why he crossed to Dublin in the first place to give all Irish people access to “cheap, 
popular and good” higher education.63 
 The British Government had set up the Robertson [1903] and Fry Commissions 
[1906] to inquire into the condition of higher education outside of Trinity College, and to 
offer suggestions for a more inclusive system.  Neither Commission offered a clear-cut 
course of action. Despite this, Chief Secretary Bryce decided to produce a scheme that 
called for the establishment of a new College suitable for Catholics alongside Trinity 
College in a reconstituted University of Dublin. The old Queen’s Colleges of Galway, 
Cork and Belfast, founded in 1845 [but now failing badly], would be united with the 
University of Dublin.
 Bryce’s scheme was immediately met with scorn by both the 
leaders of Trinity and their Irish Unionist allies who did not want any government 
interference in “the only successful British institution in Ireland.” Likewise, Catholic 
religious leaders also condemned the measure, simply because they did not want any 
Protestant influence over Catholic education.
64
 Birrell believed Bryce was much too 
hasty in creating a university scheme, and knew a different approach was needed for it to 
gain acceptance.
65 
 
Upon his appointment as Chief Secretary in January 1907, Birrell took up the 
challenge of creating a university which “the Catholics of Ireland could flock to with 
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pride and pleasure.”66 The rejection of the Irish Council Bill by the Irish Party 
Convention on May 21, 1907, left Redmond in an uncomfortable position, whereby he 
had to convince his voters it was still worthwhile to maintain the Irish-Liberal alliance. 
Believing he had lost electoral support, he pressed Birrell to push forward with his plans 
for higher education.
67 
Recognizing the opposition of both Unionists across the country 
and the leaders of Trinity College towards Bryce’s scheme, the Chief Secretary proposed 
leaving this historic Protestant institution as it was.
68 
He recommended the abolition of 
the current Royal University in Belfast and the Queens’ Colleges. In their stead there 
would be two new Universities. One would be the National University of Ireland in 
Dublin with constituent colleges at Cork and Galway, while in Belfast a new Queen’s 
University would be established. Whereas Redmond wanted a universities bill 
introduced as early as May 1907 along the lines of Bryce’s scheme, Birrell was much 
more cautious in his approach to formulating legislation, opting to take his time fully to 
understand the conflicting demands of all sides.
 
 On the Catholic side Birrell interacted chiefly with the Dr. William Walsh, who 
was the Archbishop of Dublin and Primate of Ireland, and Fr. William Delaney, who 
was the head of the Catholic Defence League and President of University College. 
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Birrell’s proposals were not well-received by Walsh at first, and, reflecting on his 
discussions with the Archbishop, he quickly understood why: 
 
“To live in a Catholic city, as a Catholic Archbishop does, with this Protestant 
Elizabethan institution forever staring you in the face was no doubt galling to a 
proud prelate.”69 
 
Nevertheless, through skillful negotiation Birrell persevered. He knew the influence the 
Catholic clergy had over the Irish people, so he needed its support, otherwise any 
agreement struck with the Irish political leaders would be pointless.
70
 He managed to 
win over Delaney by a common desire to negotiate a scheme which did not include 
Trinity College. Although Walsh was disappointed successive British governments had 
failed to establish a Catholic college within the University of Dublin, he came to realize 
that Birrell’s plan had a good chance of passing through Parliament, and would not 
involve any attempt to force Catholics into a reorganized Trinity College.
71
 Reflecting 
on his negotiations with the clergy, Birrell joked that in Ireland one could sometimes 
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succeed in sending a man to prison against his will, but never to a college. The present 
college system, he concluded, was provided without thought of what Irishmen wanted.
72 
 
Birrell found it easy to placate the leaders of Trinity College by simply fostering 
a plan that left it untouched. An ancient Anglican bastion of higher education in Ireland, 
Trinity College, having come under the scrutiny of the Fry Commission, nonetheless 
regarded itself as the home of liberalism, equality of opportunity, non-
denominationalism and non-sectarianism.
73 
The Fawcett Tests Act of 1873 had opened 
up the College to non-Anglicans, and its leaders claimed lecturers were appointed based 
on merit and not on their religious affiliation.
74
 Its outright hostility to any sort of 
Catholic-controlled upper level education was succinctly articulated through its Trinity 
Defence Committee pamphlets. Whereas it claimed to offer an education based on 
freedom of thought and expression, it labelled Catholic education medieval in that it was 
based on authority and faith rather than free rational thinking, teaching only what 
bishops believed should be taught.
75 
Birrell sought out Provost Anthony Traill and 
gained his support by promising him Trinity College would remain untouched.
76
 In a 
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speech to Trinity graduates at Manchester, Traill assured his listeners the Chief Secretary 
would not interfere with the college, and on those assurances, they would be poor 
patriots if they did not offer the Chief Secretary their full support for a non-
denominational bill to address genuine educational grievances in the country.
77 
For the 
Presbyterians of Ulster the offer of a new University in Belfast where no doubt its 
professors and students would be largely of the Protestant faith was acceptable. A 
harbinger of future events surrounding the Home Rule issue, Birrell recognized the 
necessity of creating universities both in the north and south of the country in order to 
make his scheme amenable to everyone. 
 On March 31, 1908, Birrell submitted his Universities Bill to the House of 
Commons. His recent experience, although not considerable, convinced him of the 
necessity of creating an educational environment which would provide good teaching 
and intellectual discipline across the country. Bryce’s scheme of bringing the Queen’s 
Colleges in Belfast, Cork and Galway [created by Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel in 
1845] under the federal control of the National University in Dublin was unworkable due 
to “local patriotism”, and Birrell was happy to announce he had a scheme that had “an 
extraordinary amount of support throughout the length and breadth of Ireland.” He called 
for the creation of two new universities: one in Belfast and a National University of 
Ireland, which would have branches in Dublin, Galway and Cork. Although legally 
recognized as secular institutions, thus guaranteeing them public funds, Birrell accepted 
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the suggestion of the Catholic Bishops to establish senates to oversee the foundation and 
administration of both universities; as such, considering demographics, the Queen’s 
University of Belfast senate was markedly Protestant in composition while that of the 
National University of Ireland was chiefly Roman Catholic.  
Furthermore, the Bill allowed the new institutions to affiliate, or allow a 
constituent college to affiliate, for the purposes of university training and education. 
Birrell told his peers that a university which ignored the clergy of the country would 
undoubtedly start at a great disadvantage.
78
 This meant the religious colleges of 
Maynooth [Catholic] and Magee [Presbyterian] could send their clergy to receive 
degrees from the new universities.
79
 The inclusion of affiliate colleges raised a lot of 
eyebrows from disapproving politicians. Tory leader Arthur Balfour took a swipe at 
Birrell’s reversal of direction on the question of education. Referring to the Chief 
Secretary’ work on the failed Education Bill of 1906 Balfour said: 
 
“It seems to me that there is a rather violent change between bringing a Bill 
which was intended to destroy the denominational atmosphere in the places of 
education in this country and going across the Channel for the sole purpose of 
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establishing a great academic institution in which the denominational atmosphere 
is to prevail.”80 
 
Birrell’s under-secretary, Sir Antony MacDonnell, expressed his incredulity on 
this matter to the then, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Herbert Henry Asquith, saying that 
the Chief Secretary had not only delivered himself into Redmond’s hands on the land 
issue but had delivered himself into the hands of the Jesuits on the universities issue.
81
 
Irish Unionists such as Ulster’s James Craig vocally expressed their suspicions in 
Parliament that the Universities Bill was a roundabout means of establishing a university 
in Dublin that would be more or less Roman Catholic in nature. Another Unionist 
suggested that the Bill was a reward to the prelates for having declared their opposition 
to cattle-driving.
82
 The Chief Secretary replied that, in its truest sense, a denominational 
university was one which prevented people from exercising their rights, and his bill was 
as un-denominational as allowed by law. In a retort to Craig, he joked that he thought he 
would have never seen the day that a Conservative-Unionist [the traditional party of the 
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Established Anglican Church] would advocate the exclusion of clergymen from all 
participation in university education.
83
  
Despite such criticisms, Irish Unionist Sir Edward Carson believed it was the 
right thing to do. During the Second Reading of the Bill on May 11 he said it was of the 
utmost importance to address the grievances of his fellow countrymen, and insisted it 
was: 
 
“…the duty of every Irishman, of whatever creed or politics, to wish God-speed 
to these Universities, and to do his best in a spirit of noble generosity to make 
them a great success; and I hope that the bringing of them into existence may be 
a step forward in the union of all classes and religions in Ireland for the progress 
of our country and its education.” 
 
Birrell spoke of his satisfaction that Carson was fully behind his bill. The Chief 
Secretary recognized that strife and contention were the hallmarks of his first few years 
in office, but tonight he was delighted to walk the path of peace and duly assist in laying 
the foundations of liberal seats of learning in Ireland.
84
  He recognized it was likely the 
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new universities would foster a denominational atmosphere, but he would rather that 
happen that have no university at all.
85
  
Redmond, although he had some reservations about the bill, supported the 
tireless work of the Chief Secretary. Responding to critics who felt Birrell was pandering 
to the Catholic bishops, the Irish Party chairman said it was impossible for the National 
University of Ireland to not have a denominational atmosphere. He pointed to the 
recently established University of Khartoum in the Sudan, which undoubtedly had an 
Islamic atmosphere because its students were largely Muslim, then so too, he concluded, 
the new university in Dublin would have a Catholic atmosphere, something that was 
simply a fact of life given Ireland’s religious composition.86 He was delighted Birrell’s 
Bill would provide the youth of the country a great opportunity.
87 
 
Dillon was much more vociferous than his leader in defending the likelihood of a 
denominational atmosphere at the National University of Ireland. He challenged the 
opposition for their hypocrisy and fearmongering for charging the Irish Party as 
advocates of clericalism and as slaves to the Bishop of Rome. He reminded them that for 
hundreds of years Trinity College only allowed a Protestant to be Provost yet it was still 
labelled a non-denominational entity. Queen’s College in Belfast had a rule in place that 
no man could be head of the college unless he was Protestant. He said there was: 
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“no reason why in a country and a nation like Ireland, where the Catholics form 
the vast majority, they should be compelled to enter into institutions which are 
dominated, and must for years and years to come be dominated by their bitter 
enemies, and by men of other creeds.” 
 
He insisted that the Catholics of the country had a right to higher education outside of 
the hands of a small intolerant and domineering minority in the country. Praising Birrell, 
Dillon said the Irish Party, speaking for the general body of Catholics in Ireland, 
accepted his bill and thanked him for having proposed it. By persevering with the bill, in 
spite of the views of hard-line Conservatives, the Chief Secretary would render one of 
the greatest services to the Irish nation which had ever been given to an English 
statesman to render.
88
 
 The Universities Act received the Royal Assent on July 31, 1908, much to the 
delight of Redmond and the Irish Party. It gave the Irish leader the perfect platform upon 
which to continue to foster the Irish alliance with the Liberal Party. In September, 
Redmond addressed a meeting of the United Irish League in Dublin during which he 
said, to a chorus of cheers, that the University Act would rank with: 
 
“some two or three or four of the great emancipating measures of the last one 
hundred years, and which would stand as a landmark in the effort for the 
regeneration and freedom of their country.” 
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Ireland now had, he rejoiced, a free university governed by Irishmen who would make it 
a great success.
89
 The bond between the Chief Secretary and the Irish Party continued to 
grow, and Redmond wished to capitalize on this alliance with another push for Irish self-
government. He knew, however, that the Conservative-dominated House of Lords had 
the final say on any Home Rule Bill, but this would all change in late 1909 when the 
upper chamber decided to reject the Liberal Party’s financial budget, precipitating a 
major constitutional crisis. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PARLIAMENT ACT AND IRISH HOME RULE 
 
From 1907 onwards Britain had embarked on a massive shipbuilding program to 
bolster its defenses in an era of heightened imperialist ambition and militant nationalism 
on the European continent; so the Liberal Party found it increasingly difficult to fund its 
economic and social measures, such as the new and costly Old Age Pensions Act of 
1908. The “People’s Budget” of 1909 precipitated a constitutional crisis between the 
popularly elected House of Commons and the hereditary House of Lords.  Introducing 
his budget to the House of Commons on April 29, Lloyd George declared warfare 
against poverty and squalidness. His proposal called for a supertax on those making over 
£5,000 a year, a levy on alcohol and tobacco, and a scheme to place a value on all 
propertied land, so taxes could be levied on land worth more than £50.
1
 
 Approximately seventy-five percent of the tax increase would be paid by the 
wealthiest ten percent of the population, and since many Tory and Liberal landowners in 
the upper chamber were wealthy landowners they were outraged. On November 30, after 
much discussion and debate the Lords rejected the Finance Bill, thus sparking a 
constitutional crisis which would play out through two General Elections in 1910. The 
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Liberal Party hoped a sweeping electoral victory would provide it with a mandate to 
reform the upper house.
2
 
Birrell had been slighted in the past by the House of Lords when they amended 
into oblivion his Education Bill of 1906, and was therefore happy to see its hereditary 
power challenged. He would appreciate the value of an upper house if it could examine 
legislation with an impartial eye, but firmly believed the Lords “ceased to play the part 
of an intelligent second chamber.”3  Even personal vendettas stood in the way of 
meaningful legislation. For example, the Liberal Lord Rosebery, a former prime 
minister, called the budget tyrannical and socialistic. Birrell reflected that Rosebery’s 
hatred of Ireland was that of a jilted woman, because the Irish had helped bring down his 
government in 1895; therefore relying on his support was out of the question.
4
 For him 
the Lords veto power simply meant, “I say no.” When a government minister dissented 
or grumbled at Lords’ amendments to Bills, Birrell remarked, the Lords would flippantly 
suggest they dissolve so the Tories could govern.
5
 The Lords should only exist, he 
believed, if it had the capacity and willingness to exercise purely critical functions, but 
the present system was most unfair to the Liberal Party.  
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The Irish Party took offense to Lloyd George’s budget because of the proposed 
tax hikes on Ireland’s powerful liquor trade, which, in brewing and distilling, was a main 
manufacturing interest in southern Ireland, and in retail employed many in Ireland’s 
“shopkeeping” community.6  The political crisis triggered by the Lords’ rejection of the 
budget presented a fortunate opportunity for Redmond to push forward with his demand 
for Home Rule.
7
 Redmond threatened his Liberal allies that unless an official declaration 
was made in favor of Irish self-government, he would instruct his Irish supporters in 
England to vote against Liberal candidates in the upcoming election.
8 
Prime Minister 
Asquith reluctantly acceded to Redmond’s demand, and on December 10, 1909, made a 
speech at the Royal Albert Hall in London, outlining his party’s renewed commitment to 
a system of self-government for Ireland. On December 21, during his electoral address in 
his North Bristol constituency, Augustine Birrell told voters that the House of Lords had 
been the cause of “much misery, many crimes and chronic disloyalty” in Ireland, and 
warned that the imminent January election was either a vote for the Commons or for the 
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Lords.
9
 Despite Asquith and Birrell’s speeches, most Liberal candidates [61%] avoided 
addressing the polarizing issue of Home Rule during the election campaign for fear of 
losing their seats to Conservative-Unionist candidates. Instead, they focused primarily 
on the intransigence of the Lords toward the “People’s Budget”. 
 The January election saw the Liberal Party majority melt away as it returned 275 
M.P.s [a loss of 104 seats from the 1906 election], while the Conservative-Unionists 
won 273 seats, the Irish Party eighty-three, the Irish Unionists twenty-one and Labour 
forty. This gave the Home Rulers the balance of power in parliament and a hold on the 
Liberals, meaning the Irish Question could not be brushed aside. Redmond was well-
aware that the most important subject to address first was the veto power of the House of 
Lords, because failure to do so would ensure a Home Rule Bill could never become law. 
Eager to capitalize on the inconclusive election, Redmond addressed the House of 
Commons on February 21: 
 
“Our only business in coming to this House at all is to advance the cause which 
the right hon. Gentleman [Asquith], in his Albert Hall speech, rightly called the 
cause of full self-government for Ireland in all purely Irish affairs. Your British 
politics do not concern us, except so far as they impinge on the fortunes of our 
country.” 
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He warned the House that he and his colleagues belonged to no English party, so it 
would be unwise to use the number of Irish Party MPs to calculate majorities.
10
 On 
March 4, Redmond outlined his party’s policy, stressing that if the Liberals did not deal 
with the Lords, then his party would not vote for the budget. Redmond was no fool, nor 
were Asquith and his Cabinet colleagues. Redmond knew he had to keep pressure on his 
Liberal allies for the good of his Irish Party and his own leadership, while the Liberals 
insisted that the Irish would be much worse off under a Tory government. A 
Liberal/Irish alliance was the only way for both parties to achieve their goals and to 
scuttle the Conservatives.  
 In February, Redmond met with Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, who was a Home Rule 
Tory, anti-imperialist, and close friend of former Chief Secretary George Wyndham. 
During their meeting, Redmond agreed with Blunt’s assessment that Asquith, and other 
Cabinet members such as Richard Haldane [Secretary of State for War] and Sir Edward 
Grey [Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs], were not earnest about Home Rule, 
although they agreed the influential Lloyd George and Winston Churchill were sincere 
on the issue.
11 
Redmond was correct in assuming Asquith was only half-hearted in 
pursuing Home Rule. The Prime Minister, like Haldane and Grey, was a Liberal 
Imperialist [those who felt the Irish issue had prevented the Liberal Party from becoming 
a truly national party], and had a personal distaste for having to rely on Irish votes to 
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maintain a government. As such, a mutual mistrust existed between them.
12 
During a 
lunch with Blunt in April, Dillon expressed his concern that the Liberal Party leader had 
lost much influence over his party, and that his marriage to his second wife, the socialite 
Margot Tennant, [who, he believed, was a Tory at heart] hampered the Irish cause.
13
 
Consequently, the Irish Party leadership continued to apply pressure upon their trusted 
ally Augustine Birrell to ensure their voice was heard during Cabinet discussions.
 
 During his first few years in Ireland, Birrell had conducted an effective holding 
operation on Home Rule through meaningful reforms, and through the appointment to 
mid-level positions within the civil service and county court system of men clearly 
aligned with the Irish Party.
14
 For him, the constitutional crisis presented a dual 
opportunity to rein in the power of the House of Lords, and to be able to push through a 
bill that would give the Irish people self-government. Immediately after the January 
election the Liberal Party submitted a Parliament Bill, which called for the Lords’ veto 
on finance bills to be abolished, for any bill that passed the Commons in three successive 
sessions within two years to become law even if the Lords rejected it, and for the 
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maximum duration for a Parliament to be reduced from seven to five years. If the Lords 
tried to stop the Parliament Bill, Asquith warned he would go to King Edward VII to 
demand the creation of hundreds of new Liberal peers in the upper chamber to outvote 
the Conservatives, thus ensuring its passage.  
 The Chief Secretary was in a buoyant mood, and wrote to Asquith in February 
assuring him he could count on Redmond’s support provided “we steam ahead” with the 
promises made in the Royal Albert Hall speech two months prior.
15 
Furthermore, Birrell 
saw the Parliament Bill as the best remedy to finally get rid of the “No you shan’t 
attitude” of the Lords.16 Largely ignorant of the increasingly hostile sentiment of Irish 
Unionists in the North, Birrell could not have fathomed the consequences of Edward 
Carson’s appointment as leader of the Irish Unionist Parliamentary Party just one week 
after his own optimistic correspondence with Asquith. Even before the Parliament Bill 
was tabled, British and Irish Unionists were becoming increasingly perturbed by the 
“dictatorial” nature of the Liberal Party, and took particular umbrage at Birrell’s 
dismissive attitude towards Unionists in Ulster.
17
 William Moore, a lawyer and Irish 
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Unionist, believed the Chief Secretary was only capable of governing through flippancy 
and jest, given the Birrell’s light-hearted nature and propensity for making jokes in the 
House of Commons.
18
 Clearly, Birrell was out of touch with the general feeling of 
Protestants in the North of Ireland, and his facetious attitude would ensure a tumultuous 
road ahead for the passage of a Home Rule Bill. 
 The sudden death of King Edward VII on May 6, 1910, and the accession of his 
son George V, slowed the Liberal Party’s assault upon the House of Lords. The new 
king, not wishing to begin his reign with a constitutional crisis, called for a truce to 
provide an opportunity for leaders on both sides to thrash out their differences. A 
constitutional conference convened on June 17, with four members from both the Liberal 
[including Birrell] and Conservative parties in attendance. They held twenty-two 
meetings over the next five months, and, although there was some discussion on reform 
of House of Lords, a compromise could not be reached, so the king’s plan failed. The 
Irish leaders, much to their distress, were not invited to attend these meetings. During the 
conference discussions, Lloyd George had proposed the two main parties, working 
together perhaps in a coalition, could resolve the Irish question through a non-partisan 
approach. He suggested “Home Rule All Round”, whereby England, Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales would all get their own devolved assemblies, thereby freeing up Westminster 
to take care of its own business, without relying on Irish votes.
19 
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 Birrell, Redmond and Dillon were opposed to this federal scheme because they 
believed such an idea would complicate the Irish part of the question, and could delay or 
wreck Home Rule altogether.
20 
For many Nationalists, they saw the federal proposal as a 
sinister way to destroy their aspirations of self-government, because it would 
undoubtedly lead to a years- long debate on political particulars that would never be 
resolved. Some Conservatives considered the idea of federal solution because it provided 
for the maintenance of the Union, and would dilute the Liberal-Irish-Labour alliance. 
Nevertheless, Opposition leader Arthur Balfour and other senior Tories did not see 
federalism as an ideal resolution to Ireland’s political problems, so did not seriously 
embrace Lloyd George’s proposal. The failure of the cross-party talks, at the behest of 
the king, meant the issue of the Lords’ veto failed to be resolved, therefore Asquith 
decided to call another general election in December in order to get a mandate from the 
British people to reform the unelected upper chamber.
21
  
Needing to raise funds for a second election, Redmond, and fellow party 
members T.P. O’Connor and Joseph Devlin, went to North America seeking financial 
support from Irish-Americans. At home, Redmond had adopted a much more 
conciliatory tone in his Home Rule speeches after Asquith’s Royal Albert Hall speech of 
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1909, but in the U.S.A., to appeal to the Irish community, his speeches, as they had 
always been on his tours of the country, were much more provocative. In a speech at 
Buffalo, New York, he dismissed the concessions given to Ireland by successive British 
governments as valueless, although such concessions could be used to strengthen the 
will of the Irish people to push forward in their goal for national independence.
  
In 
contrast, in a speech in England several months later he assured his listeners that, given 
Home Rule, Ireland would be as loyal as the British dominions of Canada, Australia and 
South Africa.
22
 Redmond’s openly contradictory public speeches created much mistrust, 
and further embittered Unionists both in Ireland and England.  
The December election was more or less a repeat of the January results. The 
Liberal Party won 271 seats, the Conservatives 272, making them the largest party in the 
House, Labour forty-two, and the Irish Home Rule Party eighty-four. Much like before, 
the Liberal Party candidates tried to avoid questions pertaining to Ireland during the 
election campaign, while the Conservatives played up the subject more in their appeal to 
those voters unsure about the future of the United Kingdom. Once again, it appeared 
Redmond and his party held the balance of power in the House of Commons. The first 
order of business for the Liberal Party was the passage of the Parliament Bill to limit the 
Lords’ veto to three parliamentary sessions. Fearing a flood of Liberal peers into the 
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Lords, the upper house reluctantly accepted the bill. A recalcitrant and morose Lord 
Selbourne remarked: 
 
“The question is, shall we perish in the dark, slain by our own hand, or in the 
light, killed by our enemies.” 
 
The Lords voted 131 to 114 not to attempt to amend the Parliament Bill, a result which 
signaled the death of the unbridled political power of the aristocracy.
23
 Reliant once 
again on the Irish Party for a majority, Asquith had to give serious consideration to the 
future of Ireland.  
In January, 1911, the Cabinet appointed a committee of seven ministers to 
discuss the entire Home Rule question. Birrell, along with Lloyd George, Herbert 
Samuel, Winston Churchill, Richard Haldane, Sir Edward Grey and Lord Loreburn as 
Chairman, examined the option of “Home Rule All Round” and the difficult matter of 
Irish finances. For Birrell, while he considered the idea of a federal scheme for Britain to 
be a practical idea, which would have the benefit of easing the workload of the imperial 
parliament in Westminster, he did not think it appropriate for Ireland.
24
  Redmond and 
Dillon, concerned about the possibility of the Cabinet pursuing a federal devolutionary 
scheme, sent a memorandum to Birrell, warning him and his fellow committee members 
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that it would be a “serious blot” on any Bill if it did not follow Mr. Gladstone’s plan [the 
Liberal Prime Minister who formulated the first two Home Rule Bills in 1886 and 1893] 
for the Irish legislature to be allowed to craft its own laws.
25 
The Chief Secretary supported the view of his Irish allies that the federal plan 
was unworkable for Ireland, and reassured Redmond of his intention to make any other 
solution than outright Home Rule impossible.
26
 It would be unfair, he believed, to 
include Ireland in a federal scheme, because it would only cause much consternation and 
avoidable delay. Optimistic that his colleagues would heed his warnings, Birrell told a 
gathering of the National Liberal Club that a Home Rule Bill would be presented in the 
next parliamentary session “with the full support of a united Cabinet.”27 At a speech in 
Ilfracombe in October, Birrell told his audience that of the thirty five royal commissions 
established since 1880 to address Irish grievances very few had delivered tangible 
results. He labeled as preposterous those English newspapers which argued that the 
desire for Home Rule was dying out in Ireland. If the Liberals were to fall from power as 
a result of their commitment to Home Rule, he warned that the Conservatives would 
soon find out just how content Ireland really was. The worst thing for England to do, he 
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argued, was to continue to pay the administrative and social costs of a country that 
clearly wanted to govern itself.
28 
Throughout the first half of his Chief Secretaryship, Birrell maintained a publicly 
flippant attitude toward Irish Unionism. Spurred on by Redmond’s dismissive attitude of 
the concerns of Protestant Ulstermen, he largely ignored the rising tide of antagonism 
that gripped the north of the country. Redmond viewed Irish Unionist objections as the 
“artificial product of continuing English conspiracy” to prevent Irish self-government 
and convinced Birrell the Ulster problem was mere bluster.
29
 The Chief Secretary had 
immersed himself with Irish literature during his first few years in office, and 
sympathized with the plight of Ireland’s Catholics. From Elizabethan times to Victorian 
times, he learned of their great suffering. To be a Catholic, he found, was to be an 
outcast, and to lose the rights to one’s land. Pointing to such successful examples like 
South Africa and Canada, which were given the responsibility of self-government, 
Birrell claimed that “never in the history of the world has the referment of self-
government failed.”30   
In the December election of 1910, the Chief Secretary wrote to the Ulster 
Guardian newspaper expressing his satisfaction that Liberal candidates were challenging 
Unionists for seats in Ulster, because electoral victory there would prove:  
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“how much Ulster is slandered by those who would have us believe that it is 
mainly inhabited by bigots who divide their time between crying ‘To Hell with 
the Pope’ and trembling at the thought of being allowed to manage their own 
affairs.”31  
 
What Birrell had failed to grasp was that the province of Ulster had undergone a rapid 
transformation during the previous thirty years, and with the firebrand Sir Edward 
Carson’s rise to power as head of the Ulster Unionists, the Chief Secretary and his 
Liberal colleagues could no longer ignore their opposition. 
 Until the 1880s, Ulster’s Protestants tended to vote for either the Conservative or 
Liberal Party, while a small number identified themselves with Orangeism [a movement 
that identified itself with defending Protestant civil and religious privilege]. In the face 
of two Liberal Party attempts to pass Irish Home Rule Bills in 1886 and 1893, Irish 
Unionists became increasingly organized and much more vociferous in their opposition 
toward Home Rule for Ireland, because, for them, they feared for their liberties in a 
predominantly Catholic-controlled parliament in Dublin. The voice of Ulster, Sir 
Edward Carson, let it be known that he and his followers were loyal subjects who were 
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one nationality with Great Britain; therefore, it would be unjust to subject them to a 
Dublin parliament.
32
  
Upon his appointment as Chief Secretary in 1907, Birrell was viewed with 
mistrust by the Irish Unionist community because of his close friendship with Redmond. 
The Belfast Newsletter stated he “donned the livery of the Nationalists [when appointed] 
and has been their obedient servant ever since.”33 The passage of the Parliament Act in 
1911 further fueled Unionist hostility towards Birrell, Redmond and the Liberal Party. 
The bill, which received the Royal Assent in August, limited the veto power of the 
House of Lords to three successive House of Commons sessions. For the Irish Party, it 
looked as though its alliance with the Liberal Party was finally paying off, and Home 
Rule might now become a reality. For the Unionists, it was an Irish/Liberal ploy to push 
through a bill for a Catholic-dominated parliament in Dublin that they clearly opposed. 
Reeling from continued Liberal hegemony after 1910, many in the Conservative 
Party came to view Ulster as an appropriate area to exert their political energy. For them, 
the assault on property [the 1909 People’s Budget] and the threat to the United Kingdom 
itself [Irish Home Rule] constituted reckless reform by a party intent on destroying the 
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British constitution.
34 
In November 1911, Andrew Bonar Law replaced Arthur Balfour 
as leader of the Conservative Party. Although born outside of the United Kingdom, his 
parents were of Ulster-Scots ancestry, and, as such, he threw his support behind the Irish 
Unionist campaign against Home Rule. In a speech at Belfast a few weeks after his 
appointment, he described the current government’s Irish policy as:  
 
“Nothing better than the latest move in a conspiracy as treacherous as ever has 
been formed against the life of a great nation.”35 
 
He compared the present House of Commons to a marketplace where everything could 
be bought and sold. For him, the Liberal Party was out of control in its attack upon the 
English constitution, and he believed the rallying cry of the “Union in Crisis” could be 
enough to revive the fortunes of the Conservative Party, and return the country to a more 
stable constitutional footing. Despite the limitations placed on the House of Lords, both 
Law and Carson could rely on its support to hamper any proposed Home Rule Bill for 
Ireland.  Lord Londonderry expressed his hope that Sir Edward Carson and the rest of 
the Irish Unionist M.P.s could mount a successful speaking tour of England and Scotland 
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to educate the electorate about the risk of ruin, bankruptcy and civil war in Ireland if 
Home Rule was passed.
36 
 
 Realizing that a huge effort was necessary to gain public support in Britain, 
Carson and his colleagues decided to launch a massive propaganda campaign across the 
British Isles. From September 1911 to July 1914, Ulster Unionists delivered more than 
five thousand speeches in England, and almost four thousand in Scotland, supplemented 
with the distribution of approximately six million booklets, to garner sympathy for their 
cause. Across Ulster, the number of Unionist clubs rose from 14 to 371 in the space of 
three years.
37
 In September, 1911, Carson addressed a gathering of 50,000 at Craigavon, 
during which he laid out his plans for the creation of a Provisional Ulster Government 
should Home Rule be enacted. This organized campaign of resistance gradually came to 
capture the thoughts of the Chief Secretary. 
 In March 1911, during a speech at the Oxford Union Society, Birrell reflected 
that he had grown to love Ireland during his four years as Chief Secretary, and continued 
to espouse his belief in the benefits of Irish self-government, arguing England’s Act of 
Union of 1800 had damaged Ireland both socially and economically.
38
 Outside of a 
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“black patch” in Ulster [in reference to the increasingly vociferous Ulster Unionist 
resistance], Birrell viewed Home Rule as the realization of the dream of nationality for 
the country. Unionists argued that Protestants in the South and West of Ireland 
experienced persecution from their Catholic neighbors, but Birrell poured scorn on such 
claims, and viewed it as a sinister ploy to gain sympathy and votes from the British 
public. A spirit of toleration and good feeling between the majority and minority religion 
across the country, except in a small pocket of counties in the North East, so he was sure 
the rest of Ireland could “afford to laugh at the inane threats of a few popgun 
irreconcilables.”39  
In April 1911, Birrell, at the behest of worried Cabinet members, began to 
receive monthly police reports from the Royal Irish Constabulary concerning seditious 
meetings and military-style drillings across the North. Nevertheless, the Chief Secretary 
remained skeptical toward the threat of violence, and declined Home Secretary Winston 
Churchill’s offer for him to use the British Secret Service to help survey Unionist 
troublemakers. Birrell believed much of the police force in Ulster to be under the 
influence of Unionist sentiment; as such they tended to exaggerate the strength of 
militant resistance to help the Ulster Unionists win political concessions.  
By early 1912, senior Cabinet figures began to view grumblings in Ulster with a 
greater degree of seriousness, but not Birrell. In a meeting with Sir David Harrel, a 
former Chief Commissioner of the Dublin Metropolitan Police, the Chief Secretary was 
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assured that armed resistance to authority was not possible. By February, both Lloyd 
George and Churchill, concerned at the possibility of insurrection, suggested that those 
counties in Ulster which did not want to be part of a Home Rule Ireland be given the 
mandate to opt out. The Cabinet did not follow through on their suggestions, but the 
Prime Minister became increasingly apprehensive about the consequences of not 
providing Ulster generous protections. In a letter to George V, he informed the king that 
if further evidence arose of the necessity to give Ulster special treatment, then the 
government could offer safeguards through an amendment in the forthcoming Home 
Rule Bill. Like Birrell, he knew there were those in Ulster who were outraged, but was 
unsure of the “real extent and character of the Ulster resistance.”40 
 By January 1912, Augustine Birrell had assumed a leading role in framing a 
Home Rule Bill within the Gladstonian model of 1886 and 1893. He considered his party 
“bound to the Irish,” and viewed himself as a caretaker who would ultimately relinquish 
his position to Redmond as the future leader of a self-governing Ireland.
41
  The Irish 
Party leader was adamantly opposed to a separate Ulster government as a provision of 
the Home Rule Bill. In March, at a speech to the Liberal Eighty Club in London, 
Redmond, responding to the question as to why Home Rule was needed since Ireland 
was supposedly in a peaceable state, said his fellow countrymen were peaceful because 
they knew Home Rule was just around the corner. Further, he told his audience some 
newspapers spoke of the outrages that could happen in the Protestant-dominated city of 
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Belfast if Home Rule was carried, but few seemed worried about the real threat of 
violence throughout the rest of the country if it was rejected.
42 
 He was convinced neither 
coercion nor “killing Home Rule with kindness” had satiated the national ambition of the 
Irish people.
43
 Birrell’s loyalty to Redmond, the Liberal reliance upon Irish votes in the 
House of Commons, and the Prime Minister’s uncertainty over the danger posed by 
Carson and his allies, meant Ulster received no safeguards when the Home Rule Bill was 
introduced in early April.
44
  
 On April 11, 1912, Asquith introduced the Irish Home Rule Bill to the House of 
Commons. He stated that the Parliament of 1912 faced the same scenario as in 1886, that 
four-fifths of the elected representatives of Ireland demanded their own government. He 
informed the House that the majority of Nationalist seats across Ireland were not even 
contested by Unionists because the result was always a foregone conclusion. In reference 
to Ulster, which he acknowledged had serious differences of opinion about how it should 
be governed, he claimed the province as a whole was represented by seventeen Unionists 
and sixteen Home Rulers.
45
 While the Home Rule Bill would have religious safeguards 
for the minority in Ulster opposed to Home Rule, the Prime Minister warned that his 
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government would not allow a vociferous Protestant minority in Ulster to “veto the 
verdict of the vast body of their countrymen.”46  
Birrell reminded his fellow M.P.s that England had implemented eighty-six 
coercion acts since the Act of Union, yet the government had failed to keep order and 
peace in Ireland; therefore Ireland should be granted the right to govern itself.
47
 In 
response to Unionist claims that the Irish people were less desirous of and even apathetic 
towards self-government, the Chief Secretary warned the Commons it would be a 
cardinal error to suppose this thorny subject, which had been wrestled with by British 
governments for the past one hundred years, had now worked itself out. It was wrong to 
say everything was fine with Ireland, and he reminded the Opposition that it was only a 
few years ago that they constantly harangued him for not suspending ordinary law in 
favor of coercive measures to combat supposed outrages across the country. Ireland, he 
was sure, would continue to have the weakest administration in the world until it gained 
the right to deal with its own affairs. Responding to Unionist claims there were two 
religions and two camps in Ireland, Birrell begged the question which of the two sides 
was the Christian religion and what was the name of the other. The perceived fear of 
having Roman Catholics in power was evidence that Ulster Unionists still adhered to the 
old ideal of a Protestant Ascendency in the country. This false idealism, he argued, was 
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not grounds to boycott the right of the majority of Irishmen to seek the right to govern 
themselves.
48
  
 The Bill proposed having purely Irish questions be dealt with by an Irish 
parliament, whilst Westminster would continue to deal with all issues pertaining to the 
crown, army and navy, foreign policy and customs duties. Asquith viewed this as the 
start of a devolutionary process that would enable the Commons to deal with more 
pressing imperial matters. Carson poured scorn on Asquith’s speech, claiming the Prime 
Minister’s Bill simply pandered to the Irish Party, to whom he and his Liberal colleagues 
were reliant upon to retain a majority in Parliament. Redmond, refusing to get into a 
direct debate with the Unionist leader, informed the House that the principle of local 
assemblies that were self-governing had the sanction of the whole world. In his typical 
conciliatory tone, when things looked promising for his party, Redmond assured those 
Unionists fearful that Ireland would, in the future, demand outright independence, that 
those separatists who harbored such views were a small minority, and their feelings 
would soon dissipate when Ireland had its own government. In an appeal to the 
Protestants of Ireland, who feared political domination in a largely Catholic country, he 
assured them they could put as many safeguards as they wanted into the Bill.
49
 
 
What Birrell and his colleagues had failed fully to appreciate was how the 
political landscape of Ulster had evolved over the previous thirty years. The “Union in 
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Peril” and “Rome Rule” had become effective recruitment tools for the Unionist cause, 
meaning a Dublin parliament ruling Ulster became an intolerable prospect. Sir James 
Craig told a London newspaper that the people of Ulster would prefer to be ruled by the 
German Emperor rather than by John Redmond and his band of papists.
50
 The Times 
newspaper, a traditionally pro-establishment and pro-empire political mouthpiece, 
offered its appraisal of the bill: 
 
“It will not allay the fears or diminish the hostility of Unionist Ireland…The Bill 
is, in all essential points, the old impossible Bills of 1886 and 1893…Like them 
it is an attempt to find a middle way between positions hopelessly opposed, to 
reconcile the irreconcilable and fulfill conditions that are mutually 
contradictory.”51 
 
Despite Unionist protestations, the Home Rule Bill received its Second Reading 
on June 9 and reached the Committee stage two days later. The following day, a young 
Liberal M.P. named Thomas Agar-Robartes proposed an amendment to the Bill to 
safeguard what he believed were genuine Unionist grievances. His proposal called for 
the exclusion of the four predominantly Protestant counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down 
and Londonderry from the Bill. His suggestion unleashed a maelstrom of controversy as 
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both sides quarreled about its implications for Ireland. The Ulster Unionist leader Carson 
still held the position that the British Government should abandon the Bill altogether, 
although he did stress that if such an amendment was included then Tyrone and 
Fermanagh, counties with sizeable Protestant minorities, should also be included. 
Redmond voiced his anger at the Agar-Robartes plan and ridiculed such a proposed 
division of the Irish nation as “revolting and hateful.”52 
  The Chief Secretary agreed with the Irish Party chairman, and stressed it was 
useless to pretend such an amendment could bring about a lasting settlement. He spoke 
with certainty that, in a Home Rule Ireland, intelligent men would not resort to armed 
resistance.
53 
He argued it was a delusion to suppose Protestant feeling was so strong in 
Ulster that its shrewd inhabitants desired to be separated, especially since it economy 
was so intertwined with the rest of the country. He was convinced it was possible for a 
country to have religious differences while at the same time be able to join together to 
discuss political matters.
54 
In response, Bonar Law, gave an incendiary speech at 
Blenheim Palace, Oxfordshire, seat of the Dukes of Marlborough, during which he 
promised Ulster the full support of his party, no matter what level of resistance they 
presented toward the Bill. This created a major problem for Birrell, Asquith and the 
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Liberal Party, because it implied the Conservatives would support Ulster even in the 
event of armed rebellion.
55 
 
Whilst discussions took place at Westminster regarding the Amendment, the 
Ulster Unionist leadership continued to seek ways to pressure the government to scrap 
the bill in its entirety. In Ulster, a grassroots campaign of resistance was organized by 
Captain James Craig, the Irish Unionist M.P. for East Down. The son of a wealthy 
Presbyterian whisky distiller, he initially showed little interest in politics; however, his 
service in the Boer War filled him with a great sense of pride for the British Empire, and 
it helped him understand Ulster’s place within it. Craig was an able backbencher who 
worked tirelessly behind the scenes for the Unionist Party. Given Carson’s temperament 
and powers of oratory the two men formed a formidable partnership. Craig believed the 
best way to demonstrate Ulster’s opposition was through having the Unionist community 
sign a written oath, pledging to defend the province from the reach of a Dublin 
parliament. He earmarked Saturday September 28, 1912 as “Ulster Day” whereby those 
loyal to Ulster would sign the pledge.
56
  
 At Belfast City Hall the “Ulster Covenant” was first signed by Carson, Lord 
Londonderry [the former Viceroy of Ireland], representatives of various Protestant 
Churches and then Craig. In total, slightly less than half a million men and women 
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signed the pledge to oppose Home Rule for Ulster.
57
 The Unionist leadership was 
buoyed by the public support for their opposition, but reaction outside Ulster was mostly 
muted. The following month, Birrell, while giving a speech in Bristol, observed that the 
impact of Ulster’s “Solemn League and Covenant” upon the English people was a great 
failure, although he did agree the Ulster’s difficulty with Home Rule had to be dealt with 
in a rational manner.
58 
Redmond continued to stress there would be no concessions for 
Ulster, because Ireland was not a “British province or an English shire, but a nation, with 
a strongly marked individuality,” and without Home Rule Ireland could never be either 
prosperous or loyal.
59
 
 Frustratingly for Birrell, his intelligence services in Ireland focused too much on 
Nationalist secret societies located in the South, and so he could not fully grasp the level 
of orchestrated resistance across Ulster. He wrote to the Inspector General of the Royal 
Irish Constabulary in July 1912, expressing his frustration that for the past five years he 
had received bountiful knowledge of “local intrigues and dissension” from “ruffians and 
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bullies” in the South, and stressed that there should be a greater focus on Ulster where 
clubs and organizations were arming themselves under the noses of the police force.
60 
 
As the Ulster Unionists became much more boisterous in the weeks and months 
following the introduction of the Home Rule Bill, Redmond decided in July to invite 
Asquith over to Dublin to show him how much the Irish people appreciated his efforts. 
Once in Dublin, Asquith, along with Birrell and Redmond, were the keynote speakers at 
a public meeting at the Theatre Royal where they were greeted by a rancorous crowd. 
Reflecting on his visit, Asquith viewed his initial drive through the streets of Dublin as a 
triumphal procession, and recalled how the crowd cheered for a full seven minutes when 
he rose to speak at the public meeting. He told the jubilant crowd that to allow a 
minority of people in Ulster: 
 
“to thwart and defeat the constitutional demand of a vast majority of their fellow-
countrymen, and to frustrate a great international settlement, is a proposition 
which, in my opinion, does not and will never commend itself to the conscience 
or the judgement of the British people.”61 
 
The Prime Minister called Unionist demands for a referendum on Home Rule via an 
election as nothing more than a sinister campaign “purely destructive in its objects, 
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anarchic and chaotic in its methods.”62 Birrell spoke after the Prime Minister and he too 
received rapturous applause. After a few characteristic light-hearted jokes, he told the 
crowd that he would be disappointed if Home Rule dug a deeper channel between 
England and Ireland, and hoped it would lead to a more glorious, triumphant and 
prosperous union between them.
63
 With Home Rule in place the two countries could, he 
believed, see likeness in their differences and love in their dissimilarities.
64
 
In December, the Cabinet met once again to discuss the Agar-Robartes 
Amendment. Asquith was certain at this stage that any form of Ulster exclusion would 
make all other parts of the Home Rule Bill unworkable, while others, including Lloyd 
George believed a redrafting of the bill should be considered.
65 
Carson and his followers 
had reluctantly agreed to consider the amendment because failure to do so would make 
them appear unreasonable to the British public. Walter Long, leader of the Irish Unionist 
Party from 1906-1910, in a letter to Bonar Law, wrote of the amendment as a carefully 
designed trap by the British government, because a Unionist rejection of the measure 
would give the Liberals the ammunition they needed to prove that Ulstermen were 
unwilling to even accept exclusion, meaning they must have no genuine grievances.
66 
Reluctant to backtrack on their promises to the Irish Party, predictably, the Cabinet 
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rejected the amendment. This prompted Carson to write a letter to Asquith on December 
30, insisting on exclusion for the whole nine counties of Ulster as a means of avoiding 
an outbreak of violence in the province, and warning the Prime Minister that the 
repugnance of a vast body of Ulstermen to Home Rule was as deep as it was vehement.
67
 
Carson pressed home his concerns in a speech to the Commons on January 1, 
1913. He argued it was unfair to change a government without the favor of its people. 
For Ulster, although there were a few counties with small Nationalist majorities that 
politically would prefer Home Rule, economically, the province as a whole reaped the 
benefits of the industries permeating out of Belfast. It would therefore be economically 
unwise to rely on a Dublin government for employment. Summing up his arguments, the 
leader of Ulster Unionism stated that were 200,000 more Protestants than Catholics in 
the province, and it would be unwise to parcel off a portion of it solely on the basis of 
religion.  
The Prime Minister found Carson’s speech to be “very powerful and moving” 
and promised to consider carefully the concerns of the Ulster Party. Redmond believed 
Carson’s speech to be “serious and solemn,” although he disagreed with his assertion the 
province of Ulster should be excluded from any bill, because it was most unfair for such 
a small minority of his fellow countrymen to dictate the shape of the Home Rule Bill.
68
 
Birrell viewed Carson’s speech as another Unionist ploy to wreck the Bill in its entirety. 
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The Opposition’s alternative would be, he claimed, to offer the Irish people false 
promises of better times ahead in return for votes, with the subversive goal of sending a 
solid block of Unionists to Parliament at the expense of the Home Rule movement, 
which was, he believed, the soul of Ireland. Birrell added that the current mode of 
administration could not go on indefinitely, and the Ulster Unionists’ supposed right to 
bring down this national solution was a right they did not possess.
69
 
Carson’s proposal to have all of Ulster excluded from the bill was rejected by the 
Liberal-Irish majority in the House of Commons, which meant the Bill passed its Third 
Reading on January 16. Revealingly, Bonar Law, during his speech against the Bill, 
asked Birrell if he could, upon his honor, guarantee Ulster would not be awash in blood 
once Home Rule was passed; however, the Chief Secretary refused to respond. In 
condemning the Bill in the upper house, Lord Ashbourne reminded the Lords that 
Ireland was not a united nation and that it contained at least two races. He ridiculed 
Asquith for going back on his word that he would guarantee the people of Ulster 
whatever concessions they wanted, because the proposed bill contained none of any real 
substance. Lord Curzon, in opposing the bill, used a succinct metaphor to describe the 
feelings of Ulstermen: 
 
“You compel Ulster to divorce her present husband, to whom she is not 
unfaithful, and you force her to marry somebody else whom she cordially 
                                                 
 
69
 Irish Independent, January 17, 1913, 6. 
  
110 
 
dislikes and with whom she does not want to live, because she happens to be 
rich, and because her new partner has a large and ravenous offspring to provide 
for.”70 
 
As expected, the overwhelmingly Conservative House of Lords rejected the Home Rule 
Bill two weeks later by a margin of 257 votes, but, under the constraints of the 
Parliament Act, they could only veto the legislation one more time before it became law 
if proposed a third time.  
In a spell of heightened tensions within Ulster it was most unfortunate that the 
Chief Secretary spent most of his time outside of the country. In 1911, Birrell’s wife fell 
ill with a brain tumor, to which she eventually succumbed in 1915. Her deteriorating 
condition meant Birrell increasingly spent his time by her side at their home in London, 
while fulfilling his obligations as Chief Secretary through the Irish Office in Downing 
Street, and communicating with Under-Secretary Sir James Dougherty in Dublin Castle 
via telegram. Dougherty therefore assumed responsibility for poring over the regular 
police intelligence briefings on Ulster. A committed Home Ruler, he was, like his Irish 
Party friend Dillon, skeptical of police reports concerning the build-up of militant 
resistance in the North, because he viewed it as mere Unionist hyperbole. Sympathetic to 
the Irish cause, Dougherty did not want to alarm the Liberal Party with Unionist 
propaganda. Therefore, the monthly reports he received from the Special Branch [the 
intelligence gathering unit of the police force] he forwarded to Birrell in London with 
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notes on each file with some variation of the words “there is nothing very interesting in 
these reports.”71 
 Ulster Unionist resistance towards the Home Rule Bill shifted into a militant 
phase in early 1913. Members of the Protestant Orange Order and Ulster Unionist clubs 
had been engaging in military drilling sessions from March 1912 onwards, and on 
January 13, 1913, these militias were formed into the Ulster Volunteer Force [U.V.F.] by 
the Ulster Unionist Council, in anticipation of the passage of the Home Rule Bill through 
the Commons.
72
 Commanded by landowners, businessmen, and later retired British 
Officers, this citizen army soon boasted 100,000 recruits, and possessed a cavalry, a 
motor car corps, a special strike force, signalers and dispatch riders, and ambulance and 
nursing units.
73
 
 Although Birrell had been kept informed about the U.V.F. by the Royal Irish 
Constabulary, he believed, for the most part, its activities were exaggerated and designed 
to intimidate, rather than to be actively used to resist the implementation of the 
impending Home Rule Bill. In a memorandum for the Cabinet he had drawn up in late 
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March, the Chief Secretary assured them there was little evidence to show anti-Home 
Rule sentiment was anywhere but in Belfast. Further, the police had assured him that 
many people who had signed the Ulster Covenant, when asked to engage in active 
resistance refused to do so. During a speech at Warrington, a month after the formation 
of the U.V.F, Birrell asserted that even if the issue of Home Rule was struck down after 
a future Conservative Party election victory, it would not make any difference to the 
Irish demand for self-government. Further, rejecting Ulster’s demands to opt out of a 
Home Rule Bill, he claimed a large amount of money saved by farmers in the 
agricultural south and east and west of the country was spent in the industrial sector in 
the north-east of the country. Ulster’s businessmen, he was sure, would have a long hard 
think about how they would be affected economically before committing to a policy of 
separation. The whole island, he added, was interconnected, meaning Ulster was Irish to 
the backbone, so separate consideration for the province was irrational.
74
 
 In April, Birrell sought to reassure King George V over an anonymous 
memorandum sent to the sovereign from an Ulster magistrate. The document claimed: 
 
“There are about 100,000 able-bodied Orangemen, nearly all armed with 
revolvers, prepared to follow their leaders to any length in resistance to Home 
Rule….Every lodge and club has its drill parade one night a week, and the 
squads and companies are frequently inspected by visiting ex-military 
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officers….The counties are being apportioned or divided into military districts 
and sub-districts….It is now Catholic against Protestant; a religious crusade is 
being preached; party feeling runs higher and hotter than it ever did in my 
time.”75 
 
Birrell downplayed the memorandum, claiming it was nothing new, for most newspapers 
from the province regularly published such stories. He argued the numbers signed up to 
fight for the U.V.F. were greatly exaggerated, and reassured the king there was very 
little evidence to show the movement had taken any real hold outside of Belfast. He did 
caution, however, that a large military/police force would be needed to safeguard 
elections in Ulster in a post-Home Rule Ireland, because most of the Protestant 
population in the North did oppose the legislation with various degrees of bitterness.
76
 
Here, the Chief Secretary demonstrated a lack of conviction on the level of resistance 
coming from Ulster’s Unionist community. 
 Birrell, in a letter to Lord Stamfordham, the private secretary to the Sovereign, 
claimed it was foolish to make too much or too little of Protestant and Unionist 
propaganda. Regarding claims the U.V.F. was acquiring weapons, he reassured the 
secretary that they only had in their possession cheap revolvers of an inferior continental 
pattern, quipping that they were probably as dangerous to their owners as to anyone 
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else.
77 
 In June, during a speech in his constituency of North Bristol, he decried the 
Ulster campaign as nothing more than a political move to destroy the Liberal 
government and the Home Rule Bill.
78
 In mid-June, after the Unionists had failed with a 
parliamentary motion to defeat the Home Rule Bill, thus allowing it to pass its Second 
Reading unchallenged, Birrell again decried the tactics of the Opposition. He accused 
the Unionists of trickery, by attempting to woo the Irish people with generous financial 
subsidies if they voted against the Bill, while at the same time their mouths were full of 
sneers and their tongues continually uttered libels upon the character of the Irish people. 
Again admonishing the religious bigotry prevalent in Ulster, he believed the only cure 
for it was the spread of real religion built on love, knowledge and citizenship. Bonar 
Law’s threat of civil war, if Ulster did not have its way, the Chief Secretary found to be 
reprehensible and unprecedented in the history of legislative proposals postulated in the 
House of Commons. In July, unable to attend an Irish Party dinner celebration of the 
second passage of the Home Rule Bill through the House of Commons on July 7, Birrell 
sent the gathering a letter within which he praised Asquith for his cooperation with the 
Irish Party. Full of optimism, the Chief Secretary expressed his belief that the political 
education of a nation could only be fulfilled through Home Rule.
79
  
                                                 
 
77
 “Memorandum to Lord Stamfordham April 15th 1913 from Birrell,” MS. Eng. c7034 f. 24, Bodleian 
Library. 
 
78
 “Mr. Birrell and Ulster,” Western Daily Press, June 27, 1913, MS. PRO 30/67/29 f. 1465, The National 
Archives. 
 
79
 “Mr. Birrell’s fine tribute to the Premier: The Home Rule Dinner,” The Manchester Guardian, June 11, 
1913. 
  
115 
 
 On July 24, the Chief Secretary had an audience with the King George V at 
Buckingham Palace to further discuss his thoughts on Ulster. Here, he assured the king 
that even if Ulster attempted to establish a provisional government in Belfast as a 
counter to the Home Rule Bill, it would not even last a week before it collapsed because 
the North was so economically intertwined with the rest of the country. He conceded 
that, if absolutely necessary, Ulster could opt out of a Home Rule settlement for a period 
of ten years, followed by a referendum on its exclusion. Nevertheless, he stressed that 
these potential rebels in Ulster, before they even considered the possibility of civil war, 
would have to give to the civilized world a proposal of their own on how Ulster should 
be governed. He criticized the actions of the Conservative Party, and claimed their chief 
aim was to seek a General Election and for the Home Rule Bill to be shelved.
80 
When the 
king suggested an immediate referendum should be called to resolve the crisis, Birrell 
said such a move was just like having a General Election, and that it was impossible to 
“compel people to think only of one thing by printing it on the back or front of their 
voting papers.”81 Asked if the Irish would accept the idea of an opt-out period for Ulster, 
Birrell responded that Redmond and his party could be tempted under threat of the 
dissolution of Parliament.
82
 After his meeting with King George V, the Chief Secretary 
sent a letter to Asquith, vilifying those people he believed were feeding the king false 
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information on the state of Ireland. Some royal advisors had outrageously suggested 
100,000 Orangemen in Liverpool would desert their homes when a Home Rule Bill 
became law to fight for Ulster’s cause. Further, these gossipmongers had convinced the 
king that the desire for Home Rule outside Ulster was not very strong, and that all the 
Irish people wanted was continued prosperity.
83
 
Soon after his visit with King George V, Birrell begin to confront the Ulster issue 
with a much greater degree of seriousness and urgency. In fact, his mere mention of an 
opt-out period during his royal visit showed that he had gradually come to accept the 
Unionists of Ulster needed to somehow be placated. In August, the Chief Secretary sent 
a letter to the Prime Minister, which included disturbing police reports compiled by Sir 
Neville Chamberlain, the Chief Inspector of the R.I.C., of increased drilling maneuvers, 
inflammatory speeches and further recruitment to the U.V.F.
84
 He warned Asquith if a 
bloody war did erupt then they could not rely on the R.I.C. to quell the disturbances, 
because many of them were “Covenanters” or sympathizers to the Unionist cause. He 
advised the government to be ready with the military if indeed a “big shindy” did 
occur.
85 
In early September, in a follow up letter to Lord Stamfordham, Birrell admitted 
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there was a great perturbation among the Ulster Unionists, and it would be wrong now to 
suggest the threat of violence was a political bluff.
86
 
 
Concurrently, Sir Edward Carson began to accept that Home Rule for Ireland 
was inevitable, and reluctantly pushed for the separate settlement for Ulster, not as a 
wrecking tool to bring down the bill, but as a lasting solution that would satisfy both 
sides. During a private meeting with Bonar Law on September 18, Carson informed the 
Conservative leader that “on the whole things are shaping towards a desire to settle on 
the terms of leaving Ulster out,” although he expressed uncertainty that all nine of the 
province’s counties would be included in such a settlement.87 Two days later, Carson 
wrote to the Conservative leader, expressing his concern over the propensity for violence 
across Ireland if the Unionists tried to force the complete collapse of the Home Rule 
Bill. It was his duty, he believed, to try to seek terms.
88
 In speeches at both Cahirciveen 
in September and Limerick in October, an infuriated Redmond, aware of exclusionary 
discussions among Ulster and British Unionists, condemned the threats of violence 
emanating from Ulster, and insisted his party could not agree to the political mutilation 
of the island via an artificial border. In a bid to conciliate the concerns of his fellow 
countrymen in the North he did hint at the possibility of “Home Rule within Home 
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Rule,” whereby there could be administrative devolution for the Protestant-majority 
counties within an overall self-governing framework for Ireland.
89 
 
On September 25, the 500 delegates of the Ulster Unionist Council held a 
meeting to discuss the implementation of a “Provisional Ulster Government” should 
Home Rule be enacted. The following month, in response to the deepening crisis, 
Asquith decided to hold talks with Bonar Law and Carson for a frank discussion of the 
crisis. Both men demanded the permanent exclusion of Ulster [the number of counties 
they were yet to decide upon] as a basis for a settlement. At this stage the Prime Minister 
did not entertain the thought of permanent exclusion, stating his conditions were that 
Home Rule in some form must be granted to Ireland, and there could be nothing done 
“to erect a permanent and insuperable bar to Irish unity.”90  
On November 13, Asquith sent Redmond a letter, asking him to be careful not to 
close the door to a possibility of an agreed settlement.
91 
Asquith met the Irish leader on 
November 17 to listen to his views on the Ulster crisis, but did not pressure him into 
making any formal declaration of compromise. A week later, Lloyd George spoke to 
Redmond in person, insisting that the Liberal Cabinet was adamant that some sort of 
offer must be given to Ulster as the basis of a settlement, for coercion alone was out of 
the question. He warned there were several frontbenchers including himself and 
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Churchill who would consider resigning if an agreement could not be reached, which 
would have serious consequences for Home Rule. On November 27, Birrell met with a 
clearly angry Redmond to assure him Lloyd George’s views did not represent the views 
of the vast majority of the Cabinet, and no decision would be made without Redmond’s 
input.
92 
 
In a letter to the Prime Minister, the Irish Party chairman expressed his dismay 
that “Orange threats have impressed, if not intimidated, the government.” The exclusion 
of Ulster, he added, would not only mutilate the country, but would expose the Catholics 
of North East Ulster to intolerable oppression. Attempting to downplay the strength of 
Carsonism, he told Asquith that the Ulster Unionist leader had enemies within his own 
ranks because many Ulstermen did not want to see the country partitioned.
93 
Despite 
Birrell’s assurances to the contrary, an evident shift emerged within the Liberal 
Government over the Ulster crisis, with the majority leaning towards Lloyd George’s 
plan for Ulster to be allowed to opt out for the foreseeable future. On the Unionist side, 
Bonar Law and Carson insisted that any possible inclusion should only happen by 
plebiscite, whilst Redmond and his party continued to demand the Irish nation not be 
divided.  
To make matters worse for the British government the Irish National Volunteers 
was formed in Dublin with a primary objective to “secure and maintain the rights and 
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liberties common to all the people of Ireland,” and to act as a counterweight to the 
U.V.F. in the North.
94 
Its founders represented both constitutional and militant 
nationalism, and its creation added to the powder keg that was Ireland by the end of 
1913. Augustine Birrell, although less involved in matters of high politics, had now to 
deal with a serious situation in which two armed militias with opposing agendas existed 
in Ireland. As 1914 approached so too did the threat of war appear both in Ireland and on 
the European continent. The third and final reading of the Home Rule Bill approached 
with no end in sight to Ulster’s objection and militant opposition. The Chief Secretary 
had much to contend with.
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CHAPTER V 
THE ULSTER CRISIS AND HOME RULE ON HOLD 
 
In January, 1914, Asquith informed Redmond that the Liberal Party had failed to 
convince Carson and Law to agree to Home Rule for Ireland even with the offer of 
generous safeguards for Ulster. The likelihood of civil discord when the Bill, in its 
extant form, passed its Third Reading later in the year convinced the Prime Minister that 
Ulster, nonetheless, had to be dealt with separately. In a letter to Carson on January 8, 
Asquith expressed his view that, although he objected to the idea of exclusion for Ulster, 
it appeared to hold the best opportunity to reach an agreed settlement of the Home Rule 
crisis.
1
 Asquith’s shift in stance, in the face of the militant atmosphere in Ireland, set the 
stage for a turbulent year, as Carson and his allies capitalized on the Prime Minister’s 
pusillanimous attitude, while Redmond and his colleagues now had to contend, in their 
minds, with the outrageous prospect of a politically divided Ireland. In an increasingly 
polarized atmosphere, the Irish Chief Secretary found himself in a difficult position, as 
Irish Nationalists and Unionists quarreled over possible amendments to the Home Rule 
Bill. 
On January 26, Birrell addressed his North Bristol constituents where he was 
warmly welcomed by members of the local branch of the United Irish League, who 
thanked him for his hard work on behalf of the Nationalist community. Birrell blasted 
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Carson and his “army of Covenanters,” stressing that it was a wicked thing for educated 
people in a modern world to follow a path towards anarchy. Furthermore, the Chief 
Secretary spoke of how the world would negatively view Ireland if its countrymen 
engaged in a civil war, simply because they could not agree to throw in their lot with 
each other and govern their own country.
2 Birrell was irritated by Carson’s speech in 
Chester, several days prior, during which the Unionist leader claimed Ulstermen would 
be justified in resisting the imminent Home Rule Bill “to the last extremity”.3 What was 
to him incendiary talk forced the Chief Secretary into a difficult position. Birrell did not 
want to jeopardize his own cordial working relationship with Redmond and Dillon but 
was certain that Asquith’s desire to seek a separate arrangement for Ulster would strain 
the Liberal-Irish Party alliance. 
Also weighing on the Chief Secretary’s mind was a report submitted in early 
January by Sir David Harrel.
4
 His investigation revealed the increasing tension across 
the country. Whilst he spoke of the amiable relationship between Catholics and 
Protestants across the south of the country, Harrel was certain this bond would 
disintegrate should Protestants attack Catholics across Ulster upon the passage of the 
Home Rule Bill. He warned of apparent threats towards Redmond from separatist 
Nationalist organizations, and scorned the lackadaisical intelligence department in 
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Dublin Castle for greatly underestimating the strength of Carsonism in the North. Such 
was the level of militancy in Ulster, Harrel warned the Cabinet, that even if Carson told 
his followers to stand down, few would do so.
5
 Apprised of Harrel’s findings, King 
George V was certain the risk of civil war was real and told Asquith a new offer had to 
be made: 
 
“I have always given you as my opinion that Ulster will never agree to send 
representatives to an Irish parliament in Dublin, no matter what safeguards or 
guarantees you may provide. For this reason I would point out to you the danger 
of laying before Parliament and the country, your proposed concessions (as) if 
they are to be your last word.”6 
 
Both the king and senior members of the Liberal Party finally convinced Asquith he 
needed to act swiftly to defuse the situation by providing Ulster with an alternative 
settlement. 
A week later, on February 2, Redmond met with Asquith and a notably quiet and 
morose Birrell at 10 Downing Street, during which the Prime Minister told the Irish 
Party leader exclusion would have to be offered to Ulster. Asquith spoke of the 
alarmingly dangerous rhetoric emanating from Ulster and informed Redmond that the 
                                                 
 
5
 Harrel to the British Cabinet, January 7, 1914, MS Asquith 39 f. 87, Bodleian Library Archives. Harrel 
was Under-Secretary for Ireland from 1893-1902, and formerly Chief Commissioner of the Dublin 
Metropolitan Police from 1883-1893. 
 
6
 Roy Jenkins, Asquith (London: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, 1988), 300-301. 
  
124 
 
king wished for a General Election on the Home Rule issue, because during the second 
1910 election the British people were not fully aware of the possibility of civil war in 
Ireland. Asquith assured the Irish Party chairman that if Ulster rejected reasonable 
concessions, then it would “deprive them of all moral force, and would avert any action 
by the King.”7 A recalcitrant Redmond sent a letter to Asquith two days later, in which 
he warned the premier that the Opposition would frame an amendment to the current bill 
as proof the whole thing was a failure and that the government had bowed to the threat 
of violence. Also, it would lead, he was sure, to an “explosion of popular condemnation” 
across Ireland because the government would have forsaken the Nationalists living in 
Ulster.
8
  
Fellow senior Liberal M.P.s David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill offered 
their suggestions to help resolve the vexatious Irish dilemma. Lloyd George, like 
Redmond, was wary of giving the Conservative Party the chance to denigrate the Home 
Rule Bill as full of imperfections, because the Opposition surely would then seek to 
scrap the Bill in its entirety. Nevertheless, he knew his government could not employ 
force to impose the Bill upon Ulster, so in mid-February he proposed to the Cabinet a 
plan whereby those counties which wanted to opt out of Home Rule entirely might offer 
their inhabitants the chance to vote on exclusion. After a six-year period of Westminster 
governance those counties would then automatically enter into an all-Ireland Parliament. 
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Since the current Liberal administration could not, by law, continue beyond December 
1915, he hoped the next General Election could effectively settle the matter.
9 
Seeking to capitalize on what he saw as the Liberal Party leadership’s uncertainty 
Irish Unionist M.P. Walter Long proposed an amendment in the House of Commons on 
February 11 that called for the Government of Ireland Bill to be postponed until it had 
been submitted to the judgement of the people via an election. In response, Birrell 
argued that while many in Ulster had justifiable concerns, it was unfair to use hyperbole 
and threats to bring down the bill via an election. To mollify the Ulster Unionists, the 
Chief Secretary offered his apologies to the Protestants of Ulster if he had said anything 
during his eight years in office that wounded their feelings. Attempting to defuse the 
hostile environment in the House of Commons he quipped: 
 
“I know I received this morning a statement, bearing an Ulster postmark, to the 
effect that I had got two daughters in Roman Catholic convents. I am sorry to say 
I have no daughters, and if I had I would far sooner see them happy married 
women than the inmates of any convent.” 
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On a more serious note, Birrell warned that it was prejudicial to assume that the people 
of Ulster had right on their side and that those in the rest of Ireland were mere Papists 
whom nobody need recognize.
10 
Two days before the Unionist amendment was put before the House, Birrell 
wrote to Redmond warning him of the great differences of opinion within the Cabinet 
concerning the Home Rule Bill in its current form. Bowing to tremendous pressure from 
the Liberal leadership to seek a compromise with the Ulster Unionists, the Irish Party 
leader agreed to a proposal to allow Ulster to “opt-out” of Home Rule government for a 
period of three years in the interests of preserving peace and hoped this would be the 
final negotiation on the issue.
11
 
 After further examination of the “opt-out” period, the 
Cabinet found the offer of three years of exclusion from Home Rule to be politically 
impractical and leaned towards a six year plan as the best alternative. In a letter to the 
Irish leader on March 7, Asquith explained that a General Election would have to take 
place before the exclusionary period elapsed. Since the next election was a year away, it 
would be unwise for the “opt-out” period to expire in the middle of a new ministry. 
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Therefore, he recommended six years exclusion, so when it elapsed it would occur 
during a presumptive General Election year.
12 
After a private discussion with Birrell, Redmond and Dillon agreed to the 
Cabinet’s six-year exclusionary scheme as “the very extremest limit of concession,” 
therefore Carson’s demand for exclusion was met, but with territorial and chronological 
limits attached. Birrell found the six-year exclusionary period for Ulster from the 
working of the Bill as a much better choice than an immediate referendum. The Chief 
Secretary was happy with the conciliatory gesture from Redmond and Dillon but feared 
that over the course of a long six years, further concessions could be demanded from the 
Irish Party leadership.
13
 Former Irish Chief Secretary James Bryce believed Redmond 
took the correct path by agreeing to the six-year scheme, because he maintained it was of 
the utmost importance for the Irish Party leader to get a Home Rule Parliament 
established in Dublin, even if it only administered three quarters of the island.
14
 Birrell 
informed the Cabinet that, though reluctant, the Irish Nationalist leaders had been 
persuaded to agree to the plan as the price for peace.
15  
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As such, the new exclusion scheme was submitted by Asquith to the House of 
Commons on March 9. Barely palatable to the Irish Party leadership, to Sir Edward 
Carson and his Unionist allies it was intolerable. Carson warned the House that Ulster 
would not accept a “sentence of death with a stay of execution for six years.” The 
popular Ulster newspaper, the Northern Whig observed that the offer of temporary 
exclusion was universally condemned and repudiated by the whole Ulster Unionist 
community.
16
 Both Carson and Opposition leader Bonar Law’s hostility towards the 
Liberal offer of temporary exclusion angered many in the Liberal Cabinet who believed 
their proposal to be extremely generous.  
Churchill was particularly infuriated by the “doctrines of unconstitutional action” 
from the Opposition, and threatened the use of the British Army in Ulster to uphold the 
law if need be.
17
 During a speech at Bradford on March 14, an excited Churchill went so 
far as to say there were worse things than bloodshed, even on an extended scale, in a 
veiled threat to the Ulster Volunteer Force should they threaten violence to seek political 
concessions.
18
 Churchill warned that the self-elected members of the Ulster provisional 
government were engaging in a “treasonable conspiracy.”19 His inflammatory speech at 
Bradford coupled with his orders for the British Navy 3
rd
 Battle Squadron’s next practice 
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to take place off the isle of Arran, only an hour’s sailing from the Northern Irish coast, 
led many in Ulster to believe the British government sought to coerce them into 
accepting a Dublin parliament.
20 
As the Ulster crisis deepened, the government established a special committee 
spearheaded by Lord Crewe, the Liberal Leader in the House of Lords and former Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland, to examine ways to ensure that the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer 
Force did not get its hands on any more weaponry. Crewe, Birrell and their fellow 
committee members decided it was necessary to reinforce arms depots across the North 
of Ireland with British troops stationed in Dublin and for extra patrol boats in the Irish 
Sea. To make a bad situation worse, on March 20, sixty of seventy-seven British 
Officers stationed at the Curragh Camp, the main base for the regular army in Ireland, 
declared they were not willing to participate in any military operation against Ulster.
21
 
Embarrassingly, the government attempted to downplay the incident, claiming it had 
been a misunderstanding. Nevertheless, the unwillingness of British soldiers to move on 
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Ulster had the dual effect of emboldening the Ulster Unionist community because it 
removed the threat of force, whilst convincing the leaders of Irish nationalism it could 
not rely on British troops to enforce a Home Rule Bill. In turn, this led to a dramatic 
increase in recruitment to the Irish Volunteers, further jeopardizing British rule in 
Ireland.  
Attempting to defuse the volatile situation, on the Friday following the “Curragh 
Incident”, the Chief Secretary spoke in the Connaught Rooms, London, to the National 
League of Young Liberals, warning the gathering not to be alarmed by sensationalist 
articles in the press. Responding to rumors of military intervention, he stressed that the 
forces of the Crown would never be used in Ulster, except to preserve the integrity of the 
king’s dominions and to assist civil powers with the maintenance of law and order.22 
Since its inception two years prior, the Ulster Volunteer Force had been allowed to 
operate unhindered, and, as such, their leaders had become increasingly confident that 
Home Rule could never be imposed upon Ulster, especially after the “Curragh Incident”. 
Reflecting on the Chief Secretary’s reluctance to deal with the militant threat within 
Ulster before it blossomed into the current crisis, Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, the renowned 
British poet and supporter of Irish Home Rule, believed Redmond was the culprit who 
convinced Birrell that the “Ulster movement was all bounce.”23  
Birrell’s misreading of the Ulster situation was apparent in a paper he submitted 
to the Cabinet in early March, in which he expressed his view that the general conviction 
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among the rank and file of the U.V.F. was that the prospect of civil war was out of the 
question.
24 
During a tour of Ulster in late 1913, Birrell had boasted to a loyalist 
fisherman from Portadown that he knew of all goings on in the province.
25 
The Larne 
gun running incident on the night of April 24 demonstrated that such an assertion was far 
from true. On behalf of the Ulster Unionist Council, Major Frederick H. Crawford and 
Wilfrid Spender, both former British Army officers, successfully organized a covert 
major gun-smuggling operation into Ulster, with approximately 25,000 weapons and 
five million rounds of ammunition landing on the coast at Larne, Donaghadee and 
Bangor. Meticulously organized, the U.V.F. made great use of motor vehicles to unload 
the weaponry from the ships for distribution across the province. Reporting on the 
Donaghadee landing, The Belfast Evening Telegraph reflected on how smooth the 
operation went, whilst the “police and coastguards were powerless, and could only look 
helplessly on.”26  Although the importation of arms into the province was forbidden by 
law, the newspaper reported that the two dozen or so local police officers, some of 
whom were even sympathetic, were powerless to stop a large body of men backed by the 
support of the townspeople as they swiftly loaded the weapons into their vast transport 
of cars, trucks and wagons.  
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The striking success of these Unionist militants in securing weaponry added to 
Irish Nationalist concerns that the authorities in Ulster were in connivance with the 
U.V.F., and actively supported their cause of a separate parliament outside of any 
proposed Dublin government. Redmond wrote to Asquith two days after the Larne gun-
running incident, imploring him to take strong and prompt action by increasing the 
British military and naval presence in Ulster. He called for an increase of five thousand 
officers for the Royal Irish Constabulary, which could be achieved through a draft from 
among Southern Catholics not sympathetic to the law-breakers.
27 
Nevertheless, in order 
to avoid bloodshed, both Redmond and Birrell were in agreement that the Prime 
Minister, who viewed the incident as a “grave and unprecedented outrage,” not seek out 
and arrest those responsible for the gun-running for fear that it would  lead to the 
worsening of an already delicate political environment.
28
 Birrell told Asquith he had no 
information on the whereabouts of the smuggled arms but assured the Prime Minister 
there would be no trouble in Belfast. Attempting to downplay the severity of the 
situation, he assured Asquith that, although the leadership of the Orange Lodges and 
wealthy landowners were ripe for treasonous activities, Ulster’s ordinary farmers were 
reluctant to become involved in radical actions against the government.
29
 The rank and 
file of the Unionist community, he insisted, wished to avoid conflict, and would not 
blindly follow the orders of the U.V.F. leadership.
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On May 21, 1914, the Prime Minister entered a fiery House of Commons on the 
occasion of the Third Reading of the Home Rule Bill. Asquith spoke of his belief that 
the Bill: 
 
“both in its principle, in its detail, and in its machinery, is a wise and 
statesmanlike measure; that it provides safeguards adequate, and, indeed, 
abundant, for the protection of minorities against either religious, political, or 
social oppression.”30 
 
Claiming he was not bowing to the threat of force from militants within Ulster, Asquith 
told his colleagues that any new system of government for Ireland needed to be heartily 
received by its people, therefore an amendment was needed to satisfy this requirement in 
order to remove any possible suggestions “of injustice, of oppression, of coercion.”31 
With the Liberal-Irish Party majority in the Commons, the Home Rule Bill passed its 
Third Reading on May 25, with Asquith’s assurance of an Amending Bill for Ulster, 
over which no agreement had yet been reached. 
 Both the Irish Party on the one hand, and the Conservative-Unionist alliance on 
the other, abhorred Asquith’s plan to introduce an Amending Bill after the Home Rule 
Bill had passed its final stages and become law. Redmond wanted the six-year exclusion 
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scheme built into the Home Rule Act and not offered up as a separate amendment. He 
feared such an approach left his demand for a maximum of six years’ exclusion in 
jeopardy because further amendments could now be added. To Bonar Law and Carson, 
Asquith’s approach was a cowardly way to achieve the Home Rule Bill using the device 
of the 1911 Parliament Act, without adequately addressing the deep flaws within the 
measure.
32
 Redmond told Birrell that Asquith’s talk of an Amending Bill only served to 
encourage the U.V.F. to become more boisterous, and that such weakness only made the 
government increasingly susceptible to being bullied into granting even more 
concessions. The Irish Party leader asked the Chief Secretary to strengthen military 
garrisons across the North and remove disloyal police officers to the South to ensure that 
the U.V.F could not so freely dictate the political future of Ulster.
33  
Birrell wrote a memorandum for the Cabinet after an early June tour of Ulster. 
He informed his colleagues that the proposition of a separate Amending Bill would 
present no solution to the difficulties on the ground. Based on his discussions with the 
local police force he expressed his misgivings that an offer of six years’ exclusion would 
not be enough to quell tempers in the North. The government would have to be prepared 
to deal with an outbreak of violence in Ulster, although he believed it would mostly 
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confined to the city of Belfast, where a large number of Ulster’s Nationalist community 
resided. Birrell suggested an Amending Bill with further generous safeguards would be 
needed, otherwise Carson and his followers would reject and fight what was currently on 
offer.
34 
 
 The Amending Bill was introduced by the Liberal Government on June 23, and, 
in line with the proposals made in March, gave any Ulster county the option to vote itself 
out of Home Rule for a period of up to six years. The Bill was then sent to the Unionist-
dominated House of Lords, which modified it to exclude the traditional nine counties of 
Ulster permanently from the operation of the Bill, which, of course, could never be 
accepted by the Irish Party.  In an effort to find a resolution to the Ulster crisis, a deeply 
worried King George V called for a conference at Buckingham Palace in the hope of 
finding a compromise acceptable to all. From July 21-24, prior to a Commons discussion 
on the Lords’ revisions to the Bill, Redmond, Dillon, Carson, Craig, Asquith, Lloyd 
George, Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne met at the Palace.
35
 The conference faltered 
over the area of Ulster to be excluded from the operation of the Home Rule Bill, with 
both sides adamant that their supporters would object to further concessions on the 
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matter.
36  
A sombre Asquith lamented to an associate on how differences over exactly 
how Ulster was to be partitioned was the greatest stumbling block to the negotiations: 
 
“I have rarely felt more helpless in any particular affair, an impasse with 
unspeakable consequences, upon a matter which to English eyes seems 
inconceivably small and to Irish eyes immeasurably big. Isn't it a real tragedy?”37   
 
The conference broke down on its third day, and to Asquith’s surprise Redmond, 
Carson, Craig and Dillon offered each other a friendly handshake despite the simmering 
tensions of the past few days. He thought it folly to try to understand the Irish people let 
alone govern them.
38
 Later in the day the Cabinet met to discuss the points raised at the 
conference, but attention quickly switched to Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey who 
read the terms of Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia. Winston Churchill recalled that 
discussions over the parishes of Tyrone and Fermanagh quickly faded into the mists and 
squalls of Ireland, now that Europe was on the brink of war.
39
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 On July 26, the yacht Asgard arrived at Howth harbor in Dublin with nine 
hundred guns destined for the Irish Volunteers. Unlike the Larne gun-running incident, 
the unloading of weapons occurred during daylight hours, and a curious crowd came to 
watch the Volunteers in action. William Vesey Harrel, the Assistant Commissioner of 
the Dublin Metropolitan Police, called upon his officers, reinforced by one hundred of 
the King’s Own Scottish Borderers [an infantry regiment of the British army], to 
intervene as the Irish Volunteers made their way back through Dublin with the weapons. 
The Volunteers resisted attempts to disarm them, slipping off into the crowd, and so the 
government forces backed down, leaving the scene empty-handed. As the soldiers left 
the area they were taunted and attacked with stones by a group of civilians. At nearby 
Bachelor’s Walk the soldiers responded by firing into the crowd, killing four people and 
injuring thirty-eight more. Nationalist Ireland was outraged that the army had been 
called in to disarm the Irish Volunteers and commit a “massacre,” while the U.V.F. 
experienced no such interference. An irate Redmond condemned the shootings, and 
wondered if compromise was now beyond his reach, such was the level of mutual 
hostility toward the British government. 
 The Chief Secretary immediately suspended Harrel from duty for taking it upon 
himself to call in the military regiment to disarm the Irish Volunteers. Birrell claimed the 
government had not desired to interfere with the importation of weapons destined for the 
Irish Volunteers because he chose not to prosecute those in charge of the illegal Larne 
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gun-running operation earlier in the year.
40
  Bonar Law charged that Birrell had used his 
suspension of Harrel as a way to deflect blame for the violence, and declared that the 
Liberal Party had abnegated all authority in Ireland to the various paramilitaries. Former 
Conservative-Unionist leader Arthur Balfour condemned Birrell for not giving his 
officials in Ireland the public support they needed in a time of crisis.
41 
As Chief 
Secretary in Ireland in 1887, Balfour was not afraid to publicly support police officers 
caught up in a riot in the village of Mitchelstown, County Cork.  Although three Irish 
Nationalists lay dead after that “massacre,” as it was referred to in the Irish press, 
Balfour praised the bravery of the Royal Irish Constabulary in charge of suppressing the 
riot. The police force, he believed, should always receive the full support of the Chief 
Secretary, but with Birrell this was never the case.
42
 Birrell argued that it was wrong to 
discriminate between volunteers in one part of Ireland and volunteers in another part of 
the country, therefore his condemnation and suspension of Harrel was justified.
43
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Despite Tory protestations to the contrary, a Royal Commission, set up immediately 
after the events in Howth, confirmed that the use of the military was not warranted by 
the circumstances on the ground and not utilized in accordance with the law.  
Balfour was certainly justified in his criticism of the Chief Secretary. Throughout 
his tenure in Ireland, Birrell had shown little interest in the Dublin Metropolitan Police 
and the Royal Irish Constabulary, frequently choosing to ignore their questions, and 
letting them deal with situations as they saw fit.
44
 His laissez faire approach further hurt 
his standing within the Liberal Party. Charles Hobhouse, a Cabinet colleague, blasted 
Birrell after a party discussion on the Howth incident on July 27: 
 
“Birrell gave us the most lame and unconvincing account of Mr. Harrel’s action. 
In the first place Birrell had not, save for a few days, been in Dublin for months, 
nor did it occur to him to go there now. Secondly, he had made up his mind on an 
ex parte statement of Dougherty that Harrel was willfully guilty…..The whole of 
the present difficulties in Ulster and Dublin are due to Birrell’s own negligence 
of duties, and his habitual absence from Ireland.”45 
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Asquith was both sorrowful and angry that such a tragedy could have transpired, and 
privately expressed his regret that he did not order a reshuffle of the Irish administration 
six months prior.  
 
“A weaker and more incompetent lot were never in charge of a leaking ship in 
stormy weather….poor old Birrell’s occasional and fitful appearances at the 
wheel do not greatly improve matters.”46  
 
Birrell’s shortcomings as Chief Secretary for Ireland in abstentia seemingly had left the 
country on the verge of civil war, but the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
in Sarajevo on June 28 precipitated a chain of events that would thrust Britain into a 
continental war, thereby switching the focus away from deteriorating political conditions 
in Ireland.
47
 
 Britain declared war on Germany on August 4, 1914, after Asquith’s ultimatum 
for German forces to withdraw from Belgium fell on deaf ears. Redmond and his 
followers rallied to the cause of Empire. The Irish Party leader had continually touted the 
loyalty of the Irish people toward Britain throughout his Home Rule campaign, and such 
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loyalty could be expressed once again on the battlefield. Focussed on the war effort, 
Asquith decided to abandon the unresolved Amending Bill, and quickly drew up a 
Suspensory Bill, that postponed the coming into force of both the Government of Ireland 
Act and the controversial Welsh Church Act for the duration of the war. Both the 
Suspensory Act and the other two Acts received the Royal Assent on September 18. The 
war temporarily pushed Irish politics to the side, and Asquith was glad of the reprieve. 
On August 31 he confessed to his young confidante, Venetia Stanley: 
 
“The Irish on both sides are giving me a lot of trouble just at a difficult moment. 
I sometimes wish we could submerge the whole lot of them and their island for, 
say, ten years, under the waves of the Atlantic.”48 
 
Redmond, Dillon and other senior Irish Party members accepted the Suspensory 
Act out of loyalty in a time of war, and it gave the Irish Party leader a semblance of 
victory and that self-government was now an inevitability.
49 
With a Home Rule Bill now 
on the Statute Book, Redmond believed he held the upper hand over Carson and his 
fellow Ulster Unionists because “civil war would be so fiercely condemned at such an 
hour of national peril that it could not show its head.”50 Meanwhile, Carson, assured by 
Asquith that the Act could be altered in accordance with his wishes after the war, viewed 
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the suspended Home Rule Act as meaningless, and believed that anyone who attempted 
to put it into force in Ulster would be met with the might of the Ulster Volunteer Force.
  
Nevertheless, a buoyed Redmond pledged to the British government that the Irish 
Volunteers would secure Ireland’s defense, and hoped this spirit of cooperation with the 
joint action by Nationalist volunteers in the South and Unionist volunteers in the North 
would encourage the political unity of the island after the war.
51
 On September 20, two 
days after the Home Rule Bill received the Royal Assent, an elated Redmond visited an 
Irish Volunteer parade at Woodenbridge, County Wicklow, where he called for them to 
join with the British Army for the liberty of both Catholic Belgium and France. It would 
be a shame, he declared, for Ireland and its martial traditions if Irishmen refused to fight 
in defense of “right, of freedom and religion.”52 Redmond was convinced his speeches in 
support of the war effort both in the House of Commons and at Woodenbridge would 
bridge the political divide in Ireland, and by winter he and Carson would have come to a 
satisfactory political agreement.
53
 
While Pro-British and Redmondite sentiment swept the country, it led to a split 
in the Irish Volunteers. The vast majority, roughly 158,000 recruits, sided with Redmond 
and rebranded themselves as the Irish National Volunteers. Those Irish separatists who 
opposed providing their ancient adversary with manpower in their time of need formed a 
splinter movement known as the Irish Volunteers. Led by Eoin MacNeill of the Gaelic 
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League, this group of 9,000 men believed that, world war aside, securing Ireland’s 
nationality was of primary importance. MacNeill and his followers declared that 
Redmond had violated Volunteer principles; therefore it was up to them to defend any 
assault upon Ireland’s liberties.54 They found it abhorrent that Redmond declared it to be 
the duty of the Irish Volunteers to “take foreign service under a Government which is 
not Irish,” and could therefore no longer follow his leadership.55   
Birrell was disappointed by the Irish Volunteer split, because the separatists 
made his job of maintaining law and order increasingly difficult. He viewed the seditious 
Sinn Feiner pamphlets and newspapers making the rounds in Dublin as wanton folly, out 
of touch with Irish opinion, and a “treacherous dagger” during a time of national peril.56 
Although he was reluctant to clamp down on the subversive literature for fear of stirring 
up further hostilities, he felt compelled to do so by because of outrage emanating from 
Ulster and England, and the risk of a “sham rebellion” in Dublin, if separatist 
newspapers continued to print whatever they liked.
57 
Redmond, on the other hand, 
viewed the separatist Sinn Fein grouping with disdain, labelling it a “temporary cohesion 
of isolated cranks,” with no policy and no leader.58  
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With Home Rule on the Statute Book, albeit postponed for the duration of the 
war, Redmond sought, as he embarked on an intensive recruitment campaign, formal 
recognition of a distinct and separate Irish Army Corps to be used in the war effort. In 
his way stood the mistrustful Lord Kitchener, the newly-appointed Secretary of State for 
War, and the War Office.
59
 As early as August 8, Redmond had tried to persuade 
Kitchener of the benefits of an Irish Volunteer force responsible for defending Ireland’s 
coastline, yet the Field-Marshall was unmoved, and preferred to use British Territorials 
to defend the island from German invasion.
60 
On September 3, Ulster Unionist leader Sir 
Edward Carson met with Kitchener, with the latter promising him permission to create a 
separate Ulster Division of the British army from former members of the U.V.F.; and on 
October 28, the 36
th
 [Ulster] Division was finally authorized. Kitchener viewed the Irish 
National Volunteers as inefficient and lacking leadership, and did not want to waste 
valuable British resources to train and equip a Nationalist army that, after the war, he 
believed, could enforce Home Rule on its own terms.
61 
Redmond believed Kitchener’s 
stubbornness would hamper his recruitment efforts, and undermine his authority as the 
Prime-Minister-in-waiting of a new Irish Home Rule government. Despite Kitchener’s 
rejection, Redmond adopted the 16
th
 [Irish] Division as the unofficial name of the Irish 
National Volunteers. He continued to push Birrell for help, warning him in September 
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that if “the existing volunteer organization is ignored and sneered at and made little of, 
recruiting in this country will not go ahead.”62 
 To help influence the Cabinet to be more amenable to Redmond’s demands, the 
Chief Secretary submitted a paper on the current state of Ireland. He informed his 
colleagues: 
 
“The Irish have changed, and their attitude to-day, north, south, east and west, 
towards England in her tremendous struggle with Germany and Austria is, 
speaking of Ireland as a whole, one of great friendliness.” 
 
The U.V.F. had 60,000 rifles for 100,000 men, while the Irish National Volunteers, 
170,000 strong and closely allied to the Irish Party had only 10,000 weapons.  Although 
sedition was actively encouraged by certain Irish Americans and Germans, the 
overwhelming majority of the Irish people, Birrell insisted, were loyal to the British 
cause.
63
 Despite his optimistic report, the Chief Secretary did not make much headway 
in moving Asquith and the Cabinet to force Kitchener and the War Office into yielding 
to Redmond’s demands. Whatever influence the Chief Secretary once had waned 
considerably in the wake of the Howth fiasco, and, on November 3, a frustrated and 
exasperated Birrell told the Irish Party chairman: 
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“I have stood the torture, for torture it has been so long, that I don’t care what 
happens during the short time still remaining to me.”64 
 
That the Great War did not come to an end by the winter of 1914, as many had 
predicted, disheartened Birrell because, with Home Rule suspended for the foreseeable 
future, he had to continue in a job of which he grew increasingly weary, and that seemed 
to become more challenging by the day. 
 The initial enthusiasm for the war effort among Irish Nationalists faded as 1914 
came to a close. Many of the National Volunteers were farmers’ sons, and were reluctant 
to head to the trenches of Flanders.
65 
Further, although loyal to Redmond, many National 
Volunteers continued to harbor the notion that to fight for Britain was a form of 
disloyalty to Ireland because of the acrimonious past between the two peoples.
66 
The 
shortsightedness of the War Office in not acceding to Irish sentiment by refusing to 
authorize specific Irish regiments only exacerbated the hesitancy of many Nationalists to 
come to Britain’s aid.67 From late 1914 onwards, the separatist Sinn Fein organization, 
headed by Arthur Griffith, stepped up its anti-enlistment and anti-recruitment activity 
through its weekly newspaper Sinn Fein. Birrell viewed Griffith as an extraordinarily 
clever propagandist, who could write an argumentative article as well as anyone else, but 
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viewed his paper as outrageous and treasonable.
68
 The Chief Secretary knew he could 
use the newly-passed Defence of the Realm Act to suspend such publications and arrest 
their editors, but his newly-appointed Under-Secretary, Sir Matthew Nathan, warned him 
such action would only stir up unwelcome trouble, and would not lead to improved 
recruitment levels.
69
 Further, Redmond and his party were against a tighter crackdown 
on the freedom of the press, so Birrell, assured by the Irish Party leader that the 
separatists were a small minority, responded to Unionist complaints in Parliament by 
dismissing the propaganda as a “mosquito press,” small but noisy.70 What could not be 
ignored, however, was English public opinion, which expressed incredulity that such 
provocative material should go unpunished during wartime. It was under this pressure 
that Birrell, in early December, sanctioned Nathan to clamp down upon the “rags” as 
Dillon had referred to them. 
 
In early 1915, the Chief Secretary asked Asquith if he could be relieved of office 
because of his wife’s severe illness. The Prime Minister persuaded him not to quit by 
suggesting he remain in London to focus on his wife and confine himself to a little 
parliamentary work, while Nathan took care of all essential matters in Ireland.
71
 Asquith, 
perhaps blinded by his close friendship to Birrell or by his preoccupation with the war on 
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the continent, believed him to be the best available man to continue to lead the Irish 
administration until the war was over. In a letter to his friend Miss Stanley, in which he 
ranked his Cabinet by ability, Asquith declined to place Birrell on the list, stating that he 
was “in a class by himself,” such was the strong friendship between the two men.72 
While Birrell tended to the needs of his wife, who finally succumbed, after several years 
of suffering, to a brain tumor on March 10, the situation in Ireland gradually worsened, 
as Redmond’s authority came under increased scrutiny from the influential Irish-
American lobby, and from those at home who became increasingly skeptical about the 
war and the prospects for Home Rule. 
As the war showed no signs of slowing down, separatist newspapers such as 
Nationality [funded by the revolutionary Irish Republican Brotherhood, and whose 
editor, once again, was Griffith], Irish Volunteer and Spark spoke of the moral 
corruption of Redmond and the Irish Party, of the threat of conscription, and of how the 
British were fighting solely for sinister economic reasons. The decision by the Liberal 
government, on May 25, in the wake of the disastrous Gallipoli campaign and a severe 
shortage of munitions, to form a coalition government with the Conservatives-Unionists 
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further emboldened those critical of Redmond’s leadership.73 Many Nationalists were 
outraged that the Conservatives-Unionists might now try to meddle with Irish Home 
Rule. Roman Catholic Bishop Michael Fogerty of Killaloe, a staunch Irish Party 
supporter declared:  
 
“Home Rule is dead and buried and Ireland is without a national party…What the 
future has in store for us God knows. I suppose conscription, with a bloody feud 
between people and soldiers.”74 
 
 In the weeks leading up to the formal announcement of the coalition Cabinet, 
Birrell had sounded out Redmond to see if he would be willing to join. The Chief 
Secretary agreed with Redmond that it would be a misfortune for Ireland to have the 
Opposition in government but hoped the Irish Party leader would join the coalition 
because it would be viewed favorably from an English standpoint, and would virtually 
guarantee a positive result for Home Rule. Birrell expressed his disappointment about 
the prospect of the Ulster champion, Sir Edward Carson, joining the coalition, because it 
                                                 
73
 With the advent of trench warfare at the start of the Great War a shift emerged in British military 
doctrine. Rather than have artillery assist with infantry attacks it was agreed Britain’s 18-pounder field 
guns, the backbone of its field artillery at the time, should be used to primarily control events on the stable 
battlefield lines on the Western Front. However, according to R.J.Q. Adams in Arms and the Wizard: 
Lloyd George and the Ministry of Munitions 1915-1916 (London: Cassell & Co., 1978), these guns were 
firing at an average rate of fourteen rounds per gun per day yet were only receiving seven rounds per gun 
daily from Great Britain. Rumors of a shell shortage began to circulate in the British press, and the War 
Office came under heavy criticism. With disastrous Allied military failures in the Dardanelles and 
Gallipoli in early 1915, Prime Minister Asquith came under extreme pressure to form a wartime 
government coalition to preserve national unity and to bolster the British war effort. For more on 
Asquith’s dilemma see pages 297-300 of R.J.A. Adams’ Balfour: The Last Grandee. 
 
74
 Hennessey, Dividing Ireland, 107. 
  
150 
 
could make his position in Ireland untenable.
75 
In a letter to Nathan he wrote that the 
thought of power-sharing with the Tories, and his surety that the war was nowhere close 
to ending, had left him in a foul and depressed mood, and said if his ship was torpedoed 
on his next visit to Ireland he would not mind because it would be better to drown in 
“salt water than in Irish Whisky”.76 In line with Nationalist tradition, Redmond declined 
the offer to take up a position in the British government, as did his senior party 
colleagues who were subsequently extended the offer. 
 Asquith’s new Cabinet included nine Conservatives and one Labourite, but the 
Liberals continued to hold the major positions. The Irish Party was outraged that Carson 
was appointed Attorney General and viewed it as a major setback for the prospects of 
Home Rule, with Redmond informing the Chief Secretary that the only positive in such a 
distressing situation was that he was remaining on in his current role. On May 29, Birrell 
replied to Redmond: 
 
“The PM and I have had the most hellish fortnight of our lives. Cabinet should 
have been left alone with a war committee with everyone on it. Told Cabinet 
opposed to sharing the daily admin of Ireland affairs with anyone on Unionist 
side. It was a little difficult to close the doors altogether on their ugly faces.”77 
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Birrell believed his position to be most uncomfortable and outright impossible with the 
likes of Balfour, Long and Carson in the Cabinet. He labeled Asquith’s Cabinet reshuffle 
as “untrusting as a young woman making up her mind whether she will have diamonds 
or rubies in her engagement ring.”78 He also recognized the strain this caused the Irish 
Party-Liberal alliance, but he held no ill-will toward Redmond for not joining the 
coalition, because he knew it would have been antithetic to Irish Nationalist opinion and 
would have ended his career almost immediately.
79 
 Irish Nationalists were outraged that senior Unionists now held office, and 
Redmond was savagely attacked in the press for not creating an adequate fuss on the 
matter and resultantly risking the implementation of the Home Rule Act after the war 
ended.  The popular Nationalist Independent newspaper thought it bizarre that Sir 
Edward Carson, given the position of Attorney General, could now prosecute those who 
gave seditious speeches, since he himself was fond of making them.
80
 Fear spread across 
the island that the Conservative-Unionist Party would now push for wartime 
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conscription or at least mandatory registration for service, and that it should be extended 
to Ireland.
81
 The Chief Secretary warned Nathan of the increased unrest in Ireland: 
 
“We may escape shipwreck and disturbances on a big scale in Ireland. I pray it 
be so. Ireland is, I am sure, in a rotten state, ripe for a row, without leadership.”82 
 
A livid Redmond told Asquith he was deeply disappointed that he received no 
consultation when the coalition was formulated, and expressed disbelief that Carson, the 
leader of Ulster Unionism and “apostle of physical force against law,” should hold the 
position of Attorney General. He found the offer to himself of an unknown Cabinet 
position to be offensive, and the selection of James Campbell, a staunch Unionist, to be 
Lord Chancellor of Ireland, outrageous.
83
  Campbell was vehemently opposed to Home 
Rule, and had previously spoken of civil war as the path of duty for Ulster’s Unionists. 
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To de-escalate the rift between the two men, Asquith rescinded the offer to Campbell, 
and promised Redmond that the Irish government would continue to be administered by 
Birrell and Nathan, without additional interference.
84 
 Although Redmond was pleased that Birrell would continue his administrative 
duties unhindered, others were critical of Asquith’s decision to continue to allow a 
“professional humourist” to handle what was clearly a worsening political situation.85 
John Henry Bernard, the Protestant Church of Ireland Archbishop of Dublin, lamented 
that treason was openly preached across Dublin unchecked, and allowing Birrell to 
continue to hold the weakest position in the Cabinet was shocking. Ireland needed, he 
believed, a man who could rule, not someone who spent his time making jokes and 
“spouting humbug.”86 Dillon described the political situation in Ireland after the 
establishment of the new National Government as being at its worst since 1900, and 
recognized the increased hostility of the Irish clergy towards the Irish leadership.
87
 
Birrell, writing to Nathan in late August, recognized just how precarious the situation 
was in Ireland, owing in no small part to the massive loss of life on the continent. 
                                                 
 
84
 Asquith to Redmond, June 9, 1915, MS Asquith 36 f. 102, Bodleian Library. 
 
85
 Andrew Scholes, The Church of Ireland and the Third Home Rule Bill (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 
2010), 111. 
 
86
 Ibid. 
 
87
 Finnan, John Redmond, 142. 
  
154 
 
Ireland, he felt, was very sensitive because “doing anything there was like walking on 
the upturned faces of men.”88 
 
Between late May and late September the Independent [now with a wider 
readership than the Irish Party’s Freeman’s Journal] produced more than twenty articles 
and editorials critical of the party leadership, the inadequacies of the Home Rule Act, 
and the danger presented by Asquith’s new ministry. The newspaper’s campaign against 
Redmond and his colleagues increased already commonly held misgivings from the 
party’s supporters. John Dillon believed the paper was “doing an immense amount of 
harm,” to Nationalist opinion, especially since the war showed no signs of abating.89 The 
separatist Sinn Feiners capitalized on the public mood by cleverly orchestrating an 
elaborate funeral for the veteran Fenian Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa. A large crowd 
assembled at Glasnevin Cemetery in Dublin to watch the spectacle put on by the Irish 
Volunteers, and to listen to Padraig Pearse, a poet and political activist, rebuke the Home 
Rule Act: 
 
“They think they have pacified Ireland. They think that they have purchased half 
of us and intimidated the other half. They think that they have foreseen 
everything, think that they have provided against everything; but the fools, the 
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fools, the fools! – they have left us our Fenian dead, and while Ireland holds 
these graves, Ireland unfree shall never be at peace.”90 
 
Clearly perturbed by the ostentatious display of anti-British and anti-war 
sentiment emanating from O’Donovan Rossa’s funeral spectacle, Birrell wrote to his 
Under-Secretary to express his views on the matter. He was sure very few of those who 
attended the service actually cared for or even knew the man, and felt it was orchestrated 
simply to keep alive “a sham revolutionary sentiment.” Nevertheless, he saw the 
spectacle as evidence of increased dissatisfaction with Redmond among the populace 
and believed the Sinn Feiners, who wished to keep alive the embers of Fenianism, 
sought some sort of violent reaction towards British rule in Ireland before the war was 
over. He took solace in his certainty that Sinn Fein lacked a decent orator or organizer 
but still found their actions to be disgusting during a time of national peril.
91
 Making 
matters worse for Redmond and his Irish Party was his constant bouts with sickness 
during the spring and summer months of 1915, which hindered his ability in some way 
to rally Irish Nationalist opinion at a time when an overall somber mood had enveloped 
the country.
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CHAPTER VI 
THE NATIONAL COALITION, SEDITION AND THE EASTER RISING 
 
 
The Chief Secretary had a difficult time adjusting to political life inside a 
national coalition. He would have preferred the creation of a War Committee of six to 
eight men from both parties to meet fortnightly to discuss the conduct of the war, while 
leaving the Liberal Party Cabinet unchanged.
1 
Instead he had to content himself with 
working alongside the leaders of the former Opposition, including the intransigent Irish 
Unionists Sir Edward Carson and Walter Long, who were given the positions of 
Attorney-General and President of the Local Government Board respectively. His 
disdain for these rigid champions of Ulster Unionism had grown throughout the Home 
Rule Crisis, labeling them the “greediest pigs on record.”2 Birrell had previously 
jokingly confided to his private secretary at Dublin Castle, Thomas Philip Le Fanu, that 
he would sooner be split by “the Babylonian Whore [Rome] than by Sir Edward 
Carson,” such was his antipathy for the man.3  
Writing to Redmond shortly after the Coalition was formed, Birrell confessed 
that he loathed the idea of sitting next to Irish Unionists who believed or pretended to 
believe the Liberal government had tried and failed to organize a pogrom of Ulster’s 
                                                 
1
 Birrell to Nathan, May 6, 1915, MS Nathan 449 Letters from A.B. 1914-16 f. 182, Bodleian Library 
Archives. 
 
2
 Ibid., f. 181. 
 
3
 Birrell to Le Fanu, August 21, 1912, MS 8 3 (3), Liverpool University Archives. 
  
157 
 
men and women shortly before the Curragh Crisis.
4 
 Birrell assured Redmond he would 
not be forced to share his daily administration of Ireland with anyone on the Unionist 
side, although he did admit he found it challenging to close them out completely.
5
 The 
Chief Secretary grew increasingly weary of the House of Commons, which had become 
for him a truly detestable place, full of bad-tempered outsiders, and felt his friendship 
with the Irish Party had been damaged as a result of the Coalition.
6
  
 
Birrell was in a foul and depressed mood. Throughout the Ulster Crisis he had 
been repeatedly bypassed by more senior Cabinet members during their more serious 
political discussions with the leaders of Irish Nationalism and Unionism.
7
 His wife’s 
death earlier in the year only added to his gloomy demeanor, and was looking forward to 
the end of the conflict with Germany so Asquith would finally accept his request to 
resign from his position. Birrell was impressed with the competency of his Under-
Secretary Sir Matthew Nathan, whom he believed would make an ideal successor once 
he himself was gone.
8 The Freeman’s Journal newspaper, the voice of constitutional 
nationalism, understood the difficult position the Chief Secretary now faced, and 
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claimed he could not freely administer to the trusted representatives of Irish opinion 
because into the coalition stepped the “mouthers of sedition” from Ulster.9 
 Even after his wife’s death in March Birrell continued to remain in Britain for 
long periods of time, because he had a great deal of faith in Nathan to administer from 
Dublin Castle, and because he believed he should be close to parliament, which now met 
almost daily, to better represent Irish interests during this time of national peril. 
Communication between Birrell and his Under-Secretary during the second half of 1915 
chiefly concerned the increased volume of seditious literature in Ireland. This separatist 
propaganda contributed to heightened fears across England and Ireland that Germany 
would seek to encourage the Irish Volunteer Force to sabotage the British war effort. 
Nevertheless, Birrell made little attempt to coordinate directly the Royal Irish 
Constabulary and Dublin Metropolitan Police to investigate, leaving them and the 
judicial division of Dublin Castle to their own devices.
10
 Action was stepped up against 
the purveyors of seditious papers and pamphlets, especially those of a violent tone and 
those involved in anti-recruitment meetings; however, any time police officers attempted 
to make arrests on charges of sedition they were castigated by the moderate Nationalist 
press for their seemingly heavy-handed tactics. According to the findings of the Royal 
Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland [1916], such was the volume of sedition across 
the country in 1915 that juries in Dublin, and magistrates across the land, owing to either 
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fear or favor, could not be trusted to make a legitimate decision based on the evidence in 
front of them. On top of this, the maximum sentence for those who were convicted was 
only six months’ hard labor, seemingly a minor deterrent to the law-breakers.11 
 Amid the turmoil of the Ulster Crisis, Birrell had become increasingly skeptical 
of police reports pertaining to civil discord across Ireland. He believed those police 
circulars which did make it to his desk were, for the most part, biased in nature, because 
the top positions in the Irish judicial system at Dublin Castle were held by men with 
Unionist sympathies. In a letter to Nathan he described policemen in Ulster as “chock 
full of the same passions” as those who wished to rid the country of Papists.12 The hard 
words of Carson and Craig in Ulster during the Home Rule Bill negotiations fostered a 
perverse wave of sectarianism in the North because, as the Chief Secretary described it, 
“the pulse of the machine [Ulster Unionist Party] is religious bigotry.”13 Reflecting upon 
a motorcar trip through Ulster in mid-October, Birrell told his son, Tony, of his 
disappointment that Protestants and Roman Catholics in the city of Belfast did not love 
each other as proper Christians should.
14
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The passage of the National Registration Act in July 1915 worried the leaders of 
Irish nationalism.
15
 Irish Party leader John Redmond had assured his supporters in 
August 1914 that Irishmen would only be called upon on a voluntary basis to take up 
arms against Germanic aggression. The sharp decline in the intake of volunteers in both 
Britain and Ireland by mid-1915 led many to fear possible conscription to fill the ranks 
of the armed forces. In the House of Commons, several days before the passage of the 
National Registration Act, Birrell expressed his concerns that among the peasant 
population of Ireland there existed a very great dread of conscription.
16
 The National 
Registration Act, although it only applied to Britain, gave anti-war Irish republicans the 
ammunition they needed to sow the seeds of discord through their penny papers. The 
Act, they claimed, was the first step towards conscription across the United Kingdom. 
The Chief Secretary, now spending much of his time in London, with Irish 
correspondence directed through the Irish Office at Westminster, initially expressed 
skepticism over the impact of separatist propaganda. Nathan sent him a copy of a Sinn 
Fein pamphlet in September, which he labeled the heaviest trash he ever read. Such 
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diatribe, he was certain, would “choke off anyone’s enthusiasm” for Sinn Fein so its 
publication would do no harm to recruitment efforts in Ireland.
17 
 
On October 11, Lord Derby was appointed Director-General of Recruiting by 
Prime Minister Asquith.
18
 Five days later he announced a new recruitment scheme to 
raise the number of volunteers to the army.
19
 An uncertainty hung in the air as to how 
this would impact Ireland. Birrell was sure that conscription, if it came about, would not 
be applied to Ireland. He advised Nathan that if Asquith agreed to extend a conscription 
Bill to Ireland then “all the Irish Nationalists [Redmond included] will join hands….with 
the radical camp.”20 Nevertheless, Birrell realized parliamentary discussions concerning 
registration and recruitment levels in the midst of the Derby Scheme had changed 
attitudes in Ireland. Under-Secretary Nathan met with Dillon in November, during which 
the latter impressed upon Nathan the growth in strength of Sinn Fein, and expressed his 
certainty conscription would result in widespread civil discord.
21
 Now cognizant of the 
growth of the anti-war separatist movement in Ireland, Birrell believed the conscription 
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scare had weakened his Irish administration, perhaps to the detriment of Redmond.
22
 
Furthermore, he found John Redmond’s support base and his appeal to have waned,  
because the “Bill [Home Rule] in the Statute Book” ceased to be a rallying cry from an 
increasingly disenchanted populace which saw no quick end to the war in Europe. 
Conscription would be extremely difficult to enforce in Ireland within this atmosphere, 
Birrell advised Nathan, because: 
 
“Dublin Castle would be responsible for conscription and soldiers would have to 
go from village to village to carry “all the Pats and Mikes” to custody. Shots 
would be fired…volunteers would parade in force.”23 
  
Also assisting the anti-recruitment Sinn Feiners were the mixed signals coming 
from the extremely influential Roman Catholic Church in Ireland. While a majority of 
the clergy had thrust its support behind Redmond and his recruitment efforts on behalf of 
Britain when the war began, some priests held anti-English sentiment and radical 
Nationalist attitudes.  Archbishop Walsh of Dublin, who had worked closely with Birrell 
during the formulation of the Irish Universities Bill in 1908, offered only lukewarm 
support for the war, and castigated Redmond’s recruitment campaign as the inevitable 
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result of his party’s “parliamentary subservience to the Liberals.”24 Birrell recognized a 
growing number of disloyal priests, especially the younger ones, were coming out on 
their own as leaders of anti-recruitment efforts throughout the fall of 1915.
25
 Worried 
about the growth of the Irish Volunteers, he warned Redmond fewer and fewer priests 
and laymen were committed to stamping out revolutionary sentiment.
26 
 
While the war against Germany and her allies dragged on, the British Treasury 
groaned under the burden of funding it.
27
 In November, Asquith instructed his Cabinet to 
find ways to scale back expenditure in non-essential government programs. While 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Reginald McKenna focused on cost-cutting in Britain, the 
Irish Chief Secretary was tasked with finding savings in Irish government services. 
Birrell, as chairman of the newly formed Committee on Public Retrenchment, invited 
Irish Party M.P. John Pius Boland to be his party’s representative on the panel. Much to 
Birrell’s chagrin it was decided by Redmond that none of his party members should 
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attend any discussions on retrenchment because this would allow them to freely approve 
or disapprove of any recommendations the committee might make.
28 
 
While the Committee on Public Retrenchment was only advisory in nature, it did 
alarm the Irish Nationalist community. It was understood that the British Treasury was 
bound to the financial terms of the Home Rule Act of 1914, so this new committee 
worried many who feared it was an underhanded attempt to undo what the Irish Party 
had fought to establish. Despite rumors of possible cuts to Irish language programs in 
schools and the possible closure of public galleries and other non-essential functions, 
Birrell and his fellow committee members, after having held three meetings, decided to 
abandon the economy enquiry. On December 6, the Chief Secretary reported to the 
Cabinet that any attempt to slash funding in Ireland on a large scale without legislation 
would prove contentious. He recommended the British government leave the Irish 
administration to its own devices to find areas where money could be saved. Many in the 
Irish Unionist community expected no less from Birrell, condemning his report as a clear 
demonstration of his continued and unabashed deference towards Redmond and the Irish 
Party.
29
 
 Augustine Birrell found very little joy as Irish Chief Secretary in his last few 
months on the job. The widespread panic in Ireland over conscription continued 
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unabated through the medium of republican newspapers. He confessed to his Under-
Secretary: 
 
“I was never more dissatisfied with the Irish cauldron – its bubbling and 
steaming contents, than I am now.”30 
 
He wrote to Redmond on December 19, stressing his deep concern over the state of the 
country. His Irish intelligence sources claimed the Irish Volunteers were growing 
steadily in size, now approximately 14,000 strong, while revolutionary propaganda 
continued to blossom in an uncertain environment.
31 
 
 In October, Edward Carson resigned his position as Attorney General in protest 
towards what he perceived to be British military incompetency in the Gallipoli 
Peninsula.
32
 Birrell found Carson’s resignation speech to be dignified, but was glad to 
see him out of the Cabinet, joking that this now made a future run by Carson for the 
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premiership impossible. The Ulster Unionist leader’s time in Ulster had, Birrell believed, 
made him “unfit for friendly and close relations with Englishmen,” and his volatility left 
him with very few friends at all.
33 
No longer in the coalition Cabinet, Carson became de-
facto leader of the Unionists skeptical of the coalition, thus making him Leader of the 
Opposition in the House of Commons. 
 Although pleased to see Carson gone, Birrell still had to contend with the leader 
of Ulster Unionism stirring the seeds of dissension in Ireland because of his insistence 
that Ireland should not receive special treatment should a Conscription Bill be put forth 
by the government. In a letter to his Under-Secretary on November 16, Birrell expressed 
concern about Carson’s ugly temper for fear it could provoke an outbreak of violence in 
Ireland.
34 
On December 2, a joint meeting of unionists and nationalists in the Ulster town 
of Newry extended invitations to both Carson and Redmond to address their proposed 
recruitment event. While Redmond gladly accepted the invitation, Carson did not, 
claiming: 
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“the proposal would not serve any useful purpose, as I have already from time to 
time made known in Ulster my views as to supporting our comrades at the front 
by keeping up the necessary reserves.”35 
 
The event was cancelled as a result. Such a manoeuver by Carson only strengthened the 
circulation of stories within the Irish press that the British government had something 
more than voluntarism in mind in their upcoming recruitment legislation. 
 On December 20 Lord Derby sent his final report to the Cabinet. It showed that 
out of the five million men available for military service only 59% had registered under 
his scheme. Further, for those who did make themselves available only 275,000 
volunteered for immediate service, while the rest chose to attest and await call-up. 
Glaringly, the report revealed that 38% of single men and 54% of married men in Britain 
publicly refused to enlist.
36
 Lord Derby’s dismal figures signaled the end of voluntarism 
as an effective tool for recruitment. Birrell viewed Derby’s scheme of moral compulsion 
as rotten, and assured Redmond he was confident parliamentary discussions concerning 
the now inevitable prospect of conscription would not include Ireland. He confided to 
the Irish Party chairman that talk of conscription had made Westminster a gloomy place, 
and was sure the Christmas break would do nothing to lift his own melancholy mood.
37 
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After the winter recess Birrell wrote to Nathan about a recent visit he had had with 
Asquith. The Prime Minister offered his reassurance that Ireland would be excluded 
from conscription but expressed his concern that parliament’s distraction by the war in 
Europe allowed for the menacing political situation in Ireland to fester and grow apace.
38
  
 On January 5, 1916, Prime Minister Asquith announced to the House of 
Commons the Military Service Bill.
39
 The data drawn from Lord Derby’s recruitment 
campaign calculated that 650,000 unmarried men not already in the military failed to 
register their employment details with the government. The 400,000 married men who 
registered with the Derby Scheme would not be called upon until absolutely necessary; 
therefore, Asquith insisted, to reach the figure of one million new recruits, which he 
believed was crucial for the war effort, it was necessary to compel single men of military 
age into the armed forces. To the shouts of “Why?” from several members of the 
Opposition, Asquith, using Birrell’s line of argument, said the Bill was confined to 
include those who registered under Lord Derby’s Scheme, therefore meaning it did not 
apply to Ireland.
40
 The real reason for the non-inclusion of Ireland was the government’s 
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reluctant acceptance of Redmond’s argument that conscription on that island was 
“impracticable, unworkable and impossible.”41 
 
While Birrell could breathe a sigh of relief that conscription would not be applied 
to Ireland, Redmond expressed his opposition that conscription had to be applied at all to 
Britain. He questioned whether any proof existed that the Bill was necessary from a 
military point of view, and suggested a system of compulsion was “full of menace for 
the future of the country.”42 Six days later, during the Second Reading of the Military 
Service Bill, Redmond withdrew his and his party’s opposition to the Bill on the grounds 
that the overwhelming majority [450 to 47] of British M.P.s were in favor of the 
measure. He said: 
 
“A prolonged exhibition of bitter controversy on the floor of the House, in the 
face of the enemy, would be a disaster and a scandal.”43 
 
Ulster Unionist leader Sir Edward Carson expressed his gratitude for Redmond’s 
retraction of his opposition towards the Bill, and asked him to go a step further by 
allowing Ireland to be included. It was unfair, he contended, to allow Ireland to be given 
special treatment when the defense of the realm was at stake. Carson expressed his 
disappointment with Ireland’s recruitment figures, claiming that out of 562,000 men of 
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military aged between nineteen and forty-one only 92,000 had enlisted. For him, 
voluntarism in Ireland was simply not enough.
44
 
 On January 10, Birrell provided the House of Commons with recruitment 
statistics for Ireland’s four provinces. What it revealed was an indictment of Redmond’s 
purported success of raising an adequate number of Irish volunteers for the British army. 
Since the outbreak of war in August 1914, Ulster had provided more men for combat 
than the other three provinces combined. This flew in the face of Redmond’s insistence 
that voluntarism in Ireland was working. Birrell’s private secretary Andrew Philip 
Magill suggested to Under-Secretary Nathan there would be a “great deal of crowing” in 
the North over this glaring statistic.
45 
James Chambers, the Unionist M.P. for South 
Belfast, tabled a motion before the House of Commons to have Ireland included in the 
Conscription Bill. His proposed amendment was seconded by Captain James Craig, but 
it was quickly rejected in parliament. Both Carson and Bonar Law came to realize during 
the conscription debates that to attempt to compel the Irish people into the British army 
was a risk not worth taking because: 
 
“Nationalist members would be driven to employ an attitude of uncompromising 
hostility to the Bill and to the Government which introduced it.”46 
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In early February the Chief Secretary, Redmond, and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland 
Viscount Wimborne embarked on a recruitment tour across Southern Ireland.
47
 Birrell 
was in a relaxed mood, having been reassured by Nathan a few weeks prior that, 
although there were spasmodic reports of new Irish Volunteer branches being formed, 
the removal of the threat of conscription was surely going to retard the growth of the 
separatist movement.
48
 On February 1 they addressed a huge crowd in County Galway in 
Western Ireland. Aware of increased Sinn Fein support, Redmond told the crowd that the 
small body of dissenters belonged to an entirely different stratum of Irish society, which 
explained their “imposition for evil.” In an attempt to get more farmers’ sons to join the 
army, he spoke of the fate of Polish landowners at the hands of the menacing Prussian 
planters.
49 
Birrell had little to say to the crowd other than to commend the valiant Irish 
men currently fighting at the front.
50 Birrell’s letter to Nathan after the visit to Galway 
exhibited a great deal of skepticism about Redmond’s appeal, and his ability to 
encourage a wave of new recruits. He said that while Redmond’s speech was good, the 
topic of recruitment was certainly not one the crowd was fond of.
51
 The Irish leader, he 
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explained to Nathan, did not have the ability to stir the crowd like Daniel O’Connell of 
old; rather Redmond was more of a plucky fellow in an odd and unappealing situation.
52 
 
 In Mid-March the Chief Secretary was shown as copy of a blatantly seditious 
anti-war article from The Gael, an Irish republican newspaper based in Dublin.  Having 
been reassured by Nathan that separatist activity was only sporadic and lacked appeal, 
and warned by his good friends Redmond and Dillon not to arrest the anti-war/anti-
British propagandists to prevent them from gaining the sympathy of the general public, 
Birrell’s reaction made sense. He said no defense could be made for such publications, 
but believed it was: 
 
“far more likely to make a timid reader turn pale than to cause a bold one to turn 
out to be shot down.” 
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While he was sure these sorts of publications were scandalous, they were not dangerous, 
although he admitted they probably hurt recruitment in the country.
53 
Unfortunately for 
Birrell, he refused to listen to the opinion of Irish Unionists concerning the deteriorating 
political conditions across the country. Having read over and listened, in his view, to 
exaggerated police reports concerning unrest in Ulster and across Ireland from the 
moment he set foot in Dublin Castle in 1907, Birrell continued to gravitate towards 
skepticism.  
 In early 1916 Viscount Midleton, the leader of the Irish Unionist Alliance, and a 
former war secretary
54
, approached Birrell in his office at the House of Commons with 
evidence from numerous reliable correspondents in Ireland that military-style drilling 
was going on in Dublin and elsewhere, and evidence from some quarters pointed to a 
determination to make some attempt at a rising, however reckless it might seem. The 
Chief Secretary dismissed his claims, saying that he laughed at such nonsense.
55 
On 
January 20, Midleton again approached Birrell, calling his attention to speeches made by 
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Irish priest Michael O’Flanaghan56 that Ireland should ally itself with Germany and fight 
for its independence. The Defence of the Realm Act of 1914 would have allowed Birrell 
to make arrests for those seeking to aid the enemy, but again Birrell dismissed him, and 
suggested that if he was so worried he should go himself to Ireland and visit with 
General Friend, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces there, and express his 
concerns to him. Seeking to defend himself from criticism, Birrell wrote to Midleton on 
February 25, explaining that as Chief Secretary he wished to foster the growth of loyalty 
towards the Empire on the island through both action and inaction. Ruling Ireland with 
an iron fist was not conducive to recruitment, and he told Midleton that he was more 
fearful of bombs and isolated acts of violence than of any sort of outlandish concerted 
rebellion.
57
  
Irish Attorney-General Sir James Campbell continually advocated through early 
1916 for the seizure of weapons from parading men in Dublin, but Birrell would not 
consider it because he was sure the Nationalist press would vilify him for having a 
double standard – one law for Ulster and the U.V.F. and another in the South.58 Birrell 
believed Ireland lived under a microscope; therefore any sort of perceived provocation 
could have terrible consequences: 
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“The misery of the whole thing was this – you had armed bodies of volunteers all 
over the place…and if you could have got disarmament all round it would have 
been a blessing, but to disarm any one section of the population on the evidence 
that we had appeared to me to be a very dangerous and doubtful proposition.”59 
 
In March, Redmond received a letter from Bernard MacGillan, a Chicago-based 
journalist originally from Belfast, in which he warned the Irish Party leader of rumors 
among the Irish American community of a sinister plot by the I.V.F. to “drench Ireland 
in blood.” Redmond showed the letter to Dillon, but it appeared neither of the men took 
it seriously because no evidence exists that it was ever forwarded to Birrell or to Dublin 
Castle.
60
 Had Birrell been shown this letter he might not have been overly concerned 
because a Royal Irish Constabulary report delivered to him in March suggested the Irish 
Volunteers lacked the resources to make even a brief stand against a small body of 
soldiers. The report did stress, however, its findings were based on intelligence gathering 
in the provinces, and not in the city of Dublin which was within the jurisdiction of the 
Dublin Metropolitan Police.
61 
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 The Chief Secretary’s last piece of legislation before the Easter Rising was 
typical of a man who had wedded himself to the voices of constitutional Irish 
nationalism.  The Roman Catholic Relief Act of 1829 removed many of the remaining 
restrictions imposed upon Roman Catholics in Britain and Ireland, most importantly 
granting them the right to sit in parliament. Nevertheless, several penal sections within 
the Act continued to allow for the suppression of Catholic religious orders, societies and 
communities. The Irish Party called on Birrell to pass a Bill that would rid the country of 
such discriminatory practices, which they argued belonged to another era. It was unfair 
they insisted for brave Irish Jesuits and Franciscan monks to assist dying Irish soldiers 
on the firing line in Flanders, yet at the same time be classified as outlaws under British 
law.
62 
On March 16, Birrell asked the House of Commons to give him leave to introduce 
a Bill to repeal these “long since obsolete and wholly abandoned provisions of the law.” 
He found it preposterous certain religious orders could not appeal to the courts over legal 
matters on the grounds they were legally viewed as outlaws.
63 
On April 5, Birrell 
formally introduced a Bill to repeal these provisions from the statute book, much to the 
delight of Redmond and his party. 
 In 1914, after the Irish Volunteer split between pro and anti–Redmondites, senior 
members of the secret revolutionary Irish Republican Brotherhood [I.R.B.] successfully 
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implanted themselves into important positions within the organization.
64
 In early 1915, 
the I.R.B.’s inner-circle, which included senior members Joseph Plunkett, Thomas 
MacDonagh and Padraig Pearse, began to discuss plans to utilize the Irish Volunteers to 
launch an insurrection against British rule in Ireland while the British Army was pre-
occupied on the continent. In 1914, Padraig Pearse became the Volunteers’ Director of 
Military Organization, and would use his senior position to help plan a rising. At the 
start of April, 1916, Pearse ordered all Irish Volunteers to gather at assembly points 
throughout the country on Easter Sunday [April 23] for three days of “field 
manoeuvers.” Such was the secrecy of the inner circle of the I.R.B., Irish Volunteer 
Chief-Of-Staff Eoin MacNeill was unaware Pearse’s plans were a cover for insurrection. 
MacNeill firmly believed the Irish Volunteer Force should only be called to arms if 
faced with suppression, and expressed certainty that open battle against the British Army 
would be folly. 
 On April 15 and 16 an apparently official document purporting to be from Dublin 
Castle was sent to the Irish press. Known to historians as the “Castle Document,” it 
authorized the arrest of all members of the Sinn Fein National Council and known 
leaders of the Irish Volunteer Force, and it included orders to occupy all buildings used 
by both for their activities. Initially the press did not publish the document, most likely 
to avoid transgressing increasingly prohibitive wartime censorship regulations, but a 
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copy of the document eventually made it into the hands of Dublin Corporation member 
and Sinn Fein vice-president Tom Kelly, who read it to the council on April 19. Dublin 
Castle claimed the document was bogus, but its authenticity continues to be the source of 
debate among historians.
65
 It is widely accepted by present-day scholars that I.R.B. 
member Joseph Plunkett fabricated parts of the document to spur the Irish Volunteers to 
armed insurrection.  
 Unaware of the I.R.B.’s secretive plans to launch an insurrection on Easter 
Sunday, Eoin MacNeill, upon reading the document, was persuaded by senior colleagues 
to instruct regional and local commanders to be ready to mobilize their forces to defend 
their weapons if the British attempted to suppress them.
66
 The British Navy’s 
interception of a German ship [The Aud] full of guns destined for the Irish Volunteers, 
and the arrest of Sir Roger Casement
67
 on the Southwest coast of Ireland prompted 
MacNeill, who was now approached by the I.R.B.’s inner circle to join with them in 
revolution, to issue a countermand to all Volunteers not to follow Pearse’s request to 
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begin parading on April 23.  Despite MacNeill’s orders the I.R.B. decided its plans for a 
rising would go ahead, albeit a day later on Easter Monday. 
 When Birrell and Nathan learned of the British Navy’s interception of the Aud, 
laden with Germany weaponry, and of the arrest of Casement, they expressed relief and 
concurred this was now the end of any coordinated attempt at armed rebellion.
68 
Redmond and Dillon were in London when they heard about the Aud, and the latter 
immediately rushed back to Dublin to consult with party members on the crisis. On 
Easter Monday about 1,600 men, under the direction of the I.R.B., launched an 
insurrection in Dublin city against British rule in Ireland.  Irish Volunteer leader Eoin 
MacNeill’s last minute attempt to stop the armed rebellion through his countermanding 
order, published in the Irish Independent newspaper, led to chaos and confusion, 
resulting in fewer rebels participating in the capital, and very few skirmishes in the West 
and South of the country. The insurgents quickly seized strategic locations across Dublin 
much to the bemusement of the local population, and in the early afternoon, upon the 
steps of the General Post Office, Padraig Pearse read a proclamation declaring Ireland an 
independent republic. 
 The Chief Secretary was at a Cabinet meeting in London when Commander-in 
Chief of Home Forces, Field Marshall Lord French informed them of the rising in 
Dublin.  Birrell was startled by the news and wondered whether or not the insurrection 
was a response to the failed Casement landing, or if it had already been contemplated in 
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conjunction with the arrival of weapons from Germany.
69 
After answering several 
questions about the crisis in the House of Commons, Birrell set sail for Dublin early on 
Thursday. On his motorcar trip to the Viceregal Lodge through streets under British 
control, he saw evidence of the destruction of a city he had grown to love. On April 26 
martial law was imposed in Dublin, and the next day Major-General Sir John Maxwell 
arrived in Ireland as the new Commander-in-Chief of British forces in the country.  On 
April 28, Birrell reached Dublin Castle, where he met with Nathan, Attorney-General 
Campbell and Solicitor General James O’Connor, who all agreed it would be unwise to 
extend martial law to the rest of Ireland, for fear of stoking further unrest.
70
 
 The insurrection destroyed much of central Dublin, and the sight of the 
devastation left Birrell disconsolate. He told Asquith the violence had “shattered” him, 
and that it most likely would swallow up all the good that was to come from the Liberal 
government’s Irish legislation.71 Fortuitously for the rebels, only four hundred British 
troops were stationed in Dublin on the morning of the Rising. They hoped their actions 
would evoke a wave of public support but this did not materialize. Over the course of 
Easter week the revolutionaries were crushed by the better equipped and trained British 
reinforcements sent to Dublin from Liverpool. In all, 485 people were killed during the 
insurrection, including a large number of civilians, and the number of wounded 
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exceeded 2,600. On April 30, Birrell wrote to Asquith to tell him the rebellion was 
almost at an end [Pearse signed an order for general unconditional surrender at 3:45pm 
that day], and that he expected the surrender of the rebels by Tuesday at the latest. He 
told his premier that what occurred in Dublin was not an Irish rebellion because the 
rebels did not represent nor did they have the support of the people of Ireland. He hoped 
the British response to the violence would not cause the violence to transform into a real 
rebellion. Ireland, Birrell knew from his time spent studying its history, had a long 
tradition of worshiping its martyred dead. Knowing his time was surely up as Chief 
Secretary in Ireland, Birrell told Asquith no-one could ever effectively govern Ireland 
from England, save for in a state of siege. He admonished those “loyalists” whom, he 
was sure, welcomed the violence for their own personal political gain. Birrell believed 
there were some Irish Unionists who wished for a return to their glory days of a 
Protestant Ascendency in Ireland, but he sincerely hoped something good could arise 
from the despair of it all.
72 
 On May 2, aboard a small destroyer, Birrell set off from Dublin’s docks to the 
Welsh port of Holyhead, as he made his way back to London to tender his resignation. 
Not an enthusiast of ships and stormy seas, this was his final departure from an island he 
had grown to love.  When he reached London, Birrell first went to visit with the Prime 
Minister at 10 Downing Street, whom he found to be deeply distressed by what had 
transpired in Dublin. Upon accepting the Chief Secretary’s resignation, Asquith 
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proceeded to the nearest window where he quietly wept while jingling some coins in his 
pocket.
73
 The following day Birrell announced his resignation to the House of 
Commons. He spoke of his regret that he made an untrue estimate of the Sinn Fein 
movement, and that he did not seek to disarm the disloyal elements in Irish society. In 
his defense, however, he asked the House to consider the consequences of such an action 
in the delicate political atmosphere. He pleaded for clemency for the “dupes” who were 
led astray by the rebel leaders, so that the tragedy would not be revered in Irish 
nationalist memory as a genuine rebellion with a long list of heroic martyrs.  
Shortly after Birrell’s speech John Redmond rose to pay tribute to the outgoing 
Chief Secretary. He said he held the same viewpoint as Birrell that the possibility of a 
concerted outbreak of violence on such a scale was remote, and therefore wished to 
share the blame which lay upon the Chief Secretary’s shoulders. In a tribute to his friend, 
Redmond said: 
 
“The right hon. Gentleman leaves Ireland under melancholy circumstances, but 
he has some consolations. During his term of office he has conferred some great 
and imperishable benefits upon Ireland. His name will always be honourably 
associated in the minds of all classes of the Irish people with the creation of the 
National University, and with all that he has done for the educational interests of 
the country, and I can assure him that he takes with him into his retirement—and 
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it will be a consolation to him in the melancholy circumstances—the respect, the 
good-will, and, to use the phrase of the Prime Minister, the affection of large 
masses of the Irish people.” 
 
Carson, on the other hand, had nothing positive to say about Birrell’s administration of 
Ireland, saying they had always been in direct conflict with each other, although he did 
express regret that his time as head of Dublin Castle ended under such unfortunate 
circumstances.
74 
 
The editors of the Irish Freeman’s Journal newspaper, the paper of choice for 
Irish Party supporters, said Birrell’s failure was the common failure of every Englishman 
who attempted to rule Ireland from Dublin Castle. They spoke of his remarkable 
achievements with land reforms and in higher education. The fruits of Birrell’s successes 
would be garnered by future generations long after the fallout from the insurrection had 
been repaired. Good men and peace loving citizens, they were sure, would always 
remember the good he brought to the country as Chief Secretary.
75
 On the other hand, 
for people like Viscount Midleton of the Irish Unionist Alliance, Birrell was primarily to 
blame for the Easter Rising: 
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“If Birrell had been a German spy, which he is not, he could not have done more 
against this country.”76 
 
The Church of Ireland’s John Baptist Crozier, who was the Archbishop of Armagh and 
Primate of All Ireland was just as scathing, and said the Rising was an inevitable 
insurrection that everyone knew was coming except for the “professional humourist” 
Mr. Birrell.
77 
A Royal Commission of Inquiry was established under Charles, Baron Hardinge 
of Penhurst, a former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office and Viceroy of 
India, to investigate the causes of the Rising. He was assisted by two other judges: Sir 
Montague Shearman and Sir Mackenzie Chalmers. The Commission began its work on 
May 18, and over the next nine days, in both London and Dublin, heard evidence from 
key political and military figures in Ireland including Augustine Birrell and Sir Neville 
Chamberlain, the Inspector General of the Royal Irish Constabulary. On the 
Commission’s second day Birrell was called and examined. When asked for the reasons 
for Sinn Fein’s persistence and support over the past decade, Birrell pointed to British 
failures in Ireland from when the Act of Union took effect in January 1801. He 
suggested that if Catholic Emancipation had been passed in congruence with the Act of 
Union, if meaningful land reforms had taken place much sooner, if the Protestant Church 
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of Ireland had been disestablished “a little bit more,” and if the question of higher 
education had been addressed sooner then perhaps a movement such as Sinn Fein might 
never have arisen. Due to the meaningful reforms from both the Liberal and 
Conservatives governments over the past twenty years the Sinn Fein organization was, 
he claimed, largely restricted, but the controversy surrounding the Home Rule Bill 
allowed it to grow. Birrell suggested the Gaelic literary revival of the late 19
th
 century 
evoked a latent desire for a separate Irish national existence, but he felt certain this 
would never translate into open rebellion. The suspension of Home Rule, and popular 
rumors that the Act would never be enforced even after the war was over benefited Sinn 
Fein. The inclusion of Carson, a man despised by many Irishmen outside of Ulster, in 
the Coalition government, made matters worse for the defenders of constitutional 
Nationalism. 
Later in his testimony he focused on his role as Chief Secretary. He said that 
from the moment he took up the position in 1907 he believed it was his duty to spend 
most of his time in London because parliament had a bad habit of neglecting Ireland if 
the Chief Secretary was not sitting in on Cabinet legislative discussions. He stated that 
this did not hinder his administration of Ireland because he always remained in constant 
contact with Dublin Castle through his private wire at the Irish Office in London. Birrell 
defended his decision not to forcibly disarm the Irish Volunteers because: 
 
“You would have had to attack these people and disarm them, and whether that 
was done north, south, east or west, it would have resulted in bloodshed.” 
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The administration’s policy of non-intervention applied equally to Ulster and the rest of 
the country. It would have been unfair and unwise, he argued, to single out a particular 
group for disarmament. Furthermore, despite his reservations, Birrell said he came to 
accept Irish Party leader’s John Redmond insistence that the Sinn Feiners were an 
insignificant bunch incapable of causing much harm.
78
 
 Writing to Nathan the following day, Birrell condemned the Commission for its 
bias against him. He expressed surprise that he was not to be called to the stand again for 
further questioning, but he was not terribly disappointed because the enquiry was a 
“meagre jejune performance.” A Royal Commission such as this could only begin to 
scratch the surface of the problems in Ireland. He was particularly incensed that those 
witnesses who spoke ill of his administration were not cross-examined, and was 
convinced their biased reporting of events was bound to appear in the final report. 
Birrell’s letter to Nathan, who had resigned his position as Under-Secretary on May 3, 
was one of sadness, anger and regret. He expressed his disappointment in his own 
shortcomings, found it infuriating both Redmond and Dillon declined to speak before the 
Commission where they could have defended his character, and was saddened to see the 
Irish press so full of negativity.
79
 
 The report of the Hardinge Commission was published on June 26, 1916. It 
stated that because of the war parliament had been in almost continuous session for the 
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past two and a half years, meaning Chief Secretary Birrell could only remain in Ireland 
for short periods of time. To keep up to date on Ireland’s state of affairs he relied mainly 
on reports from Under-Secretary Nathan and from Irish M.P.s in parliament, upon which 
he based many of his decisions. It also found the Royal Irish Constabulary and Dublin 
Metropolitan Police ill-equipped to deal with political crimes, while the non-
enforcement of the Unlawful Drilling Act of 1819 meant drilling and military exercises 
went unchecked by the government. The report was full of criticisms of the 
administrative and intelligence systems in Ireland and claimed that lawlessness was 
allowed to grow unchecked by its leadership. Ireland, it concluded, was administered: 
 
“on the principle that it was safer and more expedient to leave law in abeyance if 
collision with any faction of the Irish people could thereby be avoided”80 
 
The report was a harsh indictment of Birrell, which concluded that he, as the 
administrative head of government in Ireland, was primarily responsible for the chain of 
events leading up to the Rising.
81
 To escape the fallout from the report and to avoid 
reading harsh epilogues of his Chief Secretaryship in the press, Birrell retreated to his 
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cottage in Norfolk, where he busied himself writing a biography of his father-in-law 
Frederick Locker-Lampson.
82 
 On March 6, 1918, Birrell’s long-time friend John Redmond succumbed to heart 
failure after battling through several months of illness. Saddened by his death he wrote a 
moving tribute to the Irish leader in The Times newspaper. Birrell said Redmond could 
always be trusted more implicitly than almost any other politician he knew because he 
was always a man of his word. The Irish Party leader, Birrell eulogized, “was 
constitutionally incapable of giving anybody away who had trusted him.”83 In December 
1918, Birrell decided not to contest his parliamentary seat of North Bristol, because he 
was well and truly done with politics. Instead he focused on his favorite hobbies of 
reading and writing. In 1929 Birrell accepted an honorary doctorate from the National 
University of Ireland, but a stormy Irish Sea prevented him from crossing over to receive 
his degree, so he accepted it in abstentia. That same year, he wrote a letter to Andrew 
Magill, his former private secretary at Dublin Castle, with whom he had maintained a 
close friendship in his twilight years. Birrell said he often dreamed of Ireland and its 
beautiful scenery, but never of Dublin Castle or the Viceregal Lodge.
84
 He said he was 
proud of his achievements in Ireland, and his only regret was that he should have 
resigned in 1914 when war erupted on the continent. By that stage he felt he had done all 
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he could for Ireland through his education and land purchase reforms, and he was proud 
to help secure the passage of the Home Rule Bill through parliament.
85
 History 
associates Augustine Birrell with all that went wrong in Ireland during the Great War, 
but he spent nine years as Chief Secretary and for most of that time he delivered 
remarkable improvements for the Irish people. 
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CHAPTER VII 
A BRIEF CONCLUSION 
Between the enforcement of the Act of Union in1801 and Augustine Birrell’s 
appointment in 1907 Irish Chief Secretaries had spent on average slightly less than two 
years in the job. The administration of Ireland was undoubtedly a challenging and 
thankless task for those willing to accept the responsibility of governing a remarkably 
polarized country from Dublin Castle. The French Revolution of 1789 inspired the 
growth of nationalist movements all across Europe including in Ireland. Throughout the 
19
th
 century Ireland periodically experienced outbursts of coordinated violence from
those seeking self-governance. When Birrell became Chief Secretary in 1907 the Irish 
Party under the leadership of John Redmond, seeking to resurrect the case for a third 
Home Rule Bill for Ireland, proposed legislation that had been the undoing of the Liberal 
Party on two previous occasions. 
Birrell’s formative political years were much influenced by his party leader 
William Gladstone, who was a passionate champion of the necessity for Irish Home 
Rule. Furthermore, although he had no personal knowledge of Ireland before he crossed 
the Irish Sea in January 1907, Birrell, being a literary man, knew much of its rich 
political history.
1
 His friendly political interaction with Redmond and Dillon throughout
1906, while he formulated an Education Bill for England and Wales, undoubtedly 
1 Birrell, Some Reflections on Ireland, MS 8 6 (1), Liverpool University Archives. 
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inclined him to remain close to them when he first reached Dublin Castle in an 
unfamiliar country. 
 Birrell’s time as Irish Chief Secretary left a mixed bag of successes and failures, 
but it is incorrect, as many have done in the past, to condemn his efforts to better govern 
Ireland, or simply to treat his long administration as a mere prelude to the bloody Easter 
Rising of 1916. His close interaction with the leaders of Irish Nationalism resulted in 
remarkable achievements in land reform and education. His Land Act of 1909 was a 
landmark piece of legislation that addressed most of the peasantry’s grievances, and 
effectively ended agrarian unrest across the country. The Chief Secretary’s amendments 
to Wyndham’s 1903 Land Act truly benefitted Irish farmers because: 
 
“By early 1913 about 250,000 holdings comprising eight million acres of land 
had been sold. Of these, only about one-third of the transactions had taken place 
under the provisions prior to the 1903 act. By March 1919 the Congested 
Districts Board had resold some 23,000 holdings (of some 585,000 acres) in its 
area of operation, and together with the Land Commissioners and Estates 
Commissioners had sold 285,000 holdings totaling 9.3 million acres. This 
amounted to about half of the agricultural land in Ireland.”2 
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Birrell successfully managed to hasten the demise of landlordism, a contentious problem 
that had been a source of major political and economic tension throughout the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, and by doing so brought about a fairer distribution of 
economic wealth. Redmond lauded Birrell’s Irish University Act of 1908 as a 
groundbreaking reform measure, which allowed Ireland’s Roman Catholic population to 
seek higher education without fear of religious persecution. Even Irish revolutionary 
Padraig Pearse, the leader of the famous 1916 insurrection praised the “honest 
Englishman” for his efforts.3 The establishment of the National University of Ireland and 
Queen’s University of Belfast solved sectarian problems in higher education, and young 
scholars today from all communities continue to enjoy the opportunities afforded to 
them with the establishment of these well-respected institutions. 
 This study has attempted to examine the depth and consequences of the 
relationship between Birrell and the leaders of the Irish Party. Nowhere was this more 
evident than during the dramas of the Budget Crisis 1909-1911 and the Home Rule 
Crisis 1912-1914. The Chief Secretary understood the importance of the Liberal-Irish 
Party alliance after the 1910 General Elections, and believed his trustworthy Irish partner 
Redmond’s assessment of Ulster Unionism to be sufficient for him to base his policies. 
Birrell acted virtually as Redmond’s voice during Cabinet discussions on the Third 
Home Rule Bill, believed Redmond when he told him the Ulster Unionist movement 
was mostly bluster, accepted his assurance that to disarm the Ulster Volunteer Force was 
a risk not worth taking, and honored the Irish Party leader’s request to not disturb the 
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voices of sedition during the Great War so as to not weaken the constitutional nationalist 
movement. 
 As a member of the British Cabinet, and as the Home Rule debate intensified in 
the early 1910s Irish Chief Secretary Birrell found himself increasingly spending his 
time in London, where he believed he could be most useful in representing the interests 
of the Irish Party. Most unfortunately, his wife’s prolonged suffering with a fatal brain 
tumor, and the outbreak of the Great War meant he was rarely in Dublin during the 
second half of his administration. He gauged the gravity of political problems in Ireland 
often on the opinions of Irish M.P.s with whom he conversed at Westminster, oftentimes 
leaving himself vulnerable to biased opinions and misinformation. His absence from 
Ireland unfortunately kept him out of touch with the pulse of Ulster Unionism. In fact, 
even on his occasional trips to Ireland during his last four years in charge he rarely 
visited Ulster. One Ulster Unionist newspaper sneered that Birrell could probably only 
recognize by face a half dozen Ulstermen.
4
  
 Renowned Irish Party M.P. Stephen Gwynn, who represented Galway City from 
1906-1918, once admitted to Lady Aberdeen that he and his fellow party members liked 
Mr. Birrell “more than is natural for Irish members to like a Chief Secretary.”5 Historian 
Denis Gwynn, the son of the aforementioned Stephen Gwynn, best summed up the 
relationship between Birrell and Redmond: 
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“A real affection grew on both sides from their constant dealings with each other; 
and there can be few precedents for the extraordinary frankness with which 
Birrell kept Redmond informed of everything that concerned his Party. No 
politician in history has ever been less capable of deceit than Mr. Birrell.”6 
  
The close political connection between these two men influenced the Chief Secretary’s 
political decision-making throughout his nine years in office, and this ultimately led to 
his undoing. His relationship with Redmond and the Irish Party meant he lost sight of his 
true obligation as a British Liberal Party cabinet member responsible for the fair and 
effective governance of Ireland. Such was his mindset that the leaders of Irish and 
British Unionism can hardly be blamed for their mistrust of him. 
 Scholarly studies of Irish history in the years leading up to the Easter Rising of 
1916 have too often neglected the role of Augustine Birrell in helping to shape those 
events. He can no longer be simply regarded as the man who sat idly by while separatist 
movements flourished in the country. Birrell’s legacy can best be remembered through 
the words of his good friend Sir Henry Robinson: 
 
“He was an ideal chief, and if legislative work was the criterion of a Chief 
Secretary’s success his services would rank higher than those of any Chief 
Secretary except perhaps Gerald Balfour….But a Chief Secretary’s reputation 
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will always be founded to a large extent on the relative prosperity and 
peacefulness of the country upon his appointment and his retirement, and judged 
by this standard Birrell stands condemned, as he found the country prosperous 
and peaceful and left it in a state of armed rebellion.”7 
 
Birrell’s economic and social reforms were crucially important to the future of Ireland, 
and his political persuasion and alliance with the leaders of Irish Nationalism indirectly 
set the country on a course towards the establishment of an Irish Free State in 1922.
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